















The Dissertation Committee for Roy Samuel Doron Certifies that this is the 
approved version of the following dissertation: 
 
 
Forging a Nation while losing a Country: Igbo Nationalism, Ethnicity 















Forging a Nation while losing a Country: Igbo Nationalism, Ethnicity 








Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 




Forging a Nation while losing a Country: Igbo Nationalism, Ethnicity 
and Propaganda in the Nigerian Civil War 1968-1970 
 
Roy Samuel Doron, PhD 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2011 
 
Supervisor:  Toyin Falola 
 
This project looks at the ways the Biafran Government maintained their war machine in 
spite of the hopeless situation that emerged in the summer of 1968. Ojukwu’s 
government looked certain to topple at the beginning of the summer of 1968, yet Biafra 
held on and did not capitulate until nearly two years later, on 15 January 1970. The 
Ojukwu regime found itself in a serious predicament; how to maintain support for a war 
that was increasingly costly to the Igbo people, both in military terms and in the 
menacing face of the starvation of the civilian population. Further, the Biafran 
government had to not only mobilize a global public opinion campaign against the 
“genocidal” campaign waged against them, but also convince the world that the only 
option for Igbo survival was an independent Biafra. Thus it is not enough to look at the 
international aspects of the war, or to consider the war on a strictly domestic level. By 
looking at both the internal and external factors that shaped the Biafran propaganda 
machine and the Biafran war effort and how these efforts influenced international support 
and galvanized internal resolve to continue fighting, we can see how the Biafran war 
effort was able to last for twenty months after the fall of Port Harcourt. Recent scholarly 
 v 
and political work, uncovered documents, and the new plethora of memoirs on the Civil 
War provide us with a veritable treasure trove of data and analysis with which to study 
the issue of Igbo nationalism and a unique opportunity to create a new vision of 
secessionist conflict in Africa. This work will thus provide a step in moving away from 
the long accepted “Tribalism” paradigm that has so long pervaded not only the study of 
post-colonial Civil Wars in Africa, but more importantly, the discourse in looking at 
ethnicity, violence and national identity across the continent. Further, by analyzing the 
ways that the Biafran propaganda machine operated on a nationalist level, we can see the 
effects of Biafran secession on the broader Igbo national consciousness and the Igbo 
national movement, as well as on subsequent political movements in Nigeria.    
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On 30 May 1967, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu declared the Eastern 
Region of Nigeria the independent Republic of Biafra. The culmination of the Nigerian 
political crisis that began on 15 January 1966, Biafran secession ushered in a war that 
lasted 30 months and cost the lives of millions, due mainly to starvation.
1
 The plight of 
the starving millions in Biafra rivaled some of other major events of the late 60s, such as 
the Vietnam War, the Arab-Israeli Six Day War and the Soviet Invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. Yet the study of the Biafran War has largely been relegated to obscurity 
outside Nigeria. Perhaps it is because the war did not change the African political 
landscape or create long lasting shockwaves that it has been largely forgotten. However, 
the war is important because, and not in spite of, these aspects. Why did a war that caused 
such great controversy, both in Nigeria and around the world fade from the collective 
memory around the world, and be relegated to a taboo subject at home? The fact that 
                                                 
1 Though the numbers have been disputed and have varied from less than half a million 
to as high as five million, the accepted figure has recently been that about one million 
died as a result of the war and ensuing starvation. However, because of the nature of 
Nigeria’s political conflicts in the early years after independence, a clear census was 
never established and the real casualty figure will probably never be known. During 
the war, the Red Cross estimated that anywhere between 2,000 – 10,000 people were 
dying every day from starvation in Biafra. Karen Ekpenyong of the Inventory of 
Conflict & Environment (ICE) at the American University estimates that 2,000,000 
civilians died in Biafra due to starvation. Karen Ekpenyong, "The Biafran War," ICE 
Case Studies (1997), http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/biafra.htm. 
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many books were published around the world in the immediate postwar years and quickly 
faded into oblivion until very recently is very telling. 
Biafra’s plight became a cause célèbre due in major part to the successful 
penetration of Biafran propaganda into the world consciousness.2 Biafran propaganda, 
both at home and abroad, proved extremely effective in creating a groundswell of support 
for the secessionist enclave. All over the world, people protested the war, Nigeria’s 
perceived genocide against the Igbo and British support of the Lagos government.3 
Despite widespread public support of the starving masses in Biafra, the war continued for 
approximately thirty months and cost at least one million lives. 
                                                 
2 When referring to propaganda, I use the term to mean the public dissemination of 
information from a government source aimed at influencing behavior. During World 
War II, the German government ran an effective propaganda campaign against the 
Jews and other peoples. The Nazi campaign as orchestrated by Josef Goebbels and the 
Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda gave the word a negative and 
sinister connotation. However, my use of the term is not to imply any association with 
the Nazi regime, and the only connection I make in this work between the Biafran 
propaganda and Nazi propaganda is the fact that the Biafrans attempted to make an 
overt connection between the Nigerian campaign against them and the Nazi Holocaust 
against the Jews.  
3 Today the spelling of Igbo is more popular and it is the spelling I choose to use. 
However, when quoting source material I remain faithful to the source spelling and 
use the previous spelling of Ibo where it is used. Both spellings refer to the Igbo ethnic 
group that seceded from the Federal Republic to create the short lived Republic of 
Biafra. 
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This dissertation looks at this most polarizing issue of the war: that of Biafran 
propaganda and the accusation of genocide against the Biafran people. Even before the 
war began, the Igbo suffered a series of massacres, largely at the hands of Northerners 
who saw the series of coups as an ethnic power struggle between the north and south of 
the country. These massacres galvanized the Igbo into a siege mentality and spurned 
Ojukwu into reacting to the crisis that ended on 27 May 1967 with the declaration of the 
Eastern Region of Nigeria as the Republic of Biafra. However, the Biafrans framed the 
conflict not as an ethnic struggle, but as a religious one. Though the Muslim northerners 
massacred the Igbo, they only did so because the Igbo were the only major Christian 
group living in the North. The Igbo attempted to convince the Ijaw, Ibibio and other 
southern ethnic groups that the massacres in the North were not aimed at the Igbo, but 
that the massacres were only the beginning of a campaign of religious extermination 
against all the Christians of Southern Nigeria.  
Biafran propaganda took a decisive shift in the spring of 1968 after the city of 
Port Harcourt was captured by Nigerian troops. Port Harcourt was the last major entrepôt 
for Biafra and the last major city outside of the Igbo heartland to fall to the Nigerian 
Army.4 When the Biafrans lost the city, their propaganda effectively shift from one that 
focused on national, multiethnic unity to a narrative whereby Biafran was Igbo and Igbo 
was Biafran.  
                                                 
4 Port Harcourt was a predominantly Igbo city but its location in the heart of Ijaw 
territory gave the Biafrans control over a significant non Igbo population.  
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The archival work for the Nigerian Civil War presents unique challenges due to 
the problems of Biafra’s military defeats. The political issues surrounding the immediate 
aftermath of the war in Nigeria further compounded these problems due in no small part 
to Nigeria’s “no victor, no vanquished” policy. When Biafra surrendered in January 
1970, Ojukwu had already fled, taking with him an untold number of documents with 
him, presumably Biafran government documents.5 Furthermore, Biafra had been under 
siege for nearly three years for nearly three years before its capitulation and the capital 
was forced to relocate three times during the war.6 These forced relocations no doubt 
contributed to the loss of Biafran documents. The simple lack of paper in Biafra during 
the war also contributed to the paucity of Biafran documents in the archives. In many 
instances, government documents were recycled and the reverse was used to print new 
documents, rendering the old ones useless as order was rarely kept. Also, toward the end 
of the war, documents were printed on school notebook paper when no other paper was 
available. No doubt, many documents must have been lost due to shortage of other types 
of paper for other uses.  
                                                 
5 Interview with Col. Benjamin Okafor, who claims to have been the pilot that flew 
Ojukwu out of Biafra in January 1970. Draper states that the pilot who commanded the 
place Ojukwu left on was an American named Hank Coates. Draper states there was a 
Biafran copilot, who he names simply as Osakwe; however Draper often minimized 
the role of Biafrans in the air campaigns, focusing instead on foreign pilots.  
6 Most Biafran documents continued to identify as published in Enugu, though  Enugu 
fell to the Nigerian military very early during the war and was never recaptured, even 
temporarily, by the Biafrans.  
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Both Biafran and Nigerian government documents are conspicuous in their 
absence from the Nigerian archives. The lack of meticulous record keeping proves 
difficult for the historian, as foreign archives become even more instrumental in 
understanding the war, in an even more fundamental way than just ascertaining the 
attitudes of foreign governments. The Israeli National Archives in Jerusalem proved 
especially useful in understanding the war from the summer of 1968.7 The Israeli 
embassy in Lagos proved especially diligent in following the war and sent almost daily 
dispatches to Israel documenting the progress of the war with minimal commentary and 
analysis. The Lyndon Johnson Archives in Austin contain extensive correspondence 
between administration officials regarding the war and provide a great deal of insight into 
the international policies, not only of the Johnson administration, but of the various 
international actors like the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) and various church organizations and individuals, with special 
                                                 
7 The Israeli files from January 1967 – July 1968 are still classified, despite several 
attempts to gain access to them. My first attempt was in the summer of 2004, when I 
was told that the files were still not released due to the fact that the archives did not 
have enough declassifiers on staff and thus could submit my request for 
declassification. By the time I left Israel at the end of the summer, I could still not 
access the files. I made a second attempt in 2007, but the archives were under 
renovation and the Nigeria files were in storage at a remote location and would be 
unavailable for 18 months. I tried again in 2009 to see the files, sending my brother. 
He was told that the files were still classified and could not pursue the matter further.    
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emphasis on Count Carl Gustav Von Rosen, the Swedish pilot who almost 
singlehandedly resurrected the Biafran Air Force in 1969. 
Though the use of foreign archival sources to shed light on the internal workings 
of any African country, and especially in Nigeria during the Civil War proves 
problematic, but the lack of available Nigerian and Biafran primary sources makes the 
reliance on foreign sources unavoidable, if regrettable.    
Secondary sources suffer from a similar problem as primary sources. Though the 
Civil War was a defining moment in Nigeria’s political formation, the military regime 
suppressed meaningful research on the war as part of Gowon’s “no victors, no 
vanquished” policy. The engagement with the issues of the civil war thus focused on 
three levels. First, most Nigerian scholars were unanimous in their condemnation of the 
First Nigerian Republic that collapsed with the first coup on 15 January 1966. Though it 
remains difficult to concisely organize the origins of the civil war, three major themes 
that emerge on why the civil war broke out. First is the economic determinist argument. 
Oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1956. According to some scholars, Biafran secession 
came out of a desire to control the oil fields in the Niger Delta, rather than from the crisis 
of the Nigerian state and the crisis of 1966, which included the massacre of the Igbo in 
the North. By reducing the war to a conflict over resources, the magnitude of the crisis is 
easily overlooked and the Biafran crisis is reduced to a similar prism as Katanga.  
However, the Civil War was a traumatic experience, and the way forward was not 
at all clear. Early works emerged, especially from the Igbo side. One of the first accounts 
of the war and its political repercussions for the future was Raph Uwechuwe, Reflections 
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on the Nigerian Civil War: Facing the Future.8 In his account, Uwechuwe does not 
divulge much into the machinations of the war, for these were not important to him. 
Originally written in 1969 and subtitled A Call for Realism, Uwechuwe’s account is 
about the genesis of failure of the Nigerian state.  For Uwechuwe, the cause of the war 
led on both the corruption of the Nigerian state and the colonial basis on which it was 
founded. 
This failure of the Nigerian state, especially the first Republic would become the 
center point of the early criticism into the causes of the war. Ben Gbulie, one of the 
(in)famous five (Igbo) majors of the first Nigerian coup, wrote his account of events in 
1981. For Gbulie, there were two reasons to undertake this coup.  First and foremost was 
the corruption inherent in the Nigerian government.  He says, “The politicians and public 
officers had indeed let the nation down […] many a public servant had fraudulently 
enriched himself with the 10% takings in kickbacks from contractors.  Embezzlement, 
too, was on the increase.”9 However, for Gbulie, the number one cause of political 
instability in Nigeria was the ever present specter of tribalism. It was the colonial legacy 
of a multiethnic Nigeria, combined with the inherent and rampant corruption in the 
political system that made action unavoidable, necessary and in the best interests of 
Nigeria. 
                                                 
8 Raph Uwechuwe, Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War: Facing the Future (Paris: 
Jeune Afrique, 1971). 
9 Ben Gbulie, Nigeria's Five Majors: Coup D'etat of 15th January 1966, First inside 
Account (Onitsha: Africana Educational Publishers, 1981). 
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Another of the five majors, Adewale Ademoyega, wrote his account in the same 
year as Gbulie. Similarly, he states that 
  
People have been disillusioned and disaffected with the 
Balewa government and the rulership of the clique of the 
NNA. Corruption was rife and nepotism was the order of 
the day.  The safety belts of the nation were reposed in such 
institutions as the courts the Census commission and the 
electoral commission, the police and finally the Armed 
Forces.  But the sanctity of those institutions as being 
politically assailed assaulted in direct in the mud so that 
they were fast losing their credibility.10 
 
For Ademoyega as well, something had to be done in order to save the country 
from the ruin that corruption, tribalism and the legacy of colonial rule sought to impose. 
In his book, Ademoyega places his actions within the context of the political turmoil in 
Nigeria since independence.  For Ademoyega, the coup was not an attempt to split the 
country asunder, but rather an attempt by radical offices in the Nigerian army to save 
Nigeria from the chaos of the corrupt and decadent civilian leadership.  Though all the 
officers involved in the first coup were Igbo, they were also well trained at Sandhurst 
military Academy in Britain, and were also all radical Marxists. 
Ademoyega places the failure of his January coup at the center of the unraveling 
of the first Republic. The events that caused Ironsi to come to power, the subsequent 
counter coup and the horrors that led to Ojukwu’s secession in May 1967 came not as a 
                                                 
10 Adewale Ademoyega, Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup (Lagos: 
Evans Brothers, 1981). 
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result of Ademoyedga’s coup in January 1966, but rather as a result of the failure of his 
attempt to seize power. While Ademoyega does not feel any ill feelings toward the 
demise of the First Republic; in his view, the events that followed would have been 
avoided had his coup not failed and ushered in an ethnic power vacuum that was to prove 
so bloody. 
The amount of ink spilled over the problems of the first republic is almost without 
end. Obasanjo, Alexander Madiebo and most every other author that wrote any words 
about the causes of the Civil War in some way chastised the first Republic’s corruption, 
tribalism and infighting as a destabilizing element that made some kind of military 
intervention, if not unavoidable, then at least precariously looming.11 One dissenting 
voice in the almost universal condemnation of the First Republic came from A. M. 
Mainasara, a Northern Historian from Kano. Mainasara acknowledged the problems of 
corruption inherent in the First Republic, put points to spirit of compromise that the 
regional leaders attempted to forge in creating a united country. With all the problems of 
the government, it was still the legitimate government, and in general run by men with 
good intentions, and as such was preferable to any military junta.12 
                                                 
11 Alexander A. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War   nugu  
 ourth  imension  ublishing,        Olu  gun  basanj , My Command: An Account 
of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 (London: Heinemann, 1981). 
12 A. M. Mainasara, The Five Majors: Why They Struck (Zaria: Hudahuda Publishing 
Company, 1982). 
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Wole Soyinka, one of the great dissidents in Nigeria spent most of the war in 
prison. In 1972, he published his prison diaries where his disdain for Nigeria as a political 
entity becomes apparent. For Soyinka it is not this government or that government that 
caused Nigeria’s problems, but the fact that Nigeria exists as an independent nation state 
when it was created solely as a colonial entity. Nigeria was formed by British decree in 
1914 in order to minimize the cost of administering West Africa. For Soyinka, then, the 
problem lay in the colonization of the mind of the post-independence Nigerians who 
stuck to the colonial state. Thus Soyinka replies to the federal wartime slogan “to keep 
Nigeria One is a Task that must be done” by simply asking “why?”13 
Thus, much of the scholarship focused on the Civil War as an instrument of 
Nigeria’s unity and the reincorporation of the Igbo into Nigerian society.  or example, in 
The Economics of the Nigerian Civil War and Its Prospects for National Development, 
Rueben Ogbudinkpa charts a very safe path of the economics of the Civil War, without 
really touching any contentious issue relating to the economics of the war. Absent in this 
work is any discussion regarding oil, the politics of economic siege that caused untold 
deaths in Biafra. Instead, Ogbudinkpa discusses the innovation of Biafran rocket makers 
and chemical engineers. Though he does talk about the centers for nutrition science that 
evolved during the conflict as a response to the severe shortage in food, this work shows 
a timid literature that cannot engage the real questions and create a meaningful dialog, 
                                                 
13 Wole Soyinka, The Man Died: Prison Notes of Wole Soyinka (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1972). 
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because the fear of opening the dialog outweighed the potential benefits of allowing for a 
clear and open discussion.
 14
 
Third, the foundational literature on the war was never written. Despite several 
memoirs, such as Obasanjo, Madiebo and Adedmoyega, who wrote firsthand accounts, 
the scholars who wrote on the war, refrained from engaging the war in a meaningful way.  
The First Republic does not find many friends among those who witnessed its 
collapse. Indeed, many writers viewed the regional system of the early independence as 
untenable. Chief among those writers was Olusegun Obasanjo. Obasanjo’s seminal 
memoir, My Command,
15
 an account of his time in command of the 3
rd
 Marine 
Commando division that is credited with winning the war for the Federal Government, 
contains a scathing condemnation of the First Republic, which he saw as corrupt, inept 
and prone to regionalism. Though he never condoned any action to overthrow it, he did 
realize that, if nothing else, the republic needed a major reworking.  
Obasanjo’s memoirs are in the minority of the literature on the war, as by far, the 
vast majority of memoirs, especially in recent years have been written by those who 
fought on, or lived in the Biafran side of the conflict. This is hardly surprising 
considering the plight of the Igbo people was a major cause célèbre during the war. 
Moreover, most of the war was fought; with the exception of what Philip Efiong called 
                                                 
14 Reuben N. Ogbudinkpa, The Economics of the Nigerian Civil War and Its Prospects 
for National Development (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1985). 
15  basanj , My Command. 
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the “flash in the pan”
16
 that was the Biafran Midwest offensive, squarely in Biafra with 
its civilian population. 
One of the most prolific authors in Nigeria, Ken Saro-Wiwa, wrote a venomously 
scathing memoir called On a Darkling Plain: Account of the Nigerian Civil War in which 
he attacks the Biafran project as an Igbo land grab to control the resources of the 
“minority peoples” in the  elta. In Saro-Wiwa’s view it was better to support a united 
Nigeria and the internal conflicts of a multi ethnic nation state than allow the Biafran 
regime to succeed and create a state with one major ethnic group that could potentially 
impose its will on the minority peoples.
 17
 
Others who supported Nigeria during the war fell afoul of the Biafran experiment, 
especially during the ill-fated Midwest offensive and the short lived Republic of Benin. 
18
Samuel Umweni was the head engineer in charge of the Nigerian Broadcasting 
Corporation’s office in Benin City.  uring the Midwest offensive, when Colonel Victor 
Banjo declared the Midwest region the independent Republic of Benin, he remained loyal 
to the Federal Government and was thus imprisoned in Biafra where he was held until the 
                                                 
16 Philip Efiong, Nigeria and Biafra: My Story (Princeton, Abuja, Owerri, Loeji: 
Sunghai Books, 2003). 
17 Ken Saro-Wiwa, On a Darkling Plain: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War 
(Epsom: Saros, 1989). 
18 Not to be confused with modern day Benin that was then called Dahomey.  
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end of the war. His memoir, 888 Days in Biafra
19
, is one of the only accounts of the 
personal experiences of a man who suffered from the oppressed becoming the oppressor. 
Victor Banjo did not write any memoirs, because, like millions of others, he did 
not survive the war. Banjo was executed for allegedly plotting to overthrow Ojukwu in 
September 1967, shortly after his ill-fated expedition to the Midwest and Lagos that was 
stopped at Ore. Banjo was the highest ranking Yoruba that fought on the Biafran side and 
largely due to his sudden fall from grace and demise became a very controversial figure, 
both during the war and after it. Using his papers, official Biafran documents (that are not 
in the public domain) and her own personal connection with Banjo, F. Adetowun 
Ogunsheye, Banjo’s sister, wrote A Break in the Silence
20
 in 2001 to help clear her 
brother’s name and redeem his reputation. One of the major points of contention in 
Banjo’s legacy during the Midwest offensive was the question as to whose idea it was to 
attempt an advance to Lagos. Ojukwu and official Biafran sources called Banjo a rogue 
that attempted to subvert the Biafran experiment into a personal crusade to “liberate” the 
Yoruba. However, Ogunsheye contends that everything that Banjo attempted with regard 
to the Midwest offensive was done with the support and under the direction of Ojukwu. 
Though Ogunsheye’s chapter on Biafra is titled “the Biafran  ebacle”, like her brother, 
                                                 
19 Samuel E. Umweni, 888 Days in Biafra (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse Inc., 2007). 
20 F. Adetowun Ogunsheye, A Break in the Silence: Lt. Col. Adebukunola Banjo 
(Ibadan: Spectrum, 2001). 
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she has always been a firm supporter of a re-imagining of Nigeria and moving away from 
the “imposed Lugard negotiated federation”
21
 
As the dead cannot speak, the living make them heard. This cannot be truer than 
the account of one of the most colorful military men in Nigeria’s early history, Major 
Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu. Two very different storied of his life were penned by his 
brother and his friend Obasanjo. Nzeogwu was one of the leaders of the January coup and 
performed his duties as the coup’s mouthpiece and subsequently joined Ojukwu in Biafra 
where he was killed at Obolo Offor near Nsukka in the early days of the war. 
 eter Nzeogwu, the Major’s younger brother, wrote his memoirs of his elder 
brother in what proves to be one of the more heartfelt of memoirs on the war.
22
 Charting 
the life of his elder brother, Nzeogwu both looks at the Major’s life, political evolution 
and at himself and his own adoration of a brother who was a hero, not just to him as an 
elder, but also to many who saw in the Major a path of action that reflected heir own 
hopes for Nigeria and the quick disillusionment with the corrupt regional political 
situation that emerged so soon after independence. 
In another story, simply titled Nzeogwu,
 23
 Obasanjo attempts a work that 
showcases both the intimate friendship between the two men and the puzzlement that 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 105 
22 Okeleke Peter Nzeogwu, Major C.K. Nzeogwu: Fighting the Elusive Nigerian Enemy 
from Childhood to Death (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd. , 2003). 
23 Olu  gun  basanj , Nzeogwu: An Intimate Portrait of Major Chukwuma Kaduna 
Nzeogwu (Ibadan: Spectrum, 2004). 
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Obasanjo felt after learning that his good friend was one of the masterminds of the 
January coup. In his work, Obasanjo attempts to illustrate the friendship between the men 
with their mutual appointments in England, Congo and even back to Kaduna. For 
Obasanjo lasted even through Nzeogwu’s incarceration and subsequent defection to 
Biafra. Indeed, Obasanjo was one of the few people to attend Nzeogwu’s funeral in 
Kaduna. Both authors paint a picture of a soldier who did his best to uphold his 
conscience in a time of upheaval and to try to be the best soldier and man that he could be 
in such uncertain times. No doubt, if the war had ended differently, Nzeogwu most likely 
would be remembered another way.  
Since the Civil War was indeed a war, a large proportion of memoirs have been 
written by military men. Both high ranking officers in the military, almost exclusively on 
the Biafran side, with the notable exception of Obasanjo, wrote about their experiences 
and how the affected the war, for good or ill. Philip Efiong was second in command of 
the fledgling Biafran nation and took over as president after Ojukwu fled to Abidjan. In 
his memoirs
24
, Efiong charts out his path from secession to capitulation in an understated 
tone. Here was not a man who went to secession and war with enthusiasm, but a sober 
man who saw the tide turning against his people and did what he thought best. He states 
at the beginning of his book that “I have no regrets whatsoever of my involvement in 
Biafra or the role I played. The war deprived me of my property, dignity, my name. Yet, I 
saved so many souls on both sides and by this, I mean Biafra and Nigeria” and was 
                                                 
24 Efiong, Nigeria and Biafra: My Story. 
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indeed credited, along with Obasanjo, with ensuring that Biafran surrender did not turn 
into a bloodbath.  
 or stories of bloodbaths, one needs not look further than Joe “Hannibal” 
Achuzia’s book Requiem Biafra.
25
 Achuzia claimed to have graduated from Sandhurst 
and then joined the Biafran army after secession. However, no record exists of him ever 
attending the prestigious military academy. What is well documented, however, is the 
fact that Achuzia was given command of some of the civilian militia groups and was sent 
to defend Onitsha and then  ort Harcourt. Achuzia’s work is peppered with self-
aggrandizement and he even gloats about an episode where shot a Biafran soldier in cold 
blood in order to preserve his reputation and maintain discipline during the defense of 
 ort Harcourt. Achuzia’s book places him at the center of all aspects of Biafran military 
and is more a testament to the man’s ego than to his military prowess. The most 
important aspect of his book is the testimony it serves to the disorganized nature of much 
of the military structure in Biafra that such a monster could not only be a part of it, but 
that such a beast could take arbitrary control over entire regiments that should not have 
been under his disposal. 
As mentioned above, one of the more publicized aspects of the war was Biafran 
science. Colonel E. O. Aghanya served in the Biafran army as the head of Research and 
Production (RAP) and towards the end of the war as one of the main leaders of the 
                                                 
25 Joe O. G. Achuzia, Requiem Biafra: The True Story of Nigeria's Civil War (Asaba: 
Steel Equip Nigeria Ltd., 1993). 
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Biafran Organization of Freedom fighters (BOFF). In his book, Behind the Screen
26
, 
Aghanya reveals the structure of the Biafran development program and how different 
weapons were developed, tested and constructed in very dire conditions and with very 
limited resources. It was this scrounging methodology that left Aghanya well placed to 
lead BOFF, the irregular resistance to the Federal forces that was created toward the very 
end of the war. By supplying the civilian population with food, as well as sabotaging the 
Nigerian supply lines, BOFF hoped to continue the war indefinitely while enjoying 
support from the locals who would remain loyal to Biafra even after the end. However, 
when Ojukwu left for the Ivory Coast Biafra, ceased to exist in less than a week and 
BOFF was no longer needed. 
Others served Biafra in capacities other than military, but had just as much and 
sometimes more, effect on the imagining of the breakaway region. I. Dike Ogu was one 
of the scriptwriters for the Propaganda Directorate and wrote the radio broadcasts and 
press releases that would haunt the Nigerian government and help turn world opinion 
squarely in Biafra’s favor. In his memoir, titled The Long Shadows of Biafra
27
  Dike 
recollects his time and activities as well as a terror of being a civilian in the war. Dike 
continues long after the war and tells his story of the successive military regimes, the 
terror of the Abacha years and his views on the condition of the African continent and 
what he calls “the triumph of Imperialist diplomacy”. 
                                                 
26 E. O. Aghanya, Behind the Screen (Owerri: Springfield Publishers Ltd., 2004). 
27 I. Dike Ogu, The Long Shadows of Biafra (Nsukka: AP Express Publishers, 2001). 
 18 
In 1985, the Federal Government opened a museum commemorating the Nigerian 
Civil War in Umuahia. To commemorate the occasion, the National War Museum held a 
conference titled “Nigerian Warfare through the Ages”.  Though the seminar 
encompassed warfare in Nigeria from pre-colonial and colonial times, there were three 
essays on the Nigerian Civil War. 
The opening of the War Museum in Umuahia is important for several reasons. 
First and foremost it was the first attempt by the Nigerian Government to engage the 
events of Biafran secession and begin a national dialog. However, the constraints that 
were placed on this dialog served only to water down the debate and focus on peripheral 
issues. Looking at this seminar is of utmost importance because it was the first academic 
conference that incorporated the Civil War and enjoyed official sanction by the Federal 
Government. 
The essays on the Nigerian Civil War presented in the conference show the 
official stance on the war. The official stance can be summed up on several levels. First, 
there was to be no engagement in the controversial issues of the war, or even in the war 
itself. The war was to be swept under the carpet. In fact, the chronology of the war 
presented in this conference in an essay entitled “The Nigerian Civil War – Causes and 
Courses” by Major General Ibrahim Haruna, is a black hole. It reads as follows 
 
Mar 1967 …  astern Region’s consultative 
Assembly voted to secede from Nigeria 
 
 19 
May  7th 1967 … Gowon proclaimed State of 
Emergency, unveiled plan for creation of twelve 
state federation to become effective April 1st 1968. 
 
 May  9th 1967 … Lieutenant-Colonel 
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military 
Governor of Eastern Region, proclaimed 
establishment of independent state of Biafra.  
 
July 1967 … Civil War in Nigeria, Biafra resistance 
collapsed following capture of Owerri by federal 
[sic] 
Jan. 197  … Troops Jan 6th, unconditional cease-
fire called by Biafran Government on Jan 12th. 28 
 
In short, though the Nigerian Civil War lasted for 30 months and cost untold loss 
of life, those 30 months are practically nonexistent in the official history.  
Another troubling aspect of the way the war was portrayed at this conference is 
how the myth of a war between brothers was perpetuated. The underlying theme of the 
treatment of the Civil War in this conference was to discuss it only inasmuch as it 
pertained to the unity of Nigeria. By not engaging the problematic aspects of the war, 
including its causes, and the suffering of the Igbo, it was hoped that sleeping dogs would 
continue to lie. 
In the rest of the world, scholars made attempts to come to grips with the war in 
Nigeria, but these attempts centered on both situating the war in the global cold war 
alignments and in the framework of postcolonial studies. Both of these attempts 
                                                 
28 Ibrahim Haruna, "The Nigerian Civil War – Causes and Courses" (paper presented at 
the Nigerian Warfare through the Ages Conference, Umuahia, Nigeria, 1985), 162-63. 
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ultimately proved problematic, because the war in Biafra could not easily confine itself to 
a cold war analysis or to the issues of post-colonial nationalist reconstruction. This war 
could not be seen as another case of cold war/post-colonial resource conflict. To 
pigeonhole Biafran secession in such an oversimplified way was to negate the political 
processes that led to the coup, countercoup and massacres on 1966, as well as thirty 
bloody months of civil war. 
As mentioned above, one of the most difficult aspects of studying the Nigerian 
Civil War, and of studying post-colonial Africa in general is the state of the archives. One 
of the first objectives of historians in Africa has been to preserve the archival material. 
H.M. Kirk Greene was instrumental in preserving many of the primary documents from 
the civil war, many of which would have been lost without his contribution. His two 
volumes of Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria remain one of the most important repositories 
for primary documents about the war.
 29
 Similarly, his essay in African affairs
30
 with CC 
Wrigley begins to make sense of the reasons behind the explosion of news coverage 
about Nigeria during the war. Indeed, the Biafran side of the war employed MarkPress, a 
Swiss public relations firm, which handled almost their entire publicity and news 
campaigns abroad with stunning success. Zdenek Cervenka similarly approaches this 
cataloging of news stories in his work, The Nigerian War, 1967-1970: History of the 
                                                 
29 A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, 2 
vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
30 A. H. M. Kirk-Greene and C.C. Wrigley, "Biafra in Print," African Affairs 69, no. 
275 (1970). 
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War; Selected Bibliography and Documents. Cervenka’s work is discussed more in-depth 
in a later section. 
31
 
Media outlets, diplomats, celebrity and academia helped to galvanize public 
opinion and create a huge public interest in the war, especially the humanitarian crisis. 
Many works came out of the media itself, including several of the earliest journalistic 
accounts of the war. Most important among these are two works, one written during the 
war and the other right after Biafra’s surrender.  rederick  orsyth wrote his book The 
Biafra Story with one stated purpose: to galvanize support in Britain and around the 
world for the Biafran people.
32
 His work was a call to arms for the world to wake up and 
see the genocidal war that destroying the Igbo people. A close friend of Ojukwu’s 
Forsyth also penned a biography of the Biafran leader called Emeka.
33
 
Perhaps the most read book about the Nigerian Civil War remains John de St. 
Jorre’s The Brothers’ War.
34
  De St Jorre was a correspondent for the Observer covering 
the war and made several journeys to Biafra. A combination of first hand reportage, 
historical background and political commentary, de St. Jorre’s writing and his 
                                                 
31 Zdenek Cervenka, The Nigerian War, 1967-1970. History of the War; Selected 
Bibliography and Documents (Frankfurt: Bernard & Graefe, 1971). 
32 Frederick Forsyth, The Biafra Story: The Making of an African Legend (London: Pen 
and Sword, 1968). 
33 Frederick Forsyth, Emeka (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1982). 
34 John De St. Jorre, The Brothers' War: Biafra and Nigeria (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1972). Note: This book was also published in the UK under the title The Nigerian 
Civil War but they are the same book.  
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knowledge, journalistic sense and political acumen (honed for several years in the British 
Foreign Service) make this book one of the most essential books for any scholar or 
layman wishing for an introduction to the study of the war. 
The 1960s were a very interesting time all around the world, and some scholars 
have attempted to place the war within the context of the times, with varying degrees of 
success. This was not another Katanga with a strong post-colonial influence, nor could it 
be classified as a cold war conflict since the Americans were largely absent, and the 
Russians and British both supported the Federal side with the French supporting the 
Biafrans, along with the  ortuguese, South Africans and Ian Smith’s Rhodesia. 
Nonetheless, several scholars place the war within the global system, and several 
interesting comparative works emerged.  
Two of the more interesting works deal with placing the war within the global 
awareness. One departure from the established historiography of the war as humanitarian 
crisis deals with the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.  S.  . Orobator’s essay 
The Nigerian Civil War and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia
35
 contends that the Soviet 
invasion was in part prompted by Alexander  ubček’s anti soviet stances including 
publicly supporting Biafra in defiance of the USSR’s support for the  ederal 
Government. Indeed, the Czechoslovak government stopped delivering arms to Lagos in 
April of 1968, despite the fact that the Czechoslovakia was one of the major arms 
manufacturers of the Warsaw  act.  ubček’s courage in defying his Soviet masters was 
                                                 
35 S. E. Orobator, "The Nigerian Civil War and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia," 
African Affairs 82, no. 327 (1983). 
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not limited to the Biafran cause and Biafra was not the sole reason that the Soviet bloc 
invaded Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968. Biafra was, however, a very public, 
global defiance to the official line that Moscow sought to tow and caused much 
embarrassment to the Russian propaganda machine in the rest of the Soviet satellite 
states. 
A second work, by Wayne Nafzinger and William Richter, compares the war in 
Biafra to the war in East Pakistan, which would successfully secede and become 
Bangladesh.
36
  By looking at the long term legacies of colonialism, nationalism, religion, 
and the economy, Nafzinger and Richter seek to determine why Bangladesh was able to 
secede and Biafra failed so spectacularly. Through analyzing mainly the economic 
development of both Nigeria and Pakistan, the authors conclude that Biafra was too 
integral a part of Nigeria, especially for future economic development to allow for 
secession, while in Pakistan, the development of the east would have depleted the 
Karachi government and its business allies from enough resources that letting go of the 
territory was not as painful for future prospects than the Nigerians’ potential loss of the 
entire eastern region. The deciding factor, for Nafzinger and Richter was that the 
potential oil revenue was too much of a central aspect of any economic planning in 
Nigeria to allow for any compromise in the integrity of the nation. 
The military history of the war has been one of the most neglected aspects of the 
conflict until recently. With the exception of the plethora of recent memoirs on the 
                                                 
36 E. Wayne Nafzinger and William L. Richter, "Biafra and Bangladesh: The Political 
Economy of Secessionist Conflict," Journal of Peace Studies 13, no. 2 (1976). 
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subject, written mainly by the chief actors in government and the high echelons of 
military command only two works stand out as focusing on the military conduct of the 
war, with very inconsistent results.  irst, Zdenek Cervenka’s account of the war
37
, 
released very shortly after the end of the war, remains until today the most 
comprehensive account of the chronology of the conflict and the best bibliography of 
primary source documents from around the world during the war.  
More recently, a book commissioned by the Nigerian Military and written by H.B 
Momohwas published in 2000 with a view at creating a true military history of the war. 
By looking at the impressive 800 page tome, it would appear that Momoh succeeded. 
However, opening the book shows that a mere paltry 200 pages is devoted to the war, and 
much of that is a recap of the events leading to the war. The remaining 600 pages are 
devoted to interviews with almost every officer of rank that served during the war and 




The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War is not only the title of one the 
most influential works on the Civil War, but also one of the most studied aspects of the 
war. The civil war proves itself time and again an interesting subject of study for several 
reasons.  irst and foremost, the war occupied the world’s attention, especially after the 
                                                 
37 Cervenka, The Nigerian War, 1967-1970. History of the War; Selected Bibliography 
and Documents. 
38 H.B. Momoh, The Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970: History and Reminiscences 
(Ibadan: Sam Bookman Publishers, 2000). 
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collapse of the Biafran Midwest offensive and Ojukwu’s introduction of a massive 
propaganda scheme. This propaganda offensive blasted images of the war and, more 
poignantly, of the humanitarian crisis into homes all over the world. The images of 
starving Biafran babies mobilized the world to action.
39
 Scholarly interest also peaked 
during the war and in the immediate postwar years many scholars published works during 
the war and in the immediate postwar years. 
The politics of the civil war also prove to be a challenge to scholars of the war. 
The configuration of the power alignment challenges conventional wisdom of cold war 
and regional politics. The British found themselves on the same side as the Soviet Union, 
with both supporting the Federal side, the former despite the intense public pressure 
against supporting the perceived genocidal regime in Lagos. The French supported the 
Biafran side, though De Gaulle initially refused to get involved. After Pompidou gained 
the French Presidency in 1969, he provided more active support to Ojukwu, placing him 
on the same side of a rather motley crew which included Ian Smith and Julius Nyerere.  
The best work on the political aspect of the war remains John Stremlau’s 
excellent book, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War,
40
 published in 1977. 
Stremlau’s book is an excellent work of diplomatic and political history, and succeeds in 
                                                 
39 During my first year review at the University, when I mentioned that I was to write 
on Biafra, one of the committee members replied with “I remember Biafra. I donated 
money to someone.” 
40 John Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). 
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analyzing the political machinations and international intrigue surrounding the war. 
Stremlau’s work dissects the complex alliances both within Africa and around the world. 
Stremlau analyses how the different countries, sectors, and international organizations 
maneuvered in the war. 
Though the Organization for African Unity was determined to maintain the 
colonial boundaries, primarily to avoid endless civil wars, this was the first time they had 
been put to the test, and the strain highlighted the tensions between nationhood and the 
Pan-africanist ideal.
41
 The Nigerian Civil War was the first internal secessionist conflict 
since the creation of the organization, and the war dominated the organization’s agenda, 
with many attempts to bring draft a strong resolution and two failed peace conferences in 
Addis Ababa and Kampala. Yet several of the leading members in the OAU broke rank 
and openly supported Ojukwu’s separatist republic, with Nyerere joined by Kenneth 
Kaunda (Zambia), Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Ivory Coast) and Omar Bongo (Gabon) all 
recognizing Biafra and establishing diplomatic relations with the nascent republic. 
                                                 
41 Several works cite the tension between the end of colonialism and the tensions in 
independent Africa. Most especially P. Olisanwuche Esedebe, Pan-Africanism: The 
Idea and Movement, 1776-1991 (Washington DC: Howard Univeristy Press, 1994). 
The end of colonialism challenged the ideals of Pan Africanism when the nation state 
and the new political realities emerged that challenged the notion of blackness as a 
way of confirming identity. 
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devoted a chapter to the organization’s involvement in civil conflicts. The Nigerian Civil 
war serves as the benchmark for it was the first civil secessionist conflict in Africa after 
the OAU was created, and it nearly tore the organization apart when several of the major 
leaders of African Unity, such as Nyerere, Kaunda and Houphouët-Boigny broke ranks 
with the organization’s one Nigeria policy and recognized Biafra.  
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The first chapter of this work looks at the causes of the Nigerian Civil War. The 
British Colonial government under Lord Lugard created Nigeria in 1914 with the 
amalgamation of the mainly Muslim Northern and predominantly Christian Southern 
Nigeria into one administrative unit. By utilizing the British model of maximum rule at 
minimum cost, Lugard created a governmental system that carried over into 
Independence whereby regional, ethnic and religious tensions became paramount in 
establishing leadership and governance in the country. When Nigeria gained its 
independence on 1 October 1960, many of the instabilities that colonial rule mitigated 
came to the forefront. Among the tensions, control of the military and the civil service 
became one of the major battlegrounds between Northern and southern Nigeria. 
Southern Nigeria, especially the East, had a long relationship with Europeans, 
even before the imposition of colonial rule. The Igbo especially embraced many aspects 
of European culture, including Roman Catholicism, and the missionary education that 
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came with it. As a result, when the British imposed colonial rule on Nigeria in the late 
19th century, the Igbo were best equipped to act as collaborators and fill key 
administrative positions, a trend that continued through to independence. When Nigeria 
became independent in 1960, many in the North feared that the Southerners in general 
and the Igbo specifically would come to dominate all political, economic and social life 
in the new Republic. Northerners agitated for a quota system whereby civil service 
appointments and military commissions would be allocated to each ethnic group to 
preserve a regional balance of power in the country. Southerners feared that by basing 
civil service and military appointments on quotas rather than merit, the integrity of the 
state would be compromised. These tensions eventually erupted in a series of crises and 
culminated on 15 January 1966, when a group of predominantly Igbo colonels overthrew 
the Nigerian republic. Though their rebellion failed, the military Chief of Staff, Major 
General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, himself an Igbo, took command of the government, only 
to be overthrown in a bloody coup on 29 July of the same year by a group of Northern 
Officers lead by Colonel Murtala Mohammed. 
In the wake of the second coup, major massacres occurred against the Igbo in 
most parts of the country. Ojukwu, who Ironsi appointed as the governor of the Eastern 
Region issued a call for the Igbo and all other easterners to flee their homes and return to 
the relative safety of the Eastern Region.  The new Federal Government, led by a 
Northern Christian, Yakubu “Jack” Gowon, attempted to mitigate the regional conflicts 
that were so endemic to the Nigerian State by instituting a Federal structure of twelve 
states based largely on ethnic boundaries. However, Ojukwu rejected this solution and, 
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after several attempts the reach a compromise failed, declared the Eastern Region the 
independent Republic of Biafra, causing the Nigerian Civil War. 
The second chapter looks at the first year of the Civil War, from the outbreak of 
hostilities to the capture of Port Harcourt by the Nigerian Military. Two major events 
have been called the turning points in the war. First, the Biafran Midwest Offensive, led 
by Colonel Victor Banjo, was a Biafran attempt to widen the war by striking at the 
Nigerian capital, Lagos; and by attempting to lure the Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria to 
join the conflict, and to create a North-South divide in the country. Despite its initial 
success, the Midwest Offensive stalled and was eventually repulsed at the Battle of Ore, 
only 200km from Lagos. During the offensive, Banjo declared the Midwest Region the 
Republic of Benin, but the ill-fated Republic latest only a few months and did not survive 
the Nigerian counter offensive that drove Banjo back across the Niger. 
The Midwest offensive changed the attitude of both Nigerians and Biafrans. For 
the Biafrans, the rapid success of the offensive created an aura of invincibility around 
Ojukwu and the sudden collapse of the offensive quickly shattered that myth and created 
a siege mentality. For Nigeria, the offensive signaled an end to limited engagement in the 
conflict, and spurred Gowon to declare the war an all-out war, and not a “police action” 
as he initially framed it. Through a series of offensives, the Nigerians regained control of 
most of the country apart from the Igbo heartland, which remained under Biafran control. 
The chapter concludes with the capture of Port Harcourt by Nigerian Forces under the 
command of Benjamin Adekunle. The capture of Port Harcourt symbolized the end of the 
viability of the Biafran state and many expected the war to end in the ensuing peace talks 
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in Kampala. However, the Biafrans refused to surrender and the war continued for 
another twenty months before Biafra finally capitulated. 
Chapter three discusses the various methods that the Biafran Directorate of 
Propaganda used to maintain the war effort and the support of the civilian population 
during the war. Looking at the few extant documents, as well as publications such as The 
Leopard, the Biafran Armed Forces bulletin, this chapter shows the adaptability of 
Biafran propaganda to changing conditions that hampered the dissemination of 
propaganda. Further, the chapter illustrates how the Biafrans employed effective 
strategies borrowed from the corporate marketing world implemented those strategies to 
maintain both military morale and the support of the civilian population. 
Similarly, the fourth chapter looks at how Biafrans disseminated their message 
abroad. By employing both direct appeals to the Western world and using modern 
marketing tactics, most notable the use of Swiss public relations firm Markpress, the 
Biafrans successfully garnered public support that led to an intense public pressure 
campaign against the British Government to stop supporting Nigeria. Though the public 
pressure did not end British support for Nigeria, it was effective in that the British took 
special notice of the protests all around Europe and North America and formulated a 
strategy that attempted not only to bring about an end to the war, but also to overtly paint 
the efforts as in the best interests of both Nigerians and the Igbo in Biafra. 
Chapters Three and  our make the case that despite Biafra’s foundation as a multi 
ethnic expression of disgust with the corruption and brutality of the Nigerian government 
no longer willing or able to protect its citizens, the fact that by May 1968, Biafra was 
 31 
almost exclusively an Igbo enclave surrounded by Nigerian Federal forces. The fact that 
for the last twenty months of the war very few Biafrans were not Igbo, the propaganda 
switched from one that emphasized national unity in Biafra to one that focused on 
Biafran survival in the face of genocide.  
Chapter Five places Biafran propaganda at the center of the political and military 
situation in Biafra and examines the political effect of the propaganda campaign, both at 
home and abroad. More specifically, the chapter looks at various aspects of the political 
and military situation and how the response to the propaganda campaign effected changes 
in the way various actors (governments, NGOs, and empowered individuals) responded 
to the changes.  
These responses affected the outcome of events, such as the peace conferences in 
Kampala and Addis Ababa, which in turn created a new situation that Biafran propaganda 
responded to; creating new opportunities to either prolong or end the war. Biafran 
propaganda thus acted as an integral and important supporting element of the Biafran war 
effort and played an important part both strategically and tactically in the outcome of the 




Chapter I  
The Origins of the Nigerian Civil War 
On 1 January 1808, British legislation came into effect abolishing the 
Transatlantic Slave trade. The abolition of the transatlantic slave trade was brought about 
by a coalition of antislavery activists, church officials and trading interests. Thus began a 
coalition between Christian moral activism and economic interests that would eventually 
lead to the colonization of most of Africa. Initially, explorers such as Mungo Park and 
Stanley and Livingstone went into the African interior to pave the way for the three Cs: 
Commerce, Christianity and the Crown. For them, capitalism and trade was an essential 
part of spreading the Christian faith and the “civilizing mission” could only be done when 
these areas were under the control of the crown.   
The coastal region of Nigeria, especially the Bights of Benin and Biafra were 
traditional centers for the transatlantic slave trade. The British government encouraged 
trade in a legitimate commodity, palm oil, in effort to help end of the trade in human 
chattel. Palm oil was essential for Britain during the industrial revolution for two reasons. 
First, it was one of the key ingredients in the manufacture of soap.1 Second, palm oil 
(along with peanut oil) was one of the chief lubricants for industrial machinery.  
Onwuka Dike, in Trade and Politics on the Niger Delta, illustrates the difficult 
situation with which the British traders had to contend. The early history of the oil trade 
in the Niger Delta, called the Oil rivers, was that of English trade with coastal middlemen 
                                                 
1 It was essential for creating a good lather 
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who owned large trading “families” along the coast and who had exclusive access to the 
interior palm producing regions. The largest of these families were at Bonny and Brass. 
At first, the trade patterns followed those of the slave trade, except now the Europeans 
were trading in oil and other products, and not in people. The same middlemen in Bonny 
and Brass now traded with the British Merchants, only rather than slaves, these 
middlemen now traded in palm oil. In 1806, palm oil exports from the Niger Delta region 
amounted to 150 tons. By 1839, exports stood at 13,000 tons.2 
British policy was to maintain an informal presence where they could, and 
formally occupied a territory only when they had no alternative. To this effect, they 
turned to a man named George Taubman Goldie. Goldie was actively seeking a charter 
company to control the territory around the Niger River, for according to Dike, the only 
way to control the trade on the Niger was through political control of the Niger3. 
Pressures from France and Germany forced Britain to consolidate their situation in the 
Niger.4 Goldie was the natural choice, because he had already begun to consolidate the 
                                                 
2  Kenneth Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta; an Interoduction to the 
Economic and Poltical History of Nigeria (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956).and John 
Flint, Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press, 
1960), 11.  The Niger Delta region was called the Oil Rivers because the course of the 
Niger river had not been charted yet and the Europeans did not know that the Oil rivers 
were the tributaries of the Niger.   
3   Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 75. 
4   Most troublesome for the British was Bismarck’s insistence on “effective occupation” 
where a European power could only lay claim to a territory be effectively occupying it. 
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four trading firms under his own, and together they amalgamated into the United Africa 
Company, or UAC, in 1882. 
British administration in Nigeria would follow the same path as in other parts of 
the empire. Indirect rule and a divide and conquer strategy superimposed on a British 
judicial and legislative system that would guarantee British trade interests were put in 
place. Initially the territory was split into two administrative units. The predominantly 
Muslim territories of the Hausa states and Borno–Kanem were amalgamated to create 
Northern Nigeria. The very heterogeneous territories in the south were united to form 
Southern Nigeria. The creation of the Nigerian administration cannot be understated here, 
because as we will see after independence, the administrative units would remain largely 
intact and much of the instability of the newly formed Federal Republic of Nigeria can be 
traced directly to this colonial legacy. 
Perhaps the most significant development of the colonial administration came in 
1914, when the erstwhile governor, Lord Lugard, united the two halves of Nigeria and set 
the capital at Lagos. As Major Abubakar A. Atofarati stated, “This, in effect, produced 
two Nigerias [within one political entity], each with different social, political, economic 
and cultural backgrounds and developments.”5  During World War II, Nigeria was 
divided into the regions that would last until independence. 
The colonial period also marked the culmination of the doctrine of legitimate 
trade and as a direct result, the extraction economy. The economic structure that took 
                                                 
5 Abubakar A. Atofarati, "The Nigerian Civil War: Causes, Strategies, and Lessons 
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hold in Nigeria has been well studied by many scholars, such as A.G. Hopkins, Dike, and 
Flint.6 It was this economic structure, which was based on the extraction of wealth 
without concern for the consequences on the broader population that would lead to the 
perception of corruption, incompetence and disregard that the political elites were seen to 
indulge during the First Republic. Indeed, Olusegun Obasanjo, in his memoir, My 
Command, states that corruption and excess, such as the importation of expensive scotch 
whiskey for top officers was one of the main financial problems in the early years of the 
war.7 
The British Imperial project served not only to transform the political and 
economic landscape of Nigeria, but also changed the ways in which the different ethnic 
groups viewed themselves and interacted with each other. Indeed, until the coming of 
European colonialism, the Igbo lacked a distinct sense of political and social identity. 
While the Hausa and the Yoruba had strong political entities, the Igbo were touted as a 
prime example of an acephalous society.  
After the Second World War, the British government made a decided effort to 
divest itself from its colonial empire. Ghana became the first African colony to attain 
independence, under Kwame Nkrumah, in 1957. 1960 became known as the year of 
                                                 
6 Antony G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1973); Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta; Flint, Sir George 
Goldie and the Making of Nigeria. 
7 Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War (Oxford, 
Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1980). 
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African Independence, when almost all the British colonies and most of the French 
possessions achieved independence. On October 1
st
 1960, the Union Jack was lowered 
for the last time, and the Green White Green of Nigeria was unfurled for the first time.  
Sentimentalism aside, Nigeria was full of structural flaws that would allow the 
deterioration of governmental control and eventually lead to violence, secession and civil 
war. Both the institutions that the British left and those they created would serve to create 
an unstable state, and one that would eventually come to the brink of falling apart. 
 
Figure 1:  Nigeria at Independence, 1960 8 
                                                 
8 Toyin Falola; unpublished map collection 
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First and foremost, the colonial administrative system remained largely intact, and 
the four region system that the British authorities had put in place remained, with some 
minor changes. The Lagos colony was absorbed into Western Nigeria, and in 1963, the 
Midwest region was created. Thus, in 1963, the map of Nigeria was split up into four 
large regions. These regions were, for the most part, homogeneous. Though there were 
large minorities in all of them, the North was dominated by the Hausa, the West by the 
Yoruba and the East by the Igbo. The Midwest was the most heterogeneous area and was 
a mix of Igbo, Yoruba, and Ijaw.9 
The makeup of the country lent itself to the development of regionalism, and 
indeed, by 1965, the army was thoroughly segregated along ethnic lines. This would 
prove disastrous after the first coup d’état in January 1966. The early structure of the 
Nigerian state has been cited by many scholars as a determining institutional factor in 
creating the chaos that would lead to Eastern secession.10 Though most scholars and 
firsthand accounts cite the structure of the country as a leading determinant in the civil 
war, and the regional structure was the locus of the power struggle within Nigeria that 
galvanized the many other factors that contributed to the deterioration of Nigeria and 
Biafran secession.   
                                                 
9   It is impossible in a paper of this scale to give more than a brief overview of the ethnic 
composition of Nigeria. 
10   These scholars include, but are not limited to, John De St Jorre, John Oyimbo, 
Zdenek Cervenka and others cited throughout this work. 
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Second, the British created a system of government that mirrored their own in 
place of the colonial administration. This parliamentary democracy would prove sorely 
inadequate to maintaining order and control within the country. Obasanjo cites the many 
riots, fixed elections, and institutional violence as endemic of the first six years of 
independence. Though he blames much of the violence on “rogues and miscreants”11 and 
mentions the help that Northerners afforded to fleeing Igbos in the wake of the July coup, 
such large scale fraud, graft and violence cannot be summed up as nothing but the work 
of rogues and miscreants, but rather of a system that allowed such a culture of thievery 
and recklessness to thrive.  
Nigerian foreign policy was known throughout the world to be balanced, 
pragmatic and, above all, professional. Nigeria initiated and hosted a Commonwealth 
summit on Ian Smith’s illegal declaration of the independence of Rhodesia, held in Lagos 
in mid-January of 1966, only days before the first coup struck. The domestic situation in 
the country deteriorated quickly after independence with internal divisions and ethnic 
suspicions regularly boiling over. Indeed, it was this outward appearance of “business as 
usual”, even up to, literally, the day before the first coup that served to lull many, both in 
Nigerian and abroad, into a false sense of complacency regarding the deep troubles that 
Nigeria was facing. 
                                                 
11   Obasanjo, My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War, 5-9. 
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Both Obasanjo and Philip Efiong12 along with many journalists like John de St. 
Jorre13 have offered riveting and differing accounts of the events the led up to the civil 
war, especially of the violent period of the January 1966 coup and July countercoup. 
However, the violence inherent in the Nigerian political system did not begin in 1966. 
Rather, it was born with the country in 1960.  
Violence in Nigeria went part and parcel with independence. John Oyimbo, in his 
book on the war, called the first period of democracy the “Conspiracy of Optimism”.14 
For Oyimbo, the initial optimism of independence created a sort of conspiracy where the 
flaws of the system of government were not acknowledged, and often ignored. According 
to Oyimbo “Neither the British nor the Nigerians fully realized how vital the British 
presence was to the operation of a system which contained gross imbalances, was rooted 
in an alien culture and the product of another nation’s history.”15 
                                                 
12   Philip Efiong, Nigeria and Biafra: My Story (Princeton, Abuja, Owerri, Lorji: Sungai 
Books, 2003). Gen. Efiong was second in command of the Biafran army during the 
Civil War and after Col. Ojukwu fled in January 1970, he became President of Biafra 
and signed the surrender papers. 
13   John de St. Jorre, The Brothers' War: Biafra and Nigeria (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1972). 
14   John Oyimbo, . London, Charles Knight and Co. Ltd. 1971 Nigeria: Crisis and 
Beyond (London: Charles Knight and Co. Ltd., 1971), 1-36. (this is the title of his 
chapter) 
15 Ibid., 9. 
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Throughout the 1960s, elections in Nigeria were rife with regionalism, violence, 
intimidation and fraud. Since the system of representation in the federal government was 
based on the different regions, even the census became a political issue. Thus, for 
example, in the 196  census, the Northern region’s population of   .5 million people was 
certified as 31 million.16 In short, Oyimbo saw the entire project of British democracy 
transplanted to Nigeria as artificial, and would not be able to hold in a country where 
regionalism, pomp and importance went hand in hand. Much like Obasanjo’s criticism of 
the military, Oyimbo’s critique of the Westminster system in Nigeria was that there was 
no precedent in Nigeria for a government where the pomp of government were to lie in 
with the president while real power would lie with the  rime Minister. “If one had a Rolls 
Royce, so must the other”17 
 
 
                                                 
16 Obasanjo, My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War, 10; Oyimbo, 
Nigeria: Crisis and Beyond, 23. 
17 Oyimbo, Nigeria: Crisis and Beyond, 28. 
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Figure 2: 1963 Map of Nigerian Regions.18  
On 15 January 1966, a group of majors, mainly Igbos from the east rose up and 
attempted to take over the federal government of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Though 
they succeeded in killing Balewa and many other heads of the Nigerian Government, 
including Sir Ahmadu Bello, the powerful premier of the north and, in a dramatic 
gunfight, Samuel Abiola, the Premier of the Western Region, within less than 2 hours 
Major General Ironsi began to organize a resistance to the coup. 
Many events of that night are still shrouded in mystery and innuendo, but by the 
next morning, the prime minister of the federal republic, along with the chiefs of the 
                                                 
18 Toyin Falola; unpublished private map collection. 
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eastern and northern regions were dead. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ironsi, 
himself an Igbo, was able to muster troops still loyal to the government and to end the 
coup and kill or capture the ringleaders. He then appointed himself provisional head of 
government and tried to regain order and stability. Two other important actors emerged 
during this coup. First, the head of communications under Ironsi was a man named 
Yakubu (Jack) Gowon, a northerner who was approached by the plotters and refused to 
join them and thus became a target himself. He escaped with the help of his Igbo 
girlfriend and came to Ironsi’s aid. The second was a young captain in the northern city 
of Kanu named Odumegwu Ojukwu. When news of the coup broke, he sealed off the city 
and was thus able to save it from the plotters. 
The January coup was a watershed event in the history of Nigeria. It was seen as 
an ethnic coup, led by the Igbo to gain control of the federal government. Though it was 
portrayed as such, the truth is more likely that the plotters, all officers who were educated 
in  ngland, most of them classmates at Sandhurst  the  nglish officer’s training 
academy), were reacting to the chaos and instability inherent in the government. Though 
they ultimately failed in their attempts at taking over the government, they did take down 
the structures of power and replaced them with a military government. However, all the 
senior military and civilian officials that were killed were either Westerners or 
Northerners, thus increasing the regional strife. 
Ironsi sought to solve the regional differences by creating a unified country and 
abolished the federal system, replacing it with a unitary government. This would prove to 
be his downfall, as this move was seen to strengthen the  astern hold on power. Ironsi’s 
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regime also had other weaknesses that served to increase the chaos and showcase his 
weakness. First and foremost, even though the coup leaders that survived the attempt 
were arrested, none of them were executed, an act that was unheard of for such a work of 
high treason. This act alone fueled the fire of regionalism. How could Ironsi, an Igbo, 
want to create a unitary state, abolish the regional system and say that he was working for 
all Nigerians when he would not punish the plotters who had massacred the Northern 
political elite with the only punishment that could be conceived for such a treasonous act? 
To many Northerners, it was obvious that Ironsi was part and parcel of the coup. 
The end of civilian government became a talking point across Nigeria, with many 
supporting the new military government, as The West African Pilot would state in an 
editorial 
The seed of tribalism watered in Nigeria in 1949 by Sir 
John Macpherson has grown to rend Nigeria into tribal 
entities. […] Macpherson played up tribalism among the 
politicians and thus disarmed the nationalist camp. […] The 
politicians of the first Republic preached Tribalism in order 
to preserve their influence. The new Regime is resolved to 
abolish, very ruthlessly if need be, the regionalism and 
unworkable constitution thrust upon us.19 
 
By June, the Northern region was in chaos. After a month of rioting, on 29 July 
1966, a counter coup was hatched, with the dual purpose of punishing the Igbo, and 
breaking up the federation. Indeed, according to Zdenek Cervenka, once the dust settled 
                                                 
19 West African Pilot 10 February 1966 
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and the coup failed (yet this coup also removed most of the Eastern leaders20) Gowon 
became Military Governor and in his speech to the nation affirmed that Nigeria would 
remain unified. However, Cervenka points out that Gowon’s speech was so haphazardly 
put together that it seems that he was initially going to announce the secession of the 
north, but only at the last moment was counseled into changing his mind.21 Indeed, the 
coup plotters used the codename Araba, which is Hausa for secession to name their plot 
against Ironsi.  
Soon after the July coup, Northerners began to take revenge on the Igbo. Igbo 
were slaughtered in the Northern provinces. According to most estimates, around 50,000 
Igbo were killed in the months following the July coup and millions returned to their 
ancestral homes in the Eastern Province. Col. Ojukwu expelled most northerners from the 
East. In the West, many Yoruba were expressing fear and hatred of Federal soldiers from 
the North who were called “an occupation force”. 
Gowon quickly reinstituted the regions and attempted to find a way to solve this 
constitutional crisis. However, buoyed by the July coup, many northerners began to exact 
revenge on the Igbos. In September and October, the Northern Government sat idly while 
soldiers, civilians and militia slaughtered the Igbo. One account of the killing is as 
follows: 
                                                 
20 Ironsi was declared missing, but he had been murdered. Official word of his death was 
kept secret until March of 1967.   
21 Zdenek Červenka, The Nigerian War, 1967-1970. History of the War; Selected 
Bibliography and Documents. (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1971), 33. 
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A sergeant ordered that all Easterners should raise up their 
hands… The Sergeant asked us whether we could 
remember what happened on January 15
th
 when the prime 
minister and the Premier of the North lost their lives and 
the Ibos were all very happy. We said “No, Sergeant”. 
Paying no heed to that he asked us to give our names and 
addresses and send any messages we have for our people 
because we were going to die… They drove us 5 miles 
away to the Katsina road, brought us down and started 
shooting us. I felt my leg shattered and I fell down… I 
managed to crawl into the bush.22 
 
It was clear that a crisis was reaching critical mass. By March 1967, one and a 
half million Igbo had left their homes all across Nigeria and returned to the east. Any 
military personnel who were not from the East were expelled from Eastern Nigeria. 
Colonel Ojukwu became governor of the East and began with preparations for secession. 
There would be a last ditch effort at maintaining unity. A meeting was held under 
the invitation of Kwame Nkrumah in the town of Aburi in Ghana on 5 January 1967. At 
the meeting, Gowon and Ojukwu expressed their resentment for each other and the two 
were not to meet again until 1983. At Aburi, the leaders of Nigeria issued a communiqué, 
restructuring the military and renouncing the use of force in solving the crisis. The Aburi 
accords would never be implemented, and a very different solution would end up 
manifesting itself. 
                                                 
22 de St. Jorre, The Brothers' War, 85. 
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The minutes of the Aburi meeting was made public immediately and provides 
insight as to the mood, the policies and foreshadows the events that led ultimately to 
Biafran secession. 
Gowon had plans to solve the crisis by dividing Nigeria into twelve states. The 
geography of these states would leave only the Igbo heartland under direct Igbo control. 
The oil rich Niger Delta would be stripped from the East, and more importantly, the food 
producing regions would no longer be under direct Igbo supervision. After the atrocities 
of 1966, the Igbo people, especially Ojukwu expressed their fears that the Federal 
Government under Gowon was attempting to starve the Igbo, both physically and 
economically. Ojukwu declared that if the twelve state plan would go into effect, he 
would have no choice but to secede from the Nigerian federation. 
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Figure 3: 1967 Map of Nigerian States23 
On 27 May 1967, Gowon created 12 states out of the existing four regions. On 30 
May, Governor Ojukwu declared the Eastern Region of Nigeria to be the Independent 
“Republic of Biafra”. After Ojukwu’s declaration of independence at the end of May, 
nothing happened. This period can best be characterized as the “ hony War”.24 There are 
                                                 
23 Toyin Falola, unpublished private collection 
24 I borrow the term “phony war” from the Second World War. The  hony War refers to 
the period between Hitler’s invasion of  oland in Sept. 1939 and the battle of  rance in 
June 1940. This period is called the phony war because though war was formally 
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several reasons why it took two months from Biafra’s declaration of independence until 
Gowon’s “police action” that signaled the beginning of the Civil War.  irst and foremost, 
the Nigerian military was in turmoil. After going through two major coups, massacres, 
and a severe “ethniciztaion”, the Nigerian Army could only muster 7,    troops. This 
number would rise to over 120,000 by the end of the war, but in mid-1967, The Federal 
Government was in little shape to fight a civil war. It was not even clear if this would be 
necessary.  
As for the Biafran side, though Ojukwu began stockpiling weapons as early as 
November of 1966, the Biafran military was in even worse shape, if it could be called a 
military at all. Further, the Biafran side had no real incentive in opening the fighting. 
Because the Biafrans were fighting an essentially defensive war, there was no need for 
them to attack the Federal Government. If Gowon was reluctant to unify Nigeria by force, 
it was hoped that secession would end up a peaceful, if acrimonious affair.    
Both coups had the added effect of decimating the commissioned ranks in the 
Nigerian Army. In fact, since independence, the Nigerian military was plagued by 
sectionalism, regionalism and incompetence that left the upper ranks either dead, in exile 
or otherwise ineffective. 
Even before the coups of 1966, the Nigerian military was heading toward 
impotence and sectarian strife. With Nigerian independence in 1960 came a plan for the 
Nigerianization of the armed forces and the civil service. Though there was no doubt that 
                                                                                                                                                 
declared, there was no fighting. In the Nigerian case, the term applies because although 
no hostilities had begun, all sides knew that it was only a matter of time.  
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the Nigerian Army should consist of no foreign officers, the system broke down into 
regional conflict from the very beginning. During the colonial period, the overwhelming 
number of Nigerians commissioned as officers were Igbo. This is not surprising because 
the British system was based on exams and was a western meritocracy. The Igbo were 
traditionally considered the most receptive to western influence and were thus best suited 
to pass exams. According to N.J. Miners, Igbo and Eastern officers in the Nigerian army 
reached 44% before regional quotas were introduced to reduce Igbo influence on the 
military and by proxy on the main executive tool of the Nigerian state.25 
At independence, only 14% of Nigerian officers were from the North. This 
situation created a severe imbalance when the mass expulsions of non-easterners from 
their military posts in the east occurred. Since most of the seasoned officers were 
Easterners, and many fought in Burma and elsewhere in the Second World War, it was 
clear that the Biafran Army had an advantage in seasoned, battle hardened officers 
capable of creating a much better trained military. 
However, at Independence only 22% of the officers in the Nigerian army were 
Nigerian.26 The first defense minister, Muhammadu Ribadu embarked on a massive 
Nigerianization of the armed forces, but under a quite regional scheme, with a clear view 
at checking Eastern power in the army. Although the official policy was to Nigerianize 
the military as quickly as possible, the higher ranks were kept British, because the clear 
candidates to man them were Easterners. Most glaring, when the British head of the 
                                                 
25 Norman Miners, The Nigerian Army, 1956-1966 (London: Methuen, 1971), 115. 
26 Ibid., 108. 
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army, Major General Foster was due to leave his post in March 1962, he was replaced 
with Major General Welby-Everard and not with a Nigerian, and most assumed would be 
the case. The two top Nigerians in the Army were Lt. Cols. Ironsi and Ademulegun. This 
glaring omission sparked the Nigerian Outlook to the following editorial:  
Are we to believe that if either Lt. Col. Ironsi or Lt. Col. 
Ademulegun was appointed to take over command of the 
Nigerian Forces that Northern Nigeria would one day be 
invaded by the South? Or could it be inferred that since one 
of the most important ministries – the Defense Ministry – is 
under the control of a Northerner and perhaps there is no 
Northerner yet qualified to command the Nigerian Forces, 
then the post of commander must continue to be occupied 
by expatriates?27 
 
On the flipside, when Ironsi was eventually appointed as commander of the army 
in 1965, the Nigerian Citizen, a Northern paper based in Zaria, published the following: 
Today I am weeping because the North has foregone all its 
advantages brought to it by its natural position – majority in 
population, expanse of land, and majority in parliament. 
The head of the police force goes to Eastern Nigeria, the 
Navy also goes East. Where is the Army now? Eastern 
Nigeria has captured it too.28 
 
                                                 
27 Nigerian Outlook, Feb. 23 1962 
28 Nigerian Citizen, Mar. 3 1965 
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Eastern Nigeria’s Governmental newspaper, the Nigerian Outlook, responded by 
saying “it is to be hoped that no-one gets the stupid idea that the Ibos are going to stay 
like a punching bag for any group of mischievous but cowardly clots.”29 
Tied closely to the turmoil at the high ranks in the Nigerian army was the chaos at 
the lower level of the ranks. At independence, only 22% of officers in Nigeria were 
Nigerian. The rest were British. When Ribadu decided on a swift Nigerianization of the 
military officers, he also stated that 50% of cadets must be from the North. In the British 
system, all cadets had to have passed some type of secondary schooling, and have been 
accredited with at least the British “O Level”. Since Western education never penetrated 
the North in as significant a way as the South, the effect was to create a system where 
poorly educated, ill-suited cadets were guaranteed entry to the officer ranks. 
The regional policy became a large issue in the elections of 1964, so much so that 
the United Progressive Grand Alliance issued the following policy statement “U GA will 
accelerate the training of Nigerian officers in the Armed  orces […] Recruitment and 
promotion of members of the Armed Services will be divorced from Tribalism and based 
strictly on merit and qualifications.”30 This was seen as an anti-northern statement, since 
the easiest way to measure “merit” was by academic and other certificates. Southerners 
possessed these credentials in far greater numbers than their northern counterparts. 
Thus, the military was in such turmoil that in May of 1967, it was doubtful how it 
could function as a military force. Most of the battle hardened Eastern officers were now 
                                                 
29 Nigerian Outlook, Mar. 4, 1965 
30 Miners, The Nigerian Army, 1956-1966, 140. 
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either dead or in Biafra, and the new officer core was poorly equipped to handle a 
prolonged conflict. Gowon also believed that a prolonged conflict would not be 
necessary. When hostilities erupted, they were framed as a 48 hour “police action” to 
round up the criminals who perpetrated secession. This police action lasted 30 months 




From the Beginnings of the War to the Capture of Port Harcourt 
 
Hostilities between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Biafran secessionists 
began on July 7
th
, nearly two months after Ojukwu’s declaration of independence. 
Initially, Gowon did not see Biafran secession as a major military threat. The Nigerian 
government sent a small contingent of troops to the north to capture Enugu, apprehend 
the conspirators and restore order. On 7 July, the Nigerian government announced that 
“rebel forces” had opened fire on several outposts in Benue – Plateau state and destroyed 
several bridges along the border. The press release continued and stated that Ojukwu 
“boasted to the whole world that he will wage total war against the people of Nigeria” 
and “the commander in chief of the armed forces has since issued orders for the Nigerian 
Army to penetrate into the East-Central state and capture Ojukwu and his gang”. The 
statement concluded with the phrase that would become one of the catchphrases of the 
war “To keep Nigeria one is a task that must be done.” 1 
The  ederal Government first framed the assault as a “ olice Action”. This was 
done for several reasons. First and foremost, Gowon was not willing to accept any 
compromises with these “rogues”. The military would enter from the North, take Nsukka 
and Enugu, capture Ojukwu, Efiong and whoever supported them, reunite Nigeria and 
finish this episode. Second, by framing the conflict in any other way, it was assumed that 
Gowon at least begrudgingly accepted this move for secession and would fight to end it. 
                                                 
1 Daily Times, 7 July, 1967 
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Indeed, on 14 July, Gowon said in an interview “why should we sit with him [Ojukwu] 
and discuss as two separate countries?” Gowon would continue to say that before any 
talks could begin, Ojukwu would have to renounce secession, recognize Gowon’s central 
government and accept the 12 state solution.2 Gowon would conclude the interview by 
stating unequivocally that this was “not a total war against the  astern States, but against 
a rebellion.”3 
At first, the Biafran forces put up little resistance, and most of it was in the form 
of obstruction. The Biafran military force was still in its infancy, and could do little more 
than tear up roadways, destroy bridges and harass the advancing Nigerian forces. Though 
initially, the Nigerians expected no resistance, even this harassment caused major delays 
in the Nigerian push toward Enugu. However, by July 12
th
 Federal forces had captured 
the first major center, at Ogoja. Three days later, Nsukka fell. Clearly, this was not a 48 
hour police action, but at the same time, little seemed to be able to stop the Federal 
advance. 
Toward the end of July, Biafran forces were able to slow the Nigerian advance to 
Enugu enough to keep the Federal forces from taking any other significant towns. It 
seemed that a stalemate was fast approaching that would force both sides back to the 
negotiating table. 
                                                 
2 Recognizing Gowon’s government is not just a minor point. Since the coup failed 
especially in the east, Ojukwu refused to recognize Gowon as the head of state. Ojukwu 
would never accept Gowon’s rule and several times publicly stated his personal distaste 
for his rival.  
3 Daily Times, 14 July, 1967 
55 
 
However, on 9 August 1967, a Biafran force of 3,000 men, led by Col. Victor 
Banjo, a Yoruba officer who sided with Ojukwu, crossed the River Niger at Onitsha 
beginning what is commonly called the Midwest offensive. This move took everyone, 
including many in Biafra, totally by surprise. Largely unopposed, the Biafran “liberation 
army” entered Benin City, established a new provincial government, defense force and 
police. Soon thereafter the Governor of the Midwest province declared the “Independent 
Republic of Benin”.  
After capturing Benin, Banjo’s invasion force split up with most of the force 
headed toward Lagos and Ibadan. A smaller force went north to cut off the supply lines to 
the Federal forces at Nsukka. However, after waiting three days, the element of surprise 
was lost. The Federal Government created a new military formation, the 2
nd
 Division, and 
placed it under the command of Col. Murtala Muhammad. Muhammad’s force set out to 
engage the Biafran force and met Banjo’s forces in what was the first real battle of the 
Civil War at Ore. The Biafran offensive soon collapsed. Thus, the Midwest offensive 
turned into a quick “flash in the pan”, as Col.  fiong called it. The Republic of Benin was 
very short-lived and soon returned to full federal control.  However, the offensive was a 
complex political and military maneuver designed to bring about a change in the 
dynamics of the war. 
The battle of Ore, like most battles of the Civil War, remains shrouded in 
mystery. What is known is that Banjo’s forces crossed into the Western Region and 
arrived at Ore; after Banjo telephoned the governor of the Western Region, Governor 
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Adebayo, to notify him of his impending liberation4. Ore was a strategic location, as it 
connected the main road to Lagos with the road that headed north to Ibadan. In 
anticipation of Banjo’s arrival, the  ederal forces destroyed the major bridges on the 
roads heading north to Ibadan and the road west to Lagos. The picture then becomes very 
unclear. Though there was a skirmish along the road to Lagos, and the 2
nd
 Division called 
up every available man to defend the road to Lagos, whether there was a decisive battle at 
Ore or whether Banjo, realizing that he could advance no further and concerned about a 
Nigerian outflanking maneuver along the minor roads to the north, decided to withdraw 
from the arena. Regardless of what actually happened at Ore, it was the furthest the 
Biafrans would advance. Soon after, they were being chased back across the Niger and 
were themselves forced to destroy bridges to cover their retreat. De St Jorre states that the 
battle of Ore was the Nigerian version of Gettysburg in that it completely turned the tide 
of the war. One major difference is that Gettysburg happened after two years of war, and 
Ore was fought after less than two months. 
                                                 





Figure 4: The Biafran Midwest Offensive and subsequent Nigerian advance5 
 
The first major effect of the Midwestern offensive was to end the “limited 
engagement” of the  ederal government. After the incursion to the Midwest, the 
government in Lagos no longer saw the conflict as a “police action”, but rather now “total 
war” would be waged against the secessionists.  
The head of the Federal Military Government and 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces has issued 
instructions to the Nigerian Army, Air Force and Navy to 
                                                 
5 H.B. Momoh, The Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970: History and Reminiscences (Ibadan: 
Sam Bookman Publishers, 2000), 95. 
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carry out full scale military operations against the rebel 
forces wherever they may be. The Federal Military 
Government will reply with heavier blows for every act 
committed by the rebels and will pursue them in an all-out 
drive until the rebellion is completely stamped out.6 
 
If the incursion to the Midwest was an attempt to tell the Federal Government that 
Biafra would not be cowed to submission, it was successful. If it was an attempt to bring 
the Federal side back to the negotiating table, it failed miserably. Now the Biafran forces 
would have to deal with a more determined foe, and one that was potentially better 
supplied and definitely more determined to quash the rebellion. 
 olitically, the “Midwestern misadventure”7 is one of the most interesting 
developments of the war, even though militarily it was a total disaster. It led to the 
abandonment of Lagos’ limited engagement, opened the way for civil war and a long 
thirty months of conflict.  
Upon capturing Benin, Banjo gave the following address on Benin radio:  
Some of you might have woken up to the sound of minor 
firing in the Capital city of Benin as well as in some other 
areas of Mid-Western Nigeria and thought it was in the 
process of being invaded by Northern troops. I am happy to 
reassure you that you have not been invaded by hostile 
troops. As some of you may have found out within the last 
48 hours, the soldiers amongst you are disciplined troops of 
the Liberation Army from Biafra which I command. […] 
This action is consistent with the desired intention of Biafra 
to assist in the liberation of the people of Nigeria from 
domination by the Fulani – Hausa feudal clique.  
                                                 
6 Philip Efiong, Nigeria and Biafra: My Story (Princeton, Abuja, Owerri, Loeji: Sunghai 
Books, 2003), 202. 




It is my hope that by our presence, the people of the 
Midwest will, in complete freedom from any restraint 
either direct or implied, be able to seek their rejection of the 
fiction that peace in Nigeria is only possible under the 
conditions that the entire people of Nigeria should be 
dominated by the Fulani – Hausa feudal clique.8 
 
Banjo’s address brought the major gamble of the Midwest Offensive to the 
forefront. Banjo was by no means the top officer in the Biafran ranks, Ojukwu, Efiong, 
Achizue and many others were much more capable officers, and were put in charge of 
training, equipping and organizing the fledgling Biafran military. Banjo was the choice 
for the Midwest offensive largely because of his ethnicity. He was a Yoruba man. 
Though this aspect has been denied by many actors in subsequent years, probably the 
major gamble of the Midwest was to reach the Yoruba in the west and have them join 
secession. The survival of the Biafran state was thus hinged on tearing apart the colonial 
structure that Lord Lugard put in place in 1914. Thus Banjo’s focus on the tyranny of the 
Hausa-Fulani was to appeal to the Yoruba, who were also part and parcel of the ethnic 
power struggle that plagued Nigeria since independence. 
However, two events transpired that would ultimately doom this plan. First, the 
offensive was blocked by the newly created 2
nd
 Division at Ore. Second, the Yoruba 
leadership affirmed its loyalty to the Lagos Government. On August 2
nd
, Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo, who at the time served as Vice Chairman of the Federal Executive Council 
and was known as one of the elder statesmen of the Yoruba went on Lagos Radio to 
                                                 
8 Banjo’s address on Benin radio. Cited in Efiong, Nigeria and Biafra: My Story, 201-02. 
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“counter the massive propaganda offensives from  nugu.”9 Awolowo stated that from 
Nigeria’s independence the Yoruba have stood for the unity of Nigeria and the complete 
self-determination of all Nigerians within the framework of Nigeria. 
The gamble of widening the war was a costly one indeed and had several 
problems. First and foremost, ever since the July 1966 coup, the Igbo had been planning 
for the crisis that ultimately led to Biafran secession. There had been problems in the 
West as well, especially with the Western Region election of 1965, and some reports out 
of Nigeria as late as December 1966 stated that Yorubaland was chaotic to the point of 
anarchy and generally ungovernable. 
Other indications suggested that the Yoruba would join the Igbo in a war against 
the North, or at least not interfere if war erupted.10 Ojukwu’s gamble assumed that the 
Yoruba shared the corporal fear that the July coup and subsequent massacres instilled on 
the Igbo and led to the vast exodus back to the East. Though indeed there were power 
struggles within Nigeria, there was no strong movement for a secessionist movement.  
Efiong, in his memoirs, minimizes the political aspect of the Midwest offensive as 
a way to draw the Yoruba into secession, attributing this entirely as a rogue act by Col. 
Banjo.11 However, radio broadcasts and newspapers from Enugu and Benin after Biafran 
occupation suggest that Ojukwu’s government was not only cognizant of Banjo’s plan, 
but that it was not Banjo’s idea to create a Republic of Benin, or to attempt to reach 
Ibadan in order to sever the entire south of Nigeria from the North. 
                                                 
9 Lagos Radio, cited from Africa Research Bulletin, 1967, 641 
10 De St. Jorre, The Brothers' War. 
11 Efiong, Nigeria and Biafra: My Story, 201-03. 
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Efiong instead places the emphasis on the planning and execution of the Midwest 
offensive, stating that it was nothing more than a “flash in the pan” and that it had no 
prayer to succeed from the beginning. First and foremost, as an operative plan, the 
Midwest adventure had no clear objectives. Karl Von Clausewitz, in his seminal work on 
the subject of war Vom Kriege,12 wrote about the preparation and execution of war, not 
only from a military standpoint, but also from a political one. His central point, that “war 
is the continuation of politics with the addition of other means”13 does not divorce 
politics from the act of war. Clausewitz’s work led many scholars on the subject of war, 
such as Michael Walzer14 among others to develop the theory of connecting the political 
ends and military means of war. Was the Midwest offensive an attempt to relieve the 
pressure and cut the supply lines to the Federal forces that were besieging Enugu? Was 
this an offensive that was designed to bring the Federal side back to the negotiating table? 
Was this an attempt to widen the conflict?  
He also maligns the decision making process that would be endemic on the 
Biafran side throughout the war. Efiong states that he was the head of all military forces 
in the Onitsha sector, as well as logistics officer and commander of the Militia at the 
beginning of the war. Yet, he claims to have first heard of the Midwest offensive on 
August 8
th
, when some officers who were to take part in the offensive came to him with a 
                                                 
12 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J.J. Graham (Ware: Wordsworth, 1997). 
13 The popular phrasing of this quote “War is the continuation of politics by other 
means” is a mistranslation from the original German. 
14 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1992). 
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request to requisition 10 jeeps for the offensive. He would call Governor Ojukwu and ask 
him “May I know why I was not informed about the operation, particularly because of the 
logistical requirements of such an operation”?15 Once he was briefed on the operation, he 
immediately saw that it was doomed to failure. The supply lines would be untenably long 
for such a small force advancing towards Lagos. However, Banjo told him that the 
Nigerians would be back at the negotiating table before any supply problems would arise 
and that the federals lacked the “stomach” to fight a war on multiple fronts. However, 
 fiong’s concerns turned out to be what turned the tide against the Biafran forces in the 
Midwest.  
The classical interpretation of the Midwest offensive rests on the element of 
surprise. Essentially, most scholars agree that the offensive might have succeeded if 
Banjo had not stopped in Benin for three days and notified everyone, including the 
enemy, of his plans. De St Jorre, Cervenka and Adewale Ademoyega are in general 
agreement on this point. Ademoyega writes “Banjo returned to Benin, early on Saturday, 
12 August 1967. By then, the momentum of the initial advance, which could have led to 
the capture of Ibadan, had been lost by seventy two hours”.16 This delay allowed the 
Federal forces enough time to muster the defensive line at Ore. The delay at Benin caused 
the same problems that Efiong had foreseen but were dismissed by Banjo. Once the 
Nigerian forces were entrenched in Ore, Banjo had no way to dislodge the and 
immediately requested mortar and artillery support since the entire advancing force did 
                                                 
15 Efiong, Nigeria and Biafra: My Story, 200. 
16 Adewale Ademoyega, Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup (Lagos: 
Evans Brothers, 1981). 
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not have any type of artillery support, and lacked any defensive weapons except several 
heavy machine guns.  
The failure of the Midwest offensive is the key question when analyzing the 
offensive from a military point of view. Several explanations have been brought forward. 
The major point of contention is whether it was an adventure that was doomed from the 
start, as Efiong states, or if the Biafran forces could have succeeded. Though much of the 
argument revolves around the receptibility of the Yoruba to join in the war against the 
North, many other factors are involved that would determine the outcome of the 
offensive. In the study of the military aspects of the offensive, many fissures appear in 
the Biafran military, these fissures would expand later in the war and bring the Biafran 
military to the brink of collapse many times, but most of them appear as early as August 
1967. They include animosity between the commanders, an unclear chain of command, 
ill-supplied and ill trained troops as well as a lack of coordination in planning operations. 
One of the most disastrous consequences of the Midwest offensive was the 
euphoria with which it was greeted in Eastern Nigeria. Here was a hastily assembled 
force of several thousand men, who with lightning speed were able to enter enemy 
territory, advance nearly unopposed, take an enemy city and install a new government. 
The speed of the assault and the panic it caused in Lagos created a sense of invincibility 
that the Enugu propaganda machine glorified. Though the short term effects were a large 
increase in men available for recruitment, it also produced a sense of arrogance. This 
arrogance would turn to desperation once the noose on Biafra began to tighten. 
 At the end of the Midwest Offensive, it became clear that there was no “police 
action” but a full-fledged Civil War. Once the offensive failed and the Republic of Benin 
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collapsed, Biafra stood at a crossroad. Should the country follow the secessionist path 
and continue to fight the Nigerian Army or should secession be renounced and some sort 
of deal be reached with the Federal Government and have the Eastern region return to 
Nigeria? 
Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu (one of the five majors involved in the 
January 1966 coup) was one of the top leaders on the Biafran side. He was killed in the 
defense of Enugu in the early stages of the war, but his involvement showcases another 
voice within the Biafran leadership. He had originally requested a plan that would use the 
Biafran forces to advance north along the Niger to the Benue River. Here, the Biafran 
forces would have had a long, wide river that would have been easily defensible. 
However, Ojukwu would side with Banjo and support the invasion of the Midwest.  
The saga of Victor Banjo encompasses the struggle between the secessionist and 
the conciliatory factions within the Biafran leadership. Banjo supported the Midwest 
gamble and was the leader best suited to widen the conflict and perhaps end it with a 
lightning strike. Once the offensive failed, where would the rebellion go? Many in the 
leadership, like Banjo, Col. Emmanuel Ifeajuna, and Major Philip Alale thought that the 
war was now effectively unwinnable. They were arrested for plotting to overthrow 
Ojukwu’s government and, after a short trial on Sep.  9
th
, 1967, they were summarily 
executed. Whether or not they were involved in a plot to overthrow Ojukwu or whether 
they were scapegoats in Ojukwu’s attempt to secure a united front in his struggle for 
independence.  
The official line of Banjo’s plot was that he had conspired with Gowon and 
Obafemi Awolowo to return to Biafra and usurp Ojukwu’s control. Much of this 
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speculation had to do with Banjo’s flamboyant personality and his arrogance when 
communicating his military actions to the enemy during the Midwest offensive. 17 
On the Federal side, the end of the Midwest adventure gave the Nigerians the time 
they needed to push towards total war. The Midwest offensive forced the Nigerian 
Military to create a new formation, the 2
nd
 Division, and soon a third division, the 3
rd
 
Marine Commando Division was also formed. These new divisions would help the 
Federal Government in its push to encircle and strangle the fledgling republic of Biafra.18 
The plan was simple. Eastern Nigeria was the most heterogeneous of all the regions. The 
first phase of the Federal invasion was to reduce Biafra to only the Igbo heartland. This 
move would cut off Biafra’s access to the sea and the Cameroonian border, thus severely 
limiting the ability to import arms and cutting Biafra off from the precious oil reserves in 
the Niger Delta. 
Though oil was an important strategic asset during the war and the possession of 
the oil fields and the refineries at Port Harcourt were vital for the economic survival of 
Biafra, it was not a deciding factor of the war. Oil was first discovered in the Niger Delta 
in 1956. By May of 1967 many companies and countries had made significant 
investments in oil exploration and production in the Niger Delta region. When the 
Eastern region seceded, it took with it most of the oil producing regions of the East, and 
                                                 
17 De St. Jorre, The Brothers' War.  
18 The Federal offensive against Biafra in 1967 -1968 was very similar to General 
Winfield Scott’s Anaconda plan during the US Civil War. Scott’s Anaconda plan was 
to blockade the South to prevent the export of cotton and other good and the 
importation of arms to end the war with minimal fighting. The anaconda plan was never 
adopted by the Union, and Lincoln initially opted for a more direct invasion. 
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with the Midwest offensive threatened to divorce Nigeria of the promise of all its 
potential oil wealth.  
Though the oil producing regions were in Eastern Nigeria, they were not in the 
Igbo areas. Further, and more importantly, the Igbo heartland was surrounded on all sides 
by these “minority people”, the Ijaw, Ibibo, Ogoni and many others. By reducing the 
Biafran state to the Igbo heartland, the Federal Government would ensure that Ojukwu’s 
breakaway republic would not be economically viable. Also, Ojukwu would not be able 
to import weapons on a large scale, a fact that would considerably impair his ability to 
wage war. However, this policy would have disastrous effect on the civilian population as 
well, since the Igbo heartland depended on the surrounding areas for most of its food. 
Since the only combat ready division in the Nigerian Army was the First Division, 
and it was stationed to the north of the Eastern region, the first logical front was to be the 
capture of the Biafran capital Enugu. On October 4
th
, Enugu fell to federal forces. Enugu 
fell largely without a fight, since the Biafran leadership had fled the city long before 
along with most of the defenders and moved to Umuahia deep in the Igbo heartland. With 
the capture of  nugu, Gowon went on Radio Lagos and said that “with the capitulation of 
the city, the Ojukwu rebellion is virtually at an end.”19 This would not be the last time 
Gowon would declare imminent victory over the rebellion. However, as with all his 
declarations, actual victory would prove much more elusive. 
Two weeks after the capture of Enugu, on October 19
th
, Calabar fell to Nigerian 
forces. The capture of Calabar was one of the pivotal points of the war, since it was the 
                                                 
19 Radio Lagos, Oct. 4
th
 1967. Cited in Africa Research Bulletin 1967, 887. 
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first successful use of an amphibious assault in the war. In the early phases of the war, 
Gowon attempted to capture the island of Bonny in the Niger delta. However, the assault 
on Bonny failed largely because of the lack of a trained amphibious unit. Most of the 
soldiers who died in Bonny and in the unsuccessful assault on Onitsha (discussed shortly) 
fell because the Nigerian military did not see the importance of swimming for 
amphibious forces. It was only with the training of the 3
rd
 Marine commando division20 
that an effective amphibious force was created and was able to attack Biafra from the 
south. The attack on Calabar also showcased the increasing efficiency in coordinating 
attacks between the different branches of the armed forces, as the attack was well planned 
and executed with a naval and aerial bombardment in support of the amphibious assault.   
Calabar would prove an important prize for the Federal government, for soon 
after its capture a Dutch merchant vessel laden with arms was captured attempting to 
dock in the city.21 Biafran forces attempted several time to recapture the city and nearly 
succeeded several times, but in the end, the Federal government was able to hold its 
position, and use the city as a base to cut off the entire eastern border and create the 
“South  astern State”  one of the twelve states in Gowon’s plan from Aburi. 
The military situation was very slow in advancing after the initial Federal 
successes and soon both sides were locked in a stalemate. Federal forces could not 
properly secure the border with Cameroon, and though they maintained control of Enugu, 
                                                 
20 The 3
rd
 Marine commando division held most of its training at Tarkwa Bay near 
Lagos. Tarkwa Bay today is one of the most pristine beaches in West Africa and a 
favorite spot for people seeking to escape the hectic chaos of Lagos for a day.  
21 Radio Lagos, Oct. 25
th
 1967. Cited in Africa Research Bulletin 1967, 889. 
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Calabar and Nsukka, they could not advance on those sectors and several times were 
nearly felled by Biafran counter offensives. 
1968 began on a pessimistic note for the Biafrans. By the end of 1967, in addition 
to the short lived Republic of Benin falling back to Federal hands, the Federal 
government had also captured Calabar in the far east of the country, thus capturing a 
major port. By the end of January 1968, Federal forces had secured the entire area east of 
the Cross River, effectively securing the border with Cameroon. Federal forces had also 
captured Nsukka, and the capital at Enugu and by mid-February, were laying siege to 
Awka. Indeed, the Federal side was so confident of victory, that Gowon, in an interview 
to the Daily Times said that by March 31
st
, the “backbone of Ojukwu’s rebellion”
22
 would 
be broken. He also began to speak of the postwar period, focusing on the federal 
structure, reiterating his previous points. For the first time, Gowon began to list names of 
people he the Nigerian Government would agree to deal with during peace talks.  Among 
those mentioned were Nnamdi Azikiwe and Kenneth Dike. When asked about Ojukwu, 
Gowon said “knowing him as I do, I don’t think I could I could trust him anymore. He is 
a very dishonest and ambitious man”.
23
 
With the Federal Government so confident of its imminent victory, Ojukwu and 
the Biafran government followed two strategies. First, and foremost, the domestic 
strategy that continued since the collapse of the Midwest offensive in 1967. Ojukwu and 
the Biafran propaganda machine convinced the Igbo that this was a war of survival. The 
events preceding the war and the recent offensives against the Igbo made sure that the 
                                                 




government did not have to work had to convince the Igbo that the survival of Biafra 
meant the survival of the Igbo. Also, the end of Biafra meant the annihilation of the Igbo 
as a people. Dr. Azikiwe, in a speech to the Biafran 10
th
 Battalion said the following:  
We are citizens of a free country who are resolutely determined 
to survive the onslaught of an enemy so as to preserve for 
ourselves and our posterity the heritage of freedom. We are 
fighting because there is abundant evidence to convince us that 
our very existence is threatened. If we fail to defend ourselves, 




In the west, across the River Niger, the 2
nd
 division was preparing for an assault 
on Onitsha. The bridge over the river Niger, built only two years prior to the start of the 
war was destroyed by the Biafran forces retreating from the Midwest. The first assault on 
Onitsha, in late October 1967, was a disaster for the federal troops. Largely unopposed, 
Murtala Muhammad led his largely untrained 2
nd
 Division across the River Niger into a 
largely deserted Onitsha. One officer who was there described the scene: 
There wasn’t much resistance and we thought, “Great, 
we’ve won.” The men, mostly new recruits, were not 
disciplined and went wild, drinking and looting. In no time 
most of them were drunk. Then, suddenly, the Biafrans 
were on us. I tried to rally the men, but it was hopeless; 
everyone panicked and ran for the boats. There was no 
point in staying and getting killed for nothing so I found a 
boat and got back to Asaba safely. But hundreds didn’t 
make it and were drowned or shot.25 
 
                                                 
24 Address delivered on Feb. 26
th
 on Radio Biafra. Cited in Africa Research Bulletin 
Mar. 15, 1968, 984C 
25 De St. Jorre, The Brothers' War, 186. 
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In late March 1968, the 2
nd
 division finally captured Onitsha by crossing the Niger 
north of Asaba and advancing south to take the city. Once again, as with the battle at Ore 
and most battles of the war, the exact turn of events is not known. After the capture of 
Onitsha, federal soldiers once again went wild, massacring the few remaining people who 
were left in the city, most of them seeking refuge at Onitsha Cathedral. 
The Nigerians, however, found themselves in a quagmire with Onitsha. The 
Federal forces had captured all of the largest cities in Biafra, with the notable exception 
of Port Harcourt, but now Onitsha was a liability that threatened Gowon’s proud New 
Year’s declaration that the rebellion would be broken by the end of March. Nigeria 
effectively controlled the north of Biafra and had an enclave in Onitsha. But how to 
supply the troops in the city? Biafran forces controlled the entire area surrounding the 
town and the Nigerian army lacked the resources to secure a route across the River Niger. 
 lus, the Biafran forces at Awka under the command of Col. Joe “Hannibal” Achuzia 
were thwarting any establishment of a secure supply line from Enugu to Onitsha and 
were plundering many of the convoys. In his memoirs, Achuzia would recall the Onitsha 
days thus, “whenever the stories of the Abagana, Onitsha and Nsukka campaigns are told, 
those men who took part in them will remember and sigh, borrowing a quotation from 
Churchill  ‘Yes, that was our finest hour’.”26 However, the most important fight was to be 
in Port Harcourt. 
If Ore was the Nigerian Gettysburg, Port Harcourt was its Vicksburg. After 
launching an offensive in the Niger Delta, Federal forces controlled several key towns 
                                                 
26Joe O. G. Achuzia, Requiem Biafra: The True Story of Nigeria's Civil War (Asaba: 
Steel Equip Nigeria Ltd., 1993), 365.  
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around Port Harcourt, namely Orika, Obegu and Akweie. Realizing the importance of 
controlling its last major outlet to the sea, Ojukwu sent Achuzia to organize the defense 
of Port Harcourt. His account of the defense of the city reveals how Biafran morale had 
begun to sink and how military order began to fray at the seams. 
Achuzia tells how he arrived at Port Harcourt and attempted to make order of the 
situation. His story tells of a military formation that was about to collapse. The men of 
the 52
nd
 Brigade in charge of the defense of Port Harcourt had completely fallen into 
anarchy. When he ordered the brigade to follow him to the front, the man in charge flatly 
refused saying “we are tired”. He continues 
 
Then I said “listen to me carefully and all of you. I am 
going forward to ascertain the enemy’s true position. […] I 
want to see all of you ready, formed to move, and if you are 
not ready, you my friend who said you are in charge, I will 
shoot you down like a dog, and any other soldier that 
refuses to obey orders. […] When I came back I met the 
troops in the same position I left them. They had made no 
attempt to get ready to move. […] I walked up to the 
soldier. I asked him, “Why are you not ready?” He said “I 
told you we are no more fighting.” He was holding his gun 
in his hand. I told him to hand the gun over to me. He 
refused. I lifted my automatic rifle from my shoulder. I said 
“I warned you all before I left. Now I will carry out my 
threat and anyone still sitting down will be dealt with in the 
same way.” I lifted the gun and shot him where he stood, 
then I said “everybody get up.” They all jumped and I 
marched them forward.27 
 
Clearly, this was not a force that was ready to defend one of the major cities from 
an imminent Federal invasion. Later, during the last days of the defense of the city, some 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 367-68. 
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of the troops under his command mutinied with their commander, Lt. Col. Okpara. 
However, Col. Okpara was not court-martialed for inciting his troops to mutiny, but 
rather he was transferred to the Awka sector. Later, in another attempt to restore order in 
his collapsing defense, he summarily executed five men in an attempt to find the 
ringleaders of the mutineers. 
Port Harcourt fell largely without a fight. This fact is not surprising considering 
the chaos within the defending ranks. With the collapse of Port Harcourt, Biafra was 
effectively surrounded on all sides by federal forces. The only connection to the outside 
world was now through the air. The only airfield that was still in working condition in 
Biafra was nicknamed “Annabelle”, but was better known by its location at Uli. Clearly, 




Internal Propaganda and the Prosecution of the War 
 
THE FALL OF PORT HARCOURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF BIAFRAN PROPAGANDA 
When Port Harcourt fell to the Federal Forces on May 17
th
 1968, the changes in 
the war since the failure of Midwest offensive became increasingly apparent. The 
euphoria of Biafran independence, already a year old, was a distant memory and the 
reality of fighting a war against a much larger, better equipped, and internationally 
recognized entity was becoming increasingly painful. Even though the shift in the war 
came almost immediately after the collapse of the Midwest offensive with the fall of 
Calabar, the eastern border with Cameroon and Bonny, the fall of Port Harcourt served as 
a potent symbol of the turning tide of the war for several reasons. First and foremost, if 
the Midwest offensive gave the Biafran army and people a sense of invincibility, the fall 
of the country’s financial center and last functional entrepôt served to harden the sense of 
siege in the nascent nation, that was now reduced to a mono-ethnic enclave surrounded 
by a hostile force.  
For many observers, both within Nigeria and abroad, the Federal conquest of the 
city appeared to be the last nail in the coffin of the fledgling nation. Now that Biafra was 
reduced to little more than the Igbo heartland with very little ability to supply its military 
and even feed its population, the Biafran leadership would have little choice but to sue for 
peace in the upcoming peace talks in Niamey. However, the peace talks in Niamey stalled 
and were succeeded by talks in Addis Ababa and Kampala; all of which failed to end the 
war and showed that the Biafran spirit was far from broken. Indeed, the peace talks gave 
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the Biafran delegation an international stage to push for an internationalization of the war 
on humanitarian grounds. By arguing that the Nigerian government was starving the 
Biafran people, by this point almost exclusively Igbo, Ojukwu and his government were 
able to garner widespread support from abroad, and by doing that, apply pressure on the 
governments that were supporting Nigeria militarily. 
The Biafran Directorate of Propaganda had to respond to this change in the 
military situation in several ways. First and foremost, the internal propaganda was 
essentially “Igboized”, as the situation in Biafra became that of a small Igbo enclave 
surrounded by the Nigerian military. While the propaganda still referred to Biafrans, gone 
was the rhetoric espoused in The Spectator shortly after independence where “personal 
and sectional considerations must give way to a common front, in defence of right, of 
freedom and justice  in defence of Biafra”1, and now the rhetoric for internal Biafran 
consumption was that of the survival of the Igbo. Second and closely related, no longer 
did Biafra’s propaganda style exalt the virtues of a free and independent Biafra as a 
beacon of hope for all of Africa, most famously extolled by Ojukwu in his Ahiara 
declaration.2 Now, the propaganda style shifted to that of survival in the face of 
                                                 
1 "Fight for Fatherland!," Spectator, August 1967, 2. 
2 In the Ahiara Declaration, given in May 1969 on Biafra’s second Independence  ay, 
Ojukwu advocated Biafran independence as not only a nationalist project, but one of 
further African liberation from the yoke of colonialism. In the declaration, Ojukwu 
framed Biafra as a project that would finally liberate the black man from his colonial 
oppressors. In Ojukwu’s words “Our Revolution is a historic opportunity given to us to 
establish a just society; to revive the dignity of our people at home and the dignity of 
the Black-man in the world. We realise that in order to achieve those ends we must 
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extermination. No longer was the viability of an independent Biafra at stake; rather, the 
survival of the Igbo in the face of a genocidal enemy became paramount to the 
propaganda effort. Lastly, the question of how to efficiently deliver propaganda while 
under a relentless siege with limited resources and to a population that was largely 
uneducated and illiterate became of utmost importance. With limited access to television, 
radio and other media that require electricity to run, and a population that would largely 
be unable to utilize print media, the Biafran propaganda directorate came up with several 
ingenious solutions to the conundrum of how to practically deliver the message and keep 
both the civilian population and the military willing to fight, suffer and die.   
 ort Harcourt’s fall to the Nigerian forces crystallized the change in the dynamic 
of the war. No longer was a proud Biafra with an almost mythical military able to nearly 
bring Nigeria to its knees; now the country was under siege, with most of its territory lost, 
and the remaining territory was surrounded and under siege. The loss of the city changed 
the war on both tactical and strategic levels, with the young breakaway republic no longer 
fighting for its viability as a nation, but for the survival of the Igbo, who feared that 
losing the war would mean extermination. 
 
BIAFRA – FROM MULTIETHNIC PROJECT TO THE IGBO ALONE 
The single most important change to the dynamic of the war was the shift from a 
Biafra that included Igbo, Ijaw, Ibibio, Efik and many other ethnic and linguistic groups, 
to an Igbo enclave, surrounded by hostile forces.  
                                                                                                                                                 
remove those weaknesses in our institutions and organisations and those disabilities in 
foreign relations which have tended to degrade this dignity.” 
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Biafra began its life on May 30
th
, 1967 with the secession of the entire Eastern 
Region from Nigeria, forming the Republic of Biafra. The impetus for Biafran secession 
stemmed from the chaos of the 1966, and especially the riots in Northern Nigeria that 
killed according to most estimates anywhere from 30-50,000 people, almost exclusively 
Igbo. Biafra, however, did not begin solely as a project of Igbo secession. The Eastern 
Region’s many leaders gathered at the  residential Hotel in May of 1967 and furnished 
on May 27
th
 unanimously granting Ojukwu the authority to use whatever means 
necessary to guarantee the  astern Region’s security, thereby authorizing secession.  
When Ojukwu declared independence, he did so with the consent and 
recommendation of the chiefs and representatives of the Eastern Region who, gathered at 
the Presidential Hotel in Enugu on May 25
th 
to discuss the Nigerian crisis. One of the 
delegates – Joe Achuzia, who would later be one of the more controversial of the Biafran 
military commanders – stated that the mood at the convention was such that “it left no 
more room for doubt that the regions as we knew them had come to the end of the road.”3 
After hearing Gowon’s declaration creating the twelve states on the first day of the 
convention, the delegates voted unanimously to authorize Ojukwu to declare the Republic 
of Biafra; which he did two days later at the same hotel.4 Thus, Biafra did not begin 
solely as Igbo secession from Nigeria, but was framed as a multi ethnic expression of no 
confidence in Nigeria on a systemic level. While the Igbo did not need to be reminded of 
the massacres in August and September on 1966, which saw, by most estimates, around 
                                                 
3 Joe O. G. Achuzia, Requiem Biafra: The True Story of Nigeria's Civil War (Asaba: 
Steel Equip Nigeria Ltd., 1993). 
4 Ibid., 8. 
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50,000 killed and 2 million internally displaced people return to their ancestral homes in 
the East, the other ethnic groups in the Eastern Region did not suffer the same as the Igbo 
in Nigeria.5 Thus, unlike the Igbo, the other ethnic groups in the East did not suffer the 
same violence that galvanized the Igbo.  Thus, the Biafran propaganda had to implant the 
same kind of fear into the so called minority people in the east that the memories of the 
massacres of 1966 instilled on the Igbo. 
However, while many of the non-Igbo leaders gathered in Enugu to grant 
legitimacy to Ojukwu’s actions, not all in the East supported secession. One of the more 
vocal opponents of the Biafran project was Ogoni leader Ken Saro-Wiwa. In his memoir 
of the war, On a Darkling Plain: an Account of the Nigerian Civil War, Saro-Wiwa 
claimed that many of the leaders in the East were either coerced or bribed into supporting 
Biafran secession. Further, he clarified his position toward Biafra and its leader.  Saro-
Wiwa never supported the Biafran project, saying in his memoirs, “for me, biafra [sic] 
offered nothing new. It has no new ideology, no new inspiration. It was Nigeria in a 
different name.” Saro-Wiwa was referring to Nigeria’s regional structure, internal strife 
and political domination by the three major ethnic groups. This structure resulted in 
rioting across the country, two major coups, civil strife and violence that culminated in a 
brutal civil war. For Saro-Wiwa then, “the true interest of these lay in a more equitable 
country where all groups where all groups would be fairly treated, where all groups had 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 10 
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self-determination. Biafra was not that country […] On the other hand, Nigeria of the 
twelve states offered a glimmer of hope and I clung to that hope.”6 
Olusegun Obasanjo, in his memoir, My Command, conveyed his disappointment 
at the similar attitude that the minority peoples of the East exhibited toward the Nigerian 
side. In attempting to enlist Easterners to fight on the Federal side, he was dismayed that 
for the Ijaw, any will to fight for the Nigerian side ended with the establishment of their 
Southeast State. When Benjamin Adekunle captured the Niger Delta city of Bonny, he 
attempted to enlist the local population to augment his 3
rd
 Division. While he did succeed 
in enlisting a battalion of one thousand, their lack of commitment, training and ill-
discipline made them of little use except as a garrison left in Bonny.7 
While it would be tempting to dismiss Biafra as an Igbo project, that analysis is 
incomplete, because Biafra included many non-Igbo in its inception. Though many 
shared Saro-Wiwa’s contempt of secession, a large number of non-Igbo also embraced 
the Biafran project. Ojukwu’s Vice  resident and the man who surrendered Biafra in 
1970, Phillip Efiong (alternately spelled Effiong)8 was himself a member of the Ibibio 
people of the Calabar region. In his memoirs Nigeria and Biafra: My Story, Efiong 
recalled that the euphoria of Biafran independence was shared by the people of the non-
                                                 
6 Ken Sawo-Wiwa, On a Darkling Plain: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War (London. 
Lagos, Port Harcourt: Saros International Publishers, 1989), 88. 
7 Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-70 
(Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1980), 45-47. 
8 Though both spellings of his surname name have been used interchangeably in print, 
 fiong himself used the single “f” spelling in his memoirs.  
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Igbo speaking areas, with large contingents arriving at Enugu to voice their support for 
the creation of Biafra.9  
However, he did acknowledge that it was the creation of the Twelve States that 
eroded some support in the minority areas for Biafra.  urther, Gowon’s creation of the 
twelve States, in  fiong’s estimation, was one of the deciding factors in pushing Ojukwu 
to declare independence. Unlike the federal structure of Gowon’s new Nigeria, Ojukwu 
sought to shape Biafra into a provincial system. According to Efiong, Ojukwu thought 
that the provincial system “would eventually nullify the creation of the states.” In effect, 
however, the creation of the States swayed many in the Niger Delta to support Nigeria 
and to side with the argument that Saro-Wiwa presented.10 
At the outset of the war, Biafran propaganda sought to unify the country and rally 
the populace around the threat of extermination. To this end, the Ministry of Information, 
later replaced by the Directorate of Propaganda, used the Igbo massacres of 1966 to 
emphasize the argument that the Nigerians were waging a genocidal campaign. To most 
of the Igbo, still with the vivid memories of the 1966 massacres, accompanied by the 
horrors of millions of Igbo fleeing the violence to the relative safety of their ancestral 
homelands, no reminder was necessary.  
However, Biafran propaganda was using what was essentially an Igbo tragedy to 
galvanize support across all the regions in Biafra. To this end, they added a vitriolic 
language, nicknaming the Nigerians “vandals” and, more importantly, a religious element 
                                                 
9 Philip Efiong, Nigeria and Biafra: My Story (Princeton, Abuja, Owerri, Loeji: Sunghai 
Books, 2003), 177. 
10 Ibid., 178. 
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to the conflict. The Nigerians, led now by a Northern Muslim junta massacred the Igbo, 
not because they were Igbo; not in retaliation for the January coup, which many in the 
North viewed as an Igbo putsch; but because the Igbo were the only sizable Christian 
minority living in the North. According to John Stremlau in his work The International 
Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, Biafran propaganda played upon the perceived  
“Christian superiority, and described the Nigerian war effort as engineered by backward 
Northerners who were intent on imposing Islam on the  ast.”11 Thus, the Biafran 
propaganda effort sought, during the first year of the war, to portray the war not as an 
ethnic struggle, but as a religious one. 
 
PROPAGANDA – MINISTRY OF INFORMATION V. DIRECTORATE OF PROPAGANDA 
Biafran propaganda underwent a major shift after Port Harcourt’s fall. While in 
the early stages of the war, Biafran propaganda focused on the viability of the new state 
and the reasons for rejecting Gowon and his 12 state solution, now the focus shift to that 
of a survival ethos; one that increasingly focused on the plight of the Biafran people, 
under siege, surrounded, and, by mid-1968, almost entirely Igbo. 
Ojukwu’s inner circle anticipated the military crisis as early as October 1967 soon 
after the capture of Enugu to the federal forces. After relocating the capital to Umuahia, 
the Biafran government was restructured to give it the flexibility necessary to quickly 
adapt during war. To this end, several directorates were created to coordinate the war 
effort. These directorates answered only to Ojukwu and were kept apart from any 
                                                 
11 John Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 113-14. 
81 
 
hierarchical structure, either civilian or military and were thus almost completely 
autonomous units working independently of any civilian and military authority, save 
Ojukwu himself. 
There is some confusion about Ojukwu’s decision to create the various directives. 
According to Efiong, the directorates were created at the beginning of the war with the 
stated goal of streamlining decision making during the war. However, Stremlau’s 
extensive interviews reveal that the directorates were not created until after the fall of 
Enugu in October, 1967. Stremlau claims that they were after the Biafran Government 
relocated from  nugu to Umuahia, and that “Ojukwu had not been satisfied with the 
ministry’s work, which he considered inefficient, pedestrian and not sufficiently in tune 
with the hopes and fears of the Biafran people.” 12 
Several directorates were created, including the Transport Directorate, Food 
Directorate, Fuel Directorate, Research and Production Directorate, and of course the 
Propaganda Directorate. These directorates, though designed to streamline wartime 
administration, suffered from inconsistent mandates. The Transport Directorate suffered 
from some of the worst corruption. Efiong stated that near the end of the war the lack of 
discipline and supply “created a near free-for-all situation in the acquisition of vehicles 
by the rank and file of the army.”13  
The Propaganda Directorate, however, had a very clear mandate, and the means 
and leadership to effectively enact that mandate. Though at first there was some 
confusion regarding the Ministry of Information’s subordination to the  irectorate, and 





initially some resistance from senior officials in the ministry, very soon the Directorate 
assumed responsibility for formulating the propaganda, while the Ministry of Information 
would continue to be the official face of the Biafran nation.  
 
FOCUS OF PROJECT 
With the fall of Port Harcourt the dream of a viable, strong, multiethnic Biafra 
came to an abrupt end. With this change in the war’s dynamic came a marked shift in the 
propaganda. The Directorate of Propaganda no longer had to justify the war to a populace 
that was only in part committed to it. Now, the Directorate of Propaganda essentially 
“Igboized” the Biafran project, equating Biafra with the Igbo in an overt way that it had 
previously tried to avoid. 
In the early phases of the war, Biafran propaganda sought to unify the country’s 
different ethnic groups into a nation that would resist the pending Nigerian invasion. 
However, Biafran propaganda used the massacres against the Igbo as the main thrust of 
its propaganda effort, a fact that did not resonate to the non Igbo population in Biafra. In 
an attempt to emphasize northern brutality and to avoid alienating the minority peoples in 
the east, Biafran propaganda portrayed the massacres as religious, rather than ethnic in 
nature. The main crux of the argument was that it was the Igbo that primarily suffered the 
brunt of the massacres in the north simply because they were the only major Christian 
minority in the north. Thus, only a secure Biafra could safeguard the rights of all the 
southern Christians, not just the Igbo.  
From the outset of the war, Biafran propaganda policies sought to capitalize on 
the brutal nature of the massacres that followed in the wake of the July 1966 coup. The 
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problem was that the massacres were directed almost solely at the Igbo, while the entire 
Eastern Region that seceded was not exclusively Igbo. However, the situation changed in 
mid-1968, and the remaining territory was almost exclusively Igbo. Thus, the propaganda 
changed significantly. The Igbo needed no reminding of the massacres of 1966. The 
memory of the millions of refugees arriving in every town and city in the wake of the 
massacres was still a fresh one. Couple with the fact that virtually all the non-Igbo areas 
of Biafra were in the hands of the Nigerian Governement, the propaganda directorate saw 
little need to maintain the same propaganda line that tried to maintain unity in a multi 
ethnic environment, and focus instead on one that would keep the Igbo fighting through a 
situation that was becoming increasingly hopeless. 
Because the Biafran project shifted so quickly from the grandiose plans of May 
1967 and the ideals of creating a multiethnic Biafra to that of ethnic survival for the Igbo, 
Ojukwu used a speech today known as the Ahiara Declaration to reiterate the philosophic 
undertones of Biafra. Biafra was, according to the declaration, to be a struggle for 
survival, but also a metaphoric struggle to uphold human values against a world that had 
turned its back on the suffering of the Biafran people. Though the Ahiara declaration 
came in 1969 and attempted to frame the Biafran independence project as a beacon for all 
Africans to shed their colonial shackles, Ojukwu’s speech was a reiteration of much of 
the propaganda approach. Ojukwu’s assertions of the world’s racism toward the Biafrans 
were long a tenet of Biafran propaganda, and one of the main points that the internal 
memos sought to instill on the population.14 
                                                 
14 Ahiara Declaration, May 29, 1969 
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In fact, much of the Ahiara declaration was a focused repeat of the same ideas that 
the Biafran propaganda directorate sought to implant on the Igbo to keep them fighting. 
The portrayal of the Nigerians, not only as bloodthirsty, but as the lackeys of the western 
powers was well established in Biafran radio, in print and in the internal memoranda 
discussed in this chapter. Thus, much of the declaration can be seen as the culmination of 
much of the Biafran propaganda campaign, especially after the collapse of the Biafran 
military following the fall of Port Harcourt in 1968. The Biafran government sought to 
convince both their own people and the rest of the world that their fight was for their own 
survival and their struggle was that for the oppressed black man struggling against the 
institutionalized oppression of the world system. The Nigerians were thus only the 
lackeys of the British, the Russians, and all those that sought to maintain the inferiority of 
the black man.  
 
IN THE FACE OF GENOCIDE: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROPAGANDA 
While the message that the Biafran government sought to instill on its people was 
essentially the same message that they hoped the rest of the world would accept, the goals 
of each target audience was markedly different. Both at home and abroad, the Biafran 
propaganda was to convince the world that the Biafrans were fighting against a genocidal 
enemy that wanted only to kill every Biafran. The Biafrans had to convince the world, 
and themselves, that their only salvation lay in the establishment of an independent Biafra 
because Biafrans had no future in Nigeria. 
Obviously, the reality of a people under siege was much different than the 
Europeans or Americans sitting in their homes watching the images from Biafra on their 
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televisions and reading about the war in the newspaper. Thus, the methods, means and 
messages were carefully crafted to suit the differing realities and were then more 
strenuously adapted to suit the needs of keeping the Igbo fighting and suffering in the 
name of their survival. 
In his book The Brothers’ War, John de St Jorre, a journalist with the London 
Observer, stated that though massacres did occur, they were perpetrated by both sides, 
and that the key element of a genocidal campaign, namely that it was a deliberate 
government policy did not exist in the Biafran case.15 However, the power of the Biafran 
propaganda in perpetuating the myth remained strong and kept the population in the 
belief that the fight was no longer for independence, but for survival. De St. Jorre recalled 
one conversation with a Biafran official who told him “if you gave us the choice of 1,    
rifles or milk for 5 ,    starving children, we’d take the guns.”16 Indeed, de St. Jorre 
stated that the propaganda was so well received that people of all professions and 
educational backgrounds saw the war as a fight for survival. He boiled down the typical 
Biafran response, “we have no alternative  if we surrender or are defeated, the Nigerians 
will wipe us out, so we might as well die fighting.”17 
As if to lend credence to the Igbo fears of genocide, one of the Nigerian 
commanders, Benjamin Adekunle, nicknamed “The Black Scorpion” was quoted in the 
New York Times on Sept. 8, 1968 stating bluntly: 
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I want to see no Red Cross, no Caritas, no World Council 
of Churches, no Pope, no missionary and no UN 
delegation. I want to prevent even one Ibo from having 
even one piece to eat before their capitulation. We shoot at 
everything that moves and when our troops march into the 
centre of Ibo territory, we shoot at everything even at 
things that don’t move.18 
 
This quote has been oft cited as evidence of Nigerian plans of genocide, but is 
more likely the psychosis of one man and his mania to win the war. Adekunle later gave 
an interview to Stern Magazine, where his personal venom against the Igbo was even 
more crystallized. In what seemed to be a surreal environment that included uniformed 
go-go dancers and a goat named Ojukwu, Adekunle invited Randolph Baumann to 
interview him. When asked whether he had any sympathy for the Igbo, Adekunle told the 
German reporter, “I have learned a word from the British, which is "sorry"! That’s how I 
want to respond to your question. I did not want this war but I want to win this war. 
Therefore I have to kill the Ibos. Sorry!”19 
It was not surprising therefore that Biafran propaganda shifted to that of Igbo 
survival in the face of genocide. The propaganda effort faced a formidable challenge: 
how to maintain the war effort when many observers, both in Biafra and abroad, figured 
that capitulation was merely a matter of time. The conundrum was not only a 
philosophical one, but also required practical, logistical solutions. Because the tide had 
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turned in a seemingly irreversible way, communication and travel in Biafra was severely 
limited and required several drastic solutions. 
 
MARKETING STRATEGIES IN WAR 
One of the most innovative aspects of Biafran propaganda was the use of modern 
marketing techniques to mine data and translate that data into recommendations for future 
broadcasts and initiatives. Though very few documents remain from the Directorate for 
Propaganda, Ministry of Information and the Political Enlightenment Committee, those 
that remain reveal that the various arms of Biafran public information were very adept at 
both getting their message out and adapting their message to suit the changing realities of 
war. That the Biafrans were able to create a system that had the look and feel of any well 
oiled public relations or advertising firm, despite the obvious challenges of operating in 
war and under siege warrants special attention in itself. The fact that they were able to 
create and maintain such an effective system under the circumstances remains 
remarkable. 
The main difficulty in examining the content of Biafran propaganda, especially 
radio programs and non-print pieces, is the lack of data. Though some print propaganda 
remains, almost all the radio, television and non-print material is now lost. All of the 
scripts for the radio programs evaluated below are either lost or presumed lost. The only 
records of them ever existing are the critiques made by the Appraisals Committee of the 
Directorate for Propaganda. Even the remaining printed material reveals only a small 
portion of the voluminous propaganda made for internal consumption to keep Biafrans, 
especially the Igbo, determined to prosecute the war. On the other hand, much of the 
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information manufactured for global consumption remains; but this body of work can 
only provide us with the face that the Biafrans wished to show the rest of the world, 
which at times seems to contradict the scant evidence of what the Biafran Government 





, 1968, barely a month after Port Harcourt fell, the Appraisals 
Committee of the Directorate for  ropaganda unveiled a plan titled “Guide Lines for 
 ffective  ropaganda”  henceforth  lan #4, the other plans are now lost .20 This paper 
served as a guideline both in creating an overarching conceptualization of how Biafran 
propaganda should work and how to cope and circumvent certain problems that arose 
because the war was turning decisively against Biafra. 
Plan #4 is comprised of two parts. The first part is a general overview of effective 
propaganda, and discusses the different aims, techniques and strategies of propaganda, 
especially in wartime. The main goal of this part of the report was to instill the basic 
principles of propaganda to those who might not be familiar with the different aspects of 
market segmentation, the connection between message and form and other aspects of 
modern marketing. The report begins with the different ways that the propagandist can 
appeal to the heart of their target, such as appeals to desire, fear, hatred, as well as human 
attributes such as tendencies toward conformity, repetition, and the esthetic value of 
propaganda.  
                                                 
20 "Guide Lines for Effective Propaganda," ed. Research Bureau Appraisal Committee 
(Aba: Directorate for Propaganda, 1968). 
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The authors of Plan #4 studied the art of propaganda very carefully, and meshed 
many of their guidelines by incorporating the lessons of Allied and Axis propaganda 
during World War II with lessons and tactics from the advertising world. Thus, when the 
Biafrans discuss hate appeals as an effective propaganda tactic, they invoke both Josef 
Goebbels’ words “we are enemies of the Jews, because we are fighting for the freedom of 
the German. The Jew is the cause and the beneficiary of our misery…” with slogans such 
as “ resh up with Seven Up!”21  Like any advertising campaign, the goal was to instill a 
sense that no matter the message that the propagandist was trying to implant, “the 
presentation of propaganda materials around whatever phenomena should be so striking 
as to be memorable.”22  
However, Biafran propaganda was facing a far from ideal situation in which it 
was to work. The second part of  lan #4 explained how the Biafran “ ropaganda Man” 
was to deal with the unique challenges of operating in a war that was so close to home 
and a home front that was increasingly under siege, blockaded and teeming with 
refugees. Further, Biafran propaganda was challenged by the lack of mobility within the 
country due in large part to the lack of fuel, and the general insecurity of traveling in a 
country under siege. It was not only the effects of the war that hampered Biafra’s efforts 
to galvanize their populace, but also the diverse education level and access to technology 
of its people. With a population estimated to be 70% illiterate and rural (educational class 
3), without access to radios and television, disseminating propaganda would prove a 
formidable challenge. Indeed, only 5% of the population was considered “the elite and 





upper class”  educational status 1  and an additional  5% “the literate and illiterate 
middle class”  educational status   .23 
Plan #4 addressed circumventing the challenges both on a practical level and in 
keeping the county’s morale resolute on fighting despite the increasingly difficult 
situation. Indeed, Biafra’s situation, due to adverse effects of the war, the lack of 
infrastructure to disseminate ideas and propaganda made any effort at organized 
propaganda extremely difficult. Further, the large illiteracy among the population sorely 
limited the effectiveness of the printed word in bringing news and reports to the rural 
areas.  
The authors of the propaganda directorate offered several remedies to the 
difficulties facing them. Some of the solutions were squarely practical, such as bringing 
batteries to the marketplaces so that radios could be set to Biafran radio and played. They 
also suggested the employment of actors and playwrights to produce plays that could be 
performed in the rural areas, where people lacked access to radio and television, and 
where the high percentage of illiteracy limited the impact of printed media. However, the 
realities of the war also elicited stern recommendations from the Directorate. As the 
report states:  
One of the greatest problems which the Propaganda 
Directorate has to contend with is that of general 
immobility in the country. The immobility arose out of the 
shortage of vehicles and lately of petrol and diesel oil. […] 
The problems of blockade and transport cannot be solved 
by the propaganda machinery. The primary concern of the 
Directorate is with the mental attitude of the people.24 
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The dire situation demanded several responses and the Propaganda Directorate 
made several recommendations. First and foremost, the Directorate was to act as a 
coordinating unit for all propaganda. Not only was each department of the Directorate to 
adhere to the various guidelines when creating propaganda, especially regarding the aim 
and audience for each piece of propaganda it created, but statements regarding “Each 
[sic] propaganda item should be placed with the Director or preferably with the 
Appraisals committee. This practice may be different and rigorous but it is the only way 
to sharpen the tip point of the propaganda arrow.”25 
Lastly, Plan #4 posited some interesting ways to bind the propaganda for internal 
consumption with that for the rest of the world. Considering that Biafra’s lack of 
infrastructure at the beginning of war came under increasing strain when most of the 
urban areas with their radio and television towers fell to the FMG by mid-1968, the 
Biafrans were left with relatively few ways to effectively reach their population and the 
outside world. The  irectorate’s concern was how to minimize propaganda crossover. 
Though the Propaganda directorate had the masterful idea of effectively outsourcing most 
of the global propaganda to Swiss public relations firm Markpress (more on Markpress 
later in this chapter and the next one), Plan #4 also deals with the problems of having 
Biafrans receive propaganda that was meant for Nigerians and vice versa.  
The Directorate also set certain red lines regarding the content of the Biafran 
information. Naturally, in time of war, the main problem in propaganda is divulging 
information that the enemy can use against you. However, divulging information can also 
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have a negative effect on the enemy, such as the broadcast of a major victory against 
them. However, the Biafran propaganda man was warned to avoid publicizing 
falsehoods. This was not out of a moral need to be truthful, but rather from more practical 
considerations regarding the situation in Biafra.  
Arising from the proximity of the war fronts to the home 
audience, propaganda of falsehood cannot be effective 
because the true facts soon reach the audience through 
eyewitnesses who travel from the war zones back to the 
centre of population. Propaganda of falsehood thrives only 
where the verification of the facts cannot be verified. This 
may in fact, explain Nigeria’s lying propaganda. Our 
propaganda should thus be very cautious about faked 
stories which are false though aimed at achieving desirable 
psychological results.26 
 
Plan #4 thus provided many recommendations regarding the use of propaganda. 
The plan set forth ways not only to create propaganda, but to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the propaganda campaign, especially among the different educational groups that the 
materials targeted. Most important was to find ways to reach the uneducated and illiterate 
people living in the rural areas with little access to television and radio. To this end, the 
Propaganda Directorate sought to enlist the military in disseminating propaganda. This 
was important for several reasons. First, because of the nature of the war in Biafra, most 
of the military was in close proximity to the population it was defending. This proximity 
would allow for soldiers to help popularize much of the propaganda to those that could 
not read or write and had no access to radios. Second, the military “would benefit from 
the propaganda for the civilian population, but only as an argumentation of political 
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indoctrination and the special morale services for the armed forces.”27 Also, the military 
received top priority in the allocation of fuel and was thus a convenient means to 
circumvent the general immobility in the country. 
The initial problem of conflating the Biafrans with the Igbo was rendered largely 
moot after the middle of 1968, when the FMG was able to capture and hold all the non-
Igbo areas. Further, the crux of the genocidal argument was centered largely ion the Igbo. 
The massacres of 1966 were directed against the Igbo. The mass exodus of people from 
all parts of Nigeria to the East was mainly Igbo. The memory of people arriving in 
Enugu, Umuahia, Aba and other Igbo cities with little more than the clothes they were 
wearing, having suffered the brutality of the pogroms did not resonate with the non-Igbo 
people in Calabar, Bonny and elsewhere. Thus the collective memory that the propaganda 
was evoking was that of the Igbo, not of Biafra as a whole.  
Though the propaganda Directorate was mostly concerned with the civilian 
population, the military provided a unique challenge and opportunity for the Biafrans to 
propagate their messages. As the Biafrans were fighting a war on their home soil against 
an invading army, the military was never far from the civilian population, and in most 
cases the civilians were in intimate contact with the soldiers. Second, the military had the 
same educational background and literacy rates as the civilian population, so the same 
methods of delivery that applied to the civilians also applied to the military. Third, as 
stated earlier, the government felt that the same messages to the civilians would augment 
the political indoctrination that the soldiers themselves were receiving, and the soldiers 
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themselves could serve as mouthpieces for the propaganda owing to their position of 
authority and perceived ability to better communicate across the country. Lastly, using 
the military supply lines to deliver propaganda materials solved an important logistical 
problem. By using the military to help spread the propaganda to the civilians, the 
government solved its most important logistical problem; that of limited means to deliver 
the message without interfering with the war effort.  
THE LEOPARD 
One of the most important vehicles of propaganda dissemination was the official 
bulletin of the Biafran Armed Forces, The Leopard. The magazine began publication at 
the end of 1967, and was scheduled to be published twice a month. However, supply 
problems most likely hampered the magazine’s publication  between  ecember 1967 and 
the end of May 1968, eight issues were published, of which all but the first issue remain 
available. The ninth issue did not appear until the end of November 1968, and no other 
issues survive after the ninth. Like many newspapers in Biafra during the war, the paper 
shortage was apparent, as the last issue was printed on what obviously was school 
notebook paper, as evidenced by the lines running through the paper.  
The Leopard provides us with a clear window into the shifting nature of Biafran 
propaganda for several reasons.  irst and foremost, the paper’s language it simple, to the 
point and does not attempt to show any semblance of neutrality. Often times it addressed 
the soldiers directly, stating bluntly:  
Nigeria’s BIG PLAN aimed at you, the gallant, courageous 
Biafran soldier, and you, the mean, shameless agent of 
Gowon is DEATH.  
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Kill them NOW in their thousands at the battle fronts before 
they kill you in millions – in cold blood! 28 [Emphasis in 
original] 
 
The Leopard was replete with such colorful language, and the text was often 
accompanied with graphic images of Nigerian atrocities such as one front page that had a 
photograph of a decapitated body. The article asked the reader whether he recognized the 
person in the photo before disclosing that the image is “the dismembered body of a 
Biafran (probably your own relation) and one of the 30,000 other Biafran victims 
murdered by Northern Nigerians barely two years ago.” The article then detailed how the 
massacres of 1966 were but a foreshadowing of Nigeria’s aims against the Biafrans and 
concluded by reminding the soldiers that “TO B  ALIV  W  MUST KILL  V RY 
NIGERIAN HORDE ON OUR SOIL.”29 
The Leopard went through many content revisions in response to both the 
situation on the ground and as a response to military needs. In addition to the gruesome 
images, The Leopard had much in common with any military magazine, such as military 
related cartoons, crossword puzzles and brain teasers; as well as several recurring 
columns such as a humor section, and a section called Profile in Bravery, where historic 
acts of bravery, mainly during World War II, were recounted as an inspiration to the 
soldiers at the front. At first the cartoons seemed the fare of any magazine, with 
humorous scenes of a couple in the house, or a lovers’ quarrel gone awry. However, the 
cartoons shifted to that of a military and political nature by the third issue. Instead of a 
comic of a wife poisoning her husband and lying to the police saying she put too much 
                                                 
28 "Nigeria's 'Big Plan' Revealed," The Leopard, 16 February 1968. 
29 "Digging up the Past? Yes!," The Leopard, 31 May 1968. 
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pepper in the food, we are treated to a caricature of a diminutive Yakubu Gowon standing 
between the legs of a giant Harold Wilson on a map of Nigeria watching as a detached 
Biafra sails away into the ocean. 
 
Figure 5:  She Appears Near, but She Ain’t 30 
                                                 




Figure 6:  A broad and fit representation of Ojukwu is being held by the British and 
Russian leaders, who urge an exhausted Gowon to continue the fight.31 
 
As the situation in Biafra became more and more dire, the cartoons became more 
morbid. The November issue featured an image of a group of obviously white men, 
sitting in a boardroom labeled “International Observers HQ, Lagos”. One of the men, 
looking through binoculars into the distance, states “no blood mist!” Another man replies 
“then there’s no genocide!” Another caricature in that issue is even more gruesome, with 
a sign that reads “ oddan Barrack’s  arm, Lagos” and an emaciated soldier with a basket 
                                                 
31 "Wrestling Cartoon," The Leopard, 16 February 1968. 
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full of skeletons on his head walking through a field of corpses. The caption under the 
image reads “Gowon’s Harvest”.32 
 
Figure 7: International Observers HQ, Lagos 33 
                                                 
32 "Editorial Cartoons," The Leopard, 22 November 1968. 




Figure 8: Gowon’s Harvest 34 
The Leopard did not only create an atmosphere of fear and loathing, it also 
instilled a sense of patriotism, loyalty and morality. Several columns in the magazine 
stressed how Biafran soldiers were to act; in the face of the enemy, with their comrades 
in arms and in interactions with the civilian population. This kind of indoctrination served 
to give the Biafran soldiers a sense of moral superiority in the face of a bloodthirsty 
enemy that wanted nothing more than the rapine rape and pillaging of their country. One 
such column was called What Would You Do? In this column, the magazine presented 
the soldiers with several moral conundrums and invited the soldiers to send in their 
responses to win prizes. The soldiers were asked, for example, what they would do if they 
                                                 
34 "Gowon's Harvest," The Leopard, 22 November 1968. 
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came face to face with a friend fighting on the Nigerian side, or what they would do if 
they met a girl while fighting away from home and “forgot” they were already married.35 
While the point was, no doubt, to ascertain the soldiers’ commitment to both the Biafran 
cause and to their own morality, the questions presented in this section probably made for 
some lively barracks conversations. 
After the collapse of the Biafran lines in mid-1968, the Leopard disappeared for 
six months. When the last issue appeared, at the end of November 1968, the tone of the 
magazine had shifted dramatically. One recurring section, titled From Biafran Women 
and ostensibly written by one woman named Unamma who, in playful banter with the 
troops, made the soldiers aware of civilian life during the war. In one issue Unamma gave 
the troops insights on how to keep in touch with home; in another, she told the troops 
how the women of Biafra receive strength from the soldiers. However, in the November 
issue, Unamma’s tone shifts dramatically. Rather than tell the soldiers that they “are so 
serious minded as to melt a girl’s heart”, the November issue of The Leopard is much 
more stark in tone and bleak in message.36 By November, the magnitude of the military 
and humanitarian catastrophe was all too apparent, and Unamma stated: 
We fight for humanity. We fight for millions of refugees 
mortared out of their homes by Gowon’s soldiers. 
  
We fight for men and women crippled and bed-ridden with 
old age who have been forced to abandon their haven. 
 
We fight for young children who have lost their relations 
during their flight and are now children of charity. 
 
                                                 
35 "What Would You Do? ," The Leopard, 31 May 1968. 
36 Unamma, "Oh, So Chivalrous," The Leopard, 16 February 1968. 
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We fight for pregnant women and nursing mothers who 
lose their babies and often their own lives for lack of food 
and for excessive hardship.  
And we fight for young men who flee their farms and 
hopelessly watch members of their family die off through 
hunger. 
Above all we must fight to prevent Nigeria and Britain 
from adding to the number of these destitute persons.37 
 
The November issue is important, not just because of the bleak tone in the face of 
the military meltdown that saw the Nigerian Army capture every major Igbo population 
center. While every soldier on the front most likely witnessed the collapse of the Biafran 
military firsthand, and suffered from the lack of food, supplies and ammunition, the 
appearance of a new issue of The Leopard, after a six month absence was likely a salve 
on the beleaguered soldiers’ spirits, as it showed that the situation had stabilized enough 
to allow the magazine to return to publication. Moreover, the lead story in the issue 
explained in very simple terms why the Nigerians were suddenly able to establish 
themselves in the Igbo heartland  “the answer is British and American treachery!”38 
The November issue of The Leopard went to great lengths to explain to the troops 
both that the military situation had stabilized and that the losses to the Nigerians had been 
temporary and reversible. The loss of Port Harcourt severely hampered the supply 
situation in Biafra, at least temporarily, and most soldiers were keenly aware of the 
shortages during Nigeria’s push to end the war during the second half of 1968. By 
placing the blame on Britain and the United States, the Biafran propaganda writers were 
able to drive home two points. First, they painted Biafrans as standing up to neo-colonial 
                                                 
37 ———, "From Biafran Women," The Leopard, 22 November 1968. 
38 "Don't Let the Vandals Go!," The Leopard, 22 November 1968. 
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powers that were bent on helping Nigeria plunder the wealth of the Igbo, while turning a 
blind eye to Nigeria’s genocide. Second, they were able to show that Nigeria’s successes 
were not due to any weakness on Biafra’s part, but rather due to foreign meddling that 
undermined Biafra’s supply lines.  
The claim put forward in the magazine merits special attention because it serves 
as an excellent case study in how Biafran propaganda was formulated, edited and 
packaged for consumption. The article is very well constructed, and is built around two 
highly publicized incidents that most soldiers in Biafra would have been aware of. First, 
cut off from supplies by land and sea, the Biafran military suffered acute shortages, 
leaving the defenders of many Biafran cities with minimal ammunition. As the article 
states, the defenders at Aba and Owerri were reportedly only issues with five bullets to 
stave off the Nigerian assault on the towns. 
The arms shipments into Biafra organized by Hank Wharton suddenly ceased. 
Wharton, a maverick gun runner, who had been delivering guns and ammunition to 
Eastern Nigeria as early as October 1966, had the only two airplanes that were flying into 
Biafra for most of the first half of the war. Wharton was contracted by the Biafran 
Government to ferry weapons, as well as most of the Church Aid organizations to fly in 
relief supplies for the civilian population. Because of the stress on the engines from 
flying supplies, Wharton’s two Super Constellation aircraft developed engine trouble 
while flying from Sao Tome to the Biafran airstrip “Annabelle” at Uli. In one highly 
publicized incident, Wharton’s crew had to jettison eleven tons of arms destined for 
Biafra after one of the engines on the plane cut out. Both of the planes eventually 
returned to Lisbon, where they never flew again. Wharton was able to secure other planes 
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to fly into Biafra with supplies from the various church organizations, but he was never 
contracted by Ojukwu again. 39 
While both of these incidents were very well publicized, the Propaganda 
Directorate took these stories and concocted a fanciful story of international intrigue and 
betrayal aimed at galvanizing the soldiers’ perception that the Western  owers were 
conspiring to allow Nigeria to kill the Igbo and plunder the wealth of the land. Claiming 
to quote a British magazine called Private Eye, which The Leopard billed as “the 
authoritative British magazine that specializes in intelligence and espionage stories,”40 
The Leopard gave a fanciful story of how British Intelligence unsuccessfully attempted to 
bribe Wharton for months to stop sending aid to Biafra “until August 1968 when they 
finally succeeded in persuading Wharton to change his allegiances to their side.”41 The 
British magazine quoted did exist (and continues to publish to this day), but it was not, as 
the Biafrans claimed, an intelligence and espionage magazine. It began publication in 
1961 and continues to this day to be one of the largest circulating political satire 
magazines in the United Kingdom. Further, Wharton continued to fly into Biafra bringing 
much needed supplies, even after his reported betrayal. One incident in October 1968 saw 
                                                 
39  or a detailed biography of Henry “Hank” Wharton, see Peter Marson, "Prop 
Personailty - Hank Wharton," Propliner Aviation Magazine, December 1981. An in 
depth discussion of the air war, including a detailed discussion of each plane, civilian 
and military, that took part on either side of the war was written by Michael Draper in 
Michael I. Draper, Shadows: Airlift and Airwar in Biafra and Nigeria 1967-1970 
(Aldershot: Hikoki Publications, 2000). 




one of Wharton’s planes at the airstrip at Uli destroyed by another plane landing at the 
airstrip. Another incident, in December of the same year ended with one of the Super 
Constellations crashing on approach to Uli, killing all four crewmembers.42 
In actuality, Wharton’s arms shipments, though vital to Biafra, could never keep 
up with the Biafran demands for arms and ammunition.  ventually Ojukwu’s government 
was able to secure other clandestine means of procurement, and contrary to the 
propaganda, between July and October 1968, Biafra’s arms supply grew from ten to two 
hundred tons per week.43 Wharton continued to fly into Biafra, contracting exclusively 
with the aid organizations to ship humanitarian supplies into the besieged Igbo enclave. 
However, using Wharton as a scapegoat for Biafran propaganda provided the soldiers 
with a simple, easy to grasp explanation as to why the Nigerians were able to capture 
almost the entire Igbo heartland before their advance was finally halted.   
Further, adding the United States to the list of countries conspiring against Biafra 
made it appear that the entire world, East and West, was truly against Biafra. The 
Biafrans had tried many times to enlist American support to arrange a ceasefire or, failing 
that, to help arrange for a humanitarian relief corridor. Further, the Johnson 
                                                 
42 Marson, "Prop Personailty - Hank Wharton," 30. Annabelle was a makeshift airstrip 
and was used almost exclusively at night in blackout conditions for fear of Nigerian 
attacks on the airstrip. When a plane was on final approach, the land crew at the strip 
would flash the runway lights for no more than 5 seconds and the pilot would then have 
to make the rest of the approach in the dark. Incidents like Wharton’s in October 1968 
were not uncommon. Interview with Col. Benjamin Okafor, Chief of Biafran Air Force; 
July 18
th
, 2007.  
43 Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 222. 
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Administration was heavily invested in mediating between the sides at the peace talks, 
especially in Kampala. Johnson himself was keen to stop the bloodshed and alleviate the 
suffering of the civilian population, going so far as to donate six Super Constellation 
aircraft to the relief efforts as one of the last acts of his presidency. However, the United 
States’ reluctance to play a major role in the conflict led Johnson’s National Security 
Advisor, Walt Rostow, to state in a memo “we are doing everything we can, which is 
very little.”44 Biafran disillusion with the Johnson administration was buoyed by the 
statement of then candidate Richard Nixon that “genocide is what is taking place right 
now – and starvation is the grim reaper […] this is not the time to stand on ceremonies or 
to observe diplomatic niceties.”45 
The propaganda department supplied the military with a somewhat credible story 
to sell to their soldiers that placed the blame for Biafra’s collapse squarely on the rest of 
the world. By concocting a story that the soldiers in the field had no way to verify, and 
manipulating the rumors of lack of ammunition that every Biafran soldier must have 
experienced, the article did an excellent job of helping to stop the panic and reinforce the 
troops’ will to fight.  
 
                                                 
44 Walt Rostow, August 14th, 1968. 
45 “Nixon’s Call for American Action on Biafra,” September 9, 1968, cited in Stremlau, 
The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 289. Also see George A. Obiozor, 
The United States and the Nigerian Civil War: An American Dilemma in Africa 1966-




Like any modern advertising firm, the Biafran propaganda arm engaged in 
extensive market research to evaluate the effectiveness of its propaganda campaign. Like 
most Biafran documents, most of the research reports are unavailable, but the few that 
exist give us a glimpse into the methodology and importance that the Biafrans placed on 
the propaganda efforts, especially in regards to the local population. The report “"What 
Biafrans Know About the Nigeria/Biafra War”46, though undated, was most likely written 
in early 1969.47 
The report deals with interpreting a survey about various perceptions of the war 
and segmenting these perceptions by age groups, sex, education levels and ethnicity. The 
stated goal of the report was to “help in some small way to make our national propaganda 
campaigns more effective and more successful. This alone can JUSTIFY the amount of 
labour that goes into the production of a report of this nature. [ mphasis in original]”48 
                                                 
46 "What Biafrans Know About the Nigeria/Biafra War," ed. Research Bureau Appraisal 
Committee (Enugu (Aba): Appraisals Committee, Directorate for Propaganda, n.d 
(1969)). 
47 Though there is no date assigned to the document, it was most likely written in March 
of 1969. The Biafran government continued to place all their documents at Enugu, 
though the city was one of the first taken by Nigerian troops, in October 1967, shortly 
after the collapse of the Midwest Offensive. However, this document states the 
situation on the ground that corresponds with early 1969. Further, the Land Army 
scheme was introduced in early 1969, as a way to both relieve pressure on the 
population’s dwindling food supply and to address the international pressure that was 
increasingly skeptical of Biafra’s viability as a state.  
48"What Biafrans Know," 35. 
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More importantly, the report asked questions designed, not only to ascertain the Biafran 
people’s morale, but to ascertain the effectiveness of the Propaganda Directorate in 
reaching the various demographics in the country. Not only was the education level of 
primary concern, but the sex and the “war weariness” of the respondents merited special 
consideration. The report voiced a general concern of the effectiveness of the 
propaganda. While 5 .9% of the respondents agreed that “Biafra is continuing to fight 
because we want to prevent Nigeria from killing us off”, the report stated that number 
was extremely low “since genocide has been Biafra’s propaganda trump card, and indeed 
the single greatest factor that makes Biafrans to persist in the fight against all odds.”49 
The report’s main goal was to give “some insight as to the people’s attitude on the 
basic issues […] to shift around our points of emphasis to meet the challenges of our 
national propaganda campaigns.”50 The report was split into several segments about the 
causes of the war, conduct of the war, outside involvement, settlement of the war and the 
Land Army scheme. Results were analyzed by location, sex, educational status and age 
groups, with several sections overlapping.  or example, the report found that “female 
youths, as a group, appear least committed to the struggle […] This attitude appears quite 
dangerous at a time when the females, especially the female youths, are being called upon 
to take over the running of this nation so that the males can move to the war fronts.”51 
One section of the report deals extensively with the Land Army Scheme. The 
Land Army Scheme was a program designed to alleviate the starvation in Biafra whereby 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 15. 




communities would grow food; part of which would be distributed both among the 
community and the other would be handed over to the government for redistribution. 
While a more in depth discussion of the Land Army Scheme will be detailed in the next 
chapter, the scheme was very important to the propagandists, because “a clear knowledge 
about the pattern of the distribution of the rewards of any project of the society influences 
their degree of participation and enthusiasm in it and therefore the success of the 
project.”52 It was thus imperative that the Biafran government know the extent of the 
penetration of their messages. The Land Army Scheme survey provides us with a concise 
example of how the Appraisals Committee collected and analyzed data and how they 
arrived at their recommendations. 
The Appraisals committee sought to ascertain how well propaganda was being 
received among different demographics, such as age groups, sex, education levels and 
income levels. Segmenting the population served an important purpose, as different 
groups required different strategies to be effective. In the case of the Land Army Scheme, 
the committee asked one question:  
How will the proceeds of the Land Army Scheme 
organized in your town or village be used? 
a) Will be taken by the Government 
b) Will be shared between the Government and 
people 
c) Will be handed over to the Army 
d) Will be shared among the people 
e) I don’t know53 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 32. 
53 Ibid., 32. 
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Though the survey methodology is not clear, and the perils of conducting such 
surveys under siege and without were laid out in the guidelines, the fact that the 
Appraisals Committee was able to conduct surveys at all is remarkable. Though the 
surveys were very small in scale, with 902 respondents, the Appraisals Committee used 
these responses to give recommendations about how to approach propaganda. In the case 
of the Land Army Scheme, the answer the survey was looking for was that he proceeds 
would be shared between the government and the people. That answer garnered 57.9%, 
which, according to the survey authors, “is too small a number to know this. The people 
were therefore poorly informed on the exact nature of their reward as motivation device 
for the success of the project.”54 
It was not only in the Land Army Scheme that the appraisals committee sought to 
give the other offices of the Propaganda Directorate a snapshot of the state of the 
propaganda efforts. In another question section, entitled “Settlement of the War”, the 
appraisals committee queried the public on their perceptions on the resolution of the war. 
Though the questions asked how Biafrans thought both Nigeria and Biafra desired to end 
the war, the real motive behind the questions was to gauge how the Biafran population 
saw Nigeria as a militaristic power that was bent on either a military defeat of Biafra or 
of killing every Biafran, which polled 65.9% and 24.2%, respectively. 55  
The authors of the report broke the results according to age, sex and education. In 
all the responses, young women were the least likely to reply with the desired response. 
This troubled the authors of the report who equated the lack of knowledge about the 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 33. 
55 Ibid., 27. 
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situation with lack of commitment to the Biafran cause and then proposed ways to rectify 
the situation. Specifically, the authors of the report saw a marked difference between the 
literate and the illiterate in the ways each of the groups understood the political dynamics 
of the war.  
 
DIRECTIVES AND ANALYSIS 
Not only did the appraisals committee set guidelines for propaganda and compiled 
detailed surveys on the effect and penetration of the various propaganda messages; they 
also critiqued the various propaganda outlets. In a report titled A Critique of Propaganda 
Radio Programmes, published in October of 1969, the Appraisals Committee, which by 
now had been organized into different divisions, filed a detailed critique of four radio 
programs, Early Bird Show, Newstalk, Outlook and Calling Biafrans Behind Enemy 
Lines. The report evaluated “the propaganda effectiveness of the scripts’ methods of 
persuasion” of each show, according to its audience  the appropriateness of message and 
the ways it reached, or failed to reach, its audience.56 Though this report is the only extant 
one and is numbered the 14
th 
such critique, it is, by the committee’s own admission, “by 
far less comprehensive and less ambitious” than the other reports on the subject. 
However, it shows the underlying attitudes behind the methods that the Biafrans sought 
to disseminate their information. 57 
                                                 
56 "A Critique of Propaganda Radio Programmes," ed. Research & Publications 
Divisions Appraisal Committee (Enugu (Aba): Ministry of Information, 1969), 2. 
57 Ibid., 2. 
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Because the recordings of the broadcasts do not exist (it is unknown whether 
many of them were ever recorded) and most of their scripts are lost as well, the existing 
critique of radio programs not only provides us with insight regarding Biafra’s 
propaganda quality assessment, but also serves as the only way to show what content was 
broadcast. The radio aspect of the Biafran propaganda is especially important for several 
reasons. First, the immediacy of radio allowed the Biafran propagandists a much quicker 
turnaround in reacting to events. When anti war riots broke out in the Yoruba Western 
Region, Radio Biafra was quick to produce a piece showcasing the casualties that the 
Yoruba were suffering in the east and to portray the Yoruba leadership as subservient to 
the Hausa. Radio was thus much quicker to disseminate information than the print 
sources could ever hope to be, especially in a war torn country with limited capacity to 
transport large quantities of newspaper across the countryside, where most of the Igbo 
lived.  
Second, the majority of the population, especially the rural population, was 
illiterate. This fact, coupled with the limitations in producing and transporting printed 
matter, meant that the main method of reaching the local population was through radio 
broadcasts. Furthermore, the logistic restrictions of reaching the local population were 
compounded when trying to spread propaganda abroad, especially in Nigeria where 
possession of Biafran propaganda was a treasonous offence.58 
However, radio itself presented a unique problem in that it required both transistor 
sets to operate and batteries or access to electricity to run. Both the radios themselves and 
                                                 
58 As was listening to Biafran radio. 
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the power sources to run them were in short supply. Though the Guide Lines report did 
specify that propaganda agents were to supply batteries for radios in marketplaces so that 
the radios remained tuned to Biafra Radio, the war was going increasingly badly for the 
Biafrans and even supplying batteries to the marketplaces became increasingly difficult.59   
The two most important points of Biafran propaganda were that the Biafrans 
alone wanted peace and that the Nigerians, along with their international allies (namely 
Britain, the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, the United States) comprised a cabal 
bent on rejecting any negotiated solution, thus facilitating Nigeria’s genocidal war against 
the Igbo. Each of the propaganda scripts are evaluated by their targets (i.e. what was the 
script attempting to engage), message, technique and style; then checked for their 
appropriateness to their intended audiences. Lastly, the propaganda pieces were evaluated 
as to how well they meshed with the broader propaganda effort as laid out by Propaganda 
Directorate.60 
The most important aspect of the Biafran message was to remind the people that 
“Nigeria is bent on a military solution unlike Biafra which stands for a peaceful 
settlement of the crisis.”61 Not only was this aspect continually addressed, but the global 
dimensions of Biafra’s plight, standing alone while Nigeria conspires with Britain and the 
Soviet Union, was also repeatedly mentioned. It was thus, when the military situation 
became increasingly hopeless that the Biafran Government hoped to hold out long 
enough to convince the FMG to return to the negotiating table and conclude a treaty that 
                                                 
59 "Guide Lines for Effective Propaganda," 35. 
60 "A Critique of Propaganda Radio Programmes," 19. 
61 Ibid., 4. 
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would, if not save Biafra’s independence, at least mitigate the effect of Gowon’s twelve 
state solution on the Igbo, who perceived a very real threat for the implementation of the 
new Federal structure. Unlike the euphoria of the summer of 1967, Biafra was now 
largely an Igbo enclave, surrounded by a much stronger and better supplied Federal 
government, with little hope of winning the war on the battlefield. 
In all, the appraisals committee sought to keep Biafran propaganda clear, concise 
and, most importantly, concerted and on message both in the pieces for domestic 
consumption and for foreign ears. This was especially important because of the limited 
access the Biafrans had to the airwaves. It was thus important that there be no easily 
verifiable discrepancies between the domestic propaganda and the messages for the rest 
of the world, as such disconnects would undermine the overall credibility of Biafran 
propaganda. 
Similarly, to make use of the limited resources, the Propaganda Directorate 
sought to use easily understandable language, which would be comprehensible to people 
of all education levels. Indeed, one of the criteria of an effective propaganda piece was 
for the writing style to be “clear, non-professional and straightforward,”62 or “simple and 
non-professional and therefore easy for the audience to understand.”63 
In general, the pieces evaluated stick to the same theme and use much the same 
language to portray Biafra as the sole proponent of peace. Similarly, people like Anthony 
Enahoro and Nnamdi Azikiwe (Zik), suffer consistent ad hominem attacks throughout the 
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programs. Enahoro comes under attack in a piece called No ‘Air-Armada’ for Biafra.64 In 
this piece, Enahoro was called a jailbird, a reference to his arrest, extradition from the UK 
and imprisonment during the Awolowo treason trial.65  nahoro’s awkward usage of an 
“Air-Armada” begged the comparison to the Spanish Armada that sought to invade 
England in 1588. Thus Enahoro was compared to King Philip of Spain and painted the 
former as the “top vandal leader, foremost advocate of genocide by starvation,” and 
“bullying, threatening, insulting and blackmailing.”66 However, the report criticized the 
use of the Spanish Armada, stating that the uneducated would need too much explaining 
of the historical context and the time could best be used differently.  
Azikiwe is singled out as a traitor and turncoat. Zik, despite being the first 
president of Nigeria, was one of the early supporters of Biafran secession, and even went 
so far as to write the Biafran National Anthem. After his defection to the Nigerian side he 
became a traitor and was venomously pursued by the Biafran propaganda. In one section 
of the critique, called What the People Say, Azikiwe’s defection to the Nigerian side is 
treated as an act of gross treason. In fact, the script “consistently [depicts him] in 
unfavorable connotations as dishonest, morally bankrupt, a traitor to his own people and 
as one that lies against his nation with the express purpose of pleasing his Nigerian 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 6. 
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masters.”67 Azikiwe’s declaration that there was no genocide in Biafra had disastrous 
consequences on the psyche of the Biafran nation. It was therefore imperative that the 
Biafran propaganda machine do its utmost to discredit him, his motives and his actions.  
Because of the limitations in effectively spreading propaganda, the Appraisals 
Committee sought to broaden the appeal and comprehensibility of all propaganda 
broadcasts. By simplifying the message, the appraisals committee hoped the radio 
broadcasts would be accessible to the uneducated people in the villages and to the global 
audience. However, this balancing act was not an easy one to follow. One script analyzed 
was Nigeria, No Closer to Unity in the Outlook program.68 This segment was directed at 
the Yoruba who were fighting on the Federal side and portrayed the Yoruba as suffering 
disproportionately while their leadership was “treacherous and selfish and signed away 
the legacies of Oduduwa land for mere office promotions and shining medals.”69 The 
appraisals committee lauded this report for its techniques, such as the appeal to 
ignorance.  
 or example, “at the bloody battles at Uzuakoli and at 
Owerri, Yoruba troops featured prominently as captured 
documents indicated.” This may well be true but if it is not 
                                                 
67 Ibid., 27-28. Though Nnamdi Azikiwe was the first president of Nigeria, he was also 
one of the first to defect to the Biafran side and supported secession. He wrote the lyrics 
of the Biafran National Anthem, set to the music of the Finnish anthem, a country 
whose spirit and tenacity he admired. However, in August 1969, he changed his 
position and supported Gowon’s One Nigeria.  
68 Ibid., 17. 
69 Ibid., 17. Oduduwa, or Odùduwà is widely regarded in Yoruba oral tradition as the 
semi mythological ancestor of all the Yoruba kings.  
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… the script is a complete departure from the week’s 
propaganda guidelines. We cannot excuse this departure. 
We recognize that the disturbances in the West at the time 
were attractive materials to Committees; but discipline and 
orderly campaign require that the national guidelines be 
followed strictly.71 
 
Though the details of the guidelines are never stated in the critique and the weekly 
guidelines are now lost, there was a set of rules designed to create and maintain a 
coherent strategy, both in Biafra and for foreign consumption. The extant critique only 
contains one program for foreign consumption, and even that one is aimed at those Igbo 
that lived in areas of Biafra controlled by the Federal Forces. This one document is telling 
and one of the strongest scripts analyzed, though the directorate identified many flaws, 
mainly regarding the comprehensibility for the targeted audience. 
The script, titled We Suffer Because We Are Black, in the program Calling 
Biafrans Behind Enemy Lines, though categorized as a very problematic piece of 
propaganda, nonetheless illuminated many of the arguments framing the Biafran side 
                                                 
70 Ibid., 18. 
71 Ibid., 19. In 1968, a peasant organization in the Yoruba parts of Western Nigerian 
began to petition the government for tax reforms. By 1969, this revolt became very 
widespread as peasants and middle class Yoruba united in their demands for lowering 
taxes, changing the tax collection system and improving infrastructure. By mid-1969, 
the protests turned violent and became known as the Agbekoya Parapo Revolt. Though 
not directly related to the Civil War, the Agbekoya Parapo Revolt strained the Nigerian 
Government and forced them to divert troops from the front to confront the protesters.  
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from a pan Africanist perspective. Voiced most prominently in Ojukwu’s Ahiara 
Declaration, the Biafran government sought to garner public support for their secession 
by claiming that their self-determination was part and parcel with the broad Pan-
Africanist movement. Though this script was nominally aimed at the Biafrans behind 
enemy lines, the committee found the content too high browed for the average Biafran. 
By comparing Biafran secession to the various Balkan revolutions against the Ottoman 
Empire, the program argued that racism informed the Western world’s support for Greek, 
Yugoslavian and Romanian secession from the Ottomans, while supporting the colonial 
structure of One Nigeria. Similarly, the failure to reach an agreement on the humanitarian 
corridors to deliver aid to the besieged Igbo population was also painted in racial terms. 
Thus, the committee determined that “the script paints a sufficiently ugly picture of the 
white world in his attitude to the black world.”72 
The appraisers determined that “this message of racism is fairly well developed” 
and went on to laud the authors in showing how Nigeria was little more than a 
“blackman’s black leg” in the cogs of the great powers  namely Britain, the United States 
and the Soviet Union).73 Thus, the script painted a picture of Biafran secession and the 
continued resistance to reunification with the “corrupt, oppressive, decadent and 
irreformable Nigerian  ederation” as a type of black empowerment fighting the white 
man’s double standard.74 
                                                 
72 Ibid., 24. 
73 Ibid., 25. 
74 Ibid., 24-25. 
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 espite the script’s propaganda strengths, the committee did not find it a proper 
work of propaganda for the targeted audience. The target audience of this program, as 
stated in its title, was those Biafrans under living under Nigerian control. First and 
foremost, as with the script on the Yorubas, this script did not conform to the weekly 
guidelines. Second, the Appraisals Committee determined that the script was “very 
academic and high flown” on several levels.75 As the Guide Lines for Effective 
Propaganda stated, the majority of Biafrans were uneducated and mostly illiterate. Thus, 
this script, designed to showcase Biafra’s struggle as one of black liberation, and portray 
Nigeria as a stooge of the white world, presumed the audience was familiar with world 
history, Pan-Africanism and global politics. The appraisers scolded the scriptwriters, 
saying  
Remembering that those behind enemy lines are probably 
mostly villagers, and therefore least educated, the script 
writer should have made simplicity his watchword. […] In 
fact, we feel so disappointed by the language of the script 
that we are almost tempted to suggest that this programme 
should be written in indigenous languages.76  
 
Third, and equally as important, the appraisers addressed the issue of falsehoods 
in the program. Though the depravations in Biafra, and subsequent accusations of 
genocide were a major part of the Biafran propaganda campaign and a global cause 
célèbre during the Civil War, many of the Igbo living in Nigerian held territories were not 
suffering to the extent that those in Biafran territory were. By projecting Biafra’s 
suffering onto the population that was not necessarily suffering, this piece was deemed 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 27. 
76 Ibid., 27. 
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catastrophic from a propagandist standpoint as it could be perceived as an easily 
confirmable falsehood. Thus the Biafran propaganda writers themselves fell into the trap 
of disseminating easily verifiable lies, and projecting their own lack of evidence onto a 
population that was in a much better position to determine the accuracy of their claims 
than the propagandists. 
Not only did the Biafran government have an extremely well organized and well 
developed propaganda arm, the extant documents show that they had an intricate system 
of checks and balances. Each part of the system was acutely aware of its role and the 
methods it had to properly prosecute a propaganda war. Radio programs played an 
especially pivotal role in the war, but only scant evidence of these programs remains. 
Almost none of the radio programs have been preserved, either on tape or in transcript 
form, and many of the content aggregators, such as the Africa Research Bulletin, largely 
ignored obvious propaganda messages in their reporting. By using the critique of the 
radio scripts, we can see not only how the programs were evaluated, but also glimpse 
their content. When studying Biafran propaganda for internal consumption, it is always 
important to remember that up to 70% of the Biafran population could not read, and were 
only marginally exposed to the printed propaganda. Though the majority of extant 
material forces us to give primacy to the printed word, even this small glimpse of the 
Biafran radio propaganda and, more importantly, the ways that the Biafran censors 
maintained quality control in their propaganda techniques gives us several insights into 




The collapse of the Biafran Military that was so crystallized in the fall of Port 
Harcourt to the Federal Forces changed the dynamic of Biafran propaganda. Though the 
goal of the Biafran propaganda arm was still to galvanize the people to fight, there was 
no longer a need to cater to a multiethnic dimension within Biafran society, because that 
dimension no longer existed. The suffering of the Igbo became the suffering of Biafra in 
a way that no longer needed explaining on a religious level. 
The propaganda thus reflected the state of affairs in Biafra; the country was 
largely reduced to a mono-ethnic enclave. The Igbo, who were the driving force behind 
Biafran secession were now the only people left in the nascent republic, and the need to 
keep the population fighting despite the continued setbacks is what drove the Directorate 
for Propaganda to focus their work only on maintaining the will of the Igbo to continue 
their resistance and despite the mounting suffering to the civilian population. For the 
Biafran propagandists the issue was to keep the population willing to suffer, and to 




Heroes Fought like Biafrans
1
 – External Propaganda and the World 
System 
 
The Biafrans faced a much different set of challenges abroad than they did at 
home. Internal propaganda focused on keeping the population willing to fight, suffer and 
die for the war effort, and the construction of the propaganda required a quickly changing 
message that could adapt to the situation in the country. In the rest of the world, where 
the day to day dealing of the war were distant and vague, Biafran propaganda had to deal 
with getting its voice to penetrate the international system. Though the Biafran message 
was very straightforward and sought to elicit sympathy and action that would translate to 
public pressure on world governments to agitate for Biafran sovereignty or, at the very 
least, a political solution that would be favorable to Biafran aspirations of self-
determination. 
When the Biafrans commenced their major propaganda blitz in 1968, they 
engaged the world during one of the most eventful years of the 20
th
 century. The United 
States was embroiled in a war that took a turn for the worse in February 1968 with the 
Tet offensive, causing major unrest in the United States, most notably at Columbia 
University.  Furthermore, two major assassinations, those of Martin Luther King Jr. and 
                                                 
1 In testament to the bravery of Biafran soldiers, French Deputy Foreign Minister, 
Raymond Offroy, said “Before I came to Biafra, I was told Biafrans fought like 
heroes. But now I know that heroes fought like Biafrans.” Cited in John de St. Jorre, 
The Brothers' War: Biafra and Nigeria (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972). 
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Robert Kennedy shocked the country. In Europe, French protests erupted in May 1968, 
effectively shutting down the country and led to the demise of Charles De Gaulle. In 
Czechoslovakia, Alexander  ubcek’s “ rague Spring” came to an abrupt end in August 
when Warsaw Pact Nations invaded the country and arrested him, which eventually led to 
his expulsion from the communist party. In the Middle  ast, following Israel’s victory 
over Egypt, Jordan and Syria a long and drawn out war of attrition ensued across the 
Suez Canal, effectively shutting down the major waterway. The fact that Biafran 
propaganda machine, operating from a small besieged enclave succeeded in penetrating 
the international system in such an extensive way is in itself a testament to the ingenuity 
of the heads of the Biafran Propaganda Directorate. 
The one consistent similarity between the propaganda initiatives at home and 
abroad was the genocidal aspect of the Nigerian siege on Biafra. Within Biafra, this 
thread aimed at galvanizing a people under blockade to fight to the bitter end. However, 
the aim of Biafran propaganda abroad was to internationalize the conflict and force the 
Gowon government to accept Biafran independence. To this end, the Biafran government 
mobilized global public opinion by propagating the notion that the Nigerians were 
waging a genocidal war against the Igbo. Much like the internal propaganda, the images 
from the 1966 Igbo massacres were used to great effect abroad. Further, the pictures of 
the Biafran children, with their bellies swollen from malnutrition gave the situation an 
immediacy that could not be ignored. 
While the images delivered a sense of urgency, the Biafran propaganda machine 
had to deal with an emerging global media. Unlike at home, where television was 
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virtually inaccessible except to the very rich and radio was uncommon in the rural areas; 
in the West, television and radio were both commonplace.
2
 In contrast to most Western 
countries, which had ready access to electronic and print media, the Biafran propaganda 
machine, operating from an ever shrinking and besieged country, needed to be extremely 
innovative in how they utilized their limited resources to gain maximum effect. Though 
internal propaganda had to be dynamic and constantly shift according to the ebb and flow 
of the war, the world outside Biafra was not as in tune with the daily goings on of the 
war. Thus the message did not need to oscillate and could remain focused on one key 
aspect; that of genocide. 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
The Biafran message to the world was clear and concise. Disseminating the 
message required much of the ingenuity that the Biafrans were famous for. The Biafrans 
utilized several methods to utilize the minimal access they had to the outside world’s 
media. The Biafrans had three major ways to disseminate their views: personal, printed 
                                                 
2 During the Vietnam War, in February 1968, the North Vietnamese launched what 
would be known as the Tet Offensive. Though militarily the offensive ended in 
disaster, nightly broadcasts of the events, including the fighting inside the U.S. 
Embassy compound in Saigon had a disastrous effect on American perceptions of the 
war. Some scholars, such as James Arnold and Don Oberdorfer, concluded that 
television coverage of the offensive was instrumental in American public opinion 
turning against the war. For in-depth discussions of the role of the media during the 
Vietnam War see Daniel Hallin, The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Don Oberdorfer, Tet!: The Turning 
Point in the Vietnam War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
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and transmitted. The personal method required direct contact between Biafran officials 
and the outside world in the form of interviews, press conferences and speeches. It was 
the most straightforward, but also the least effective for several reasons. First, 
transportation into and out of Biafra was dangerous, infrequent and costly.  
Second, Biafra’s diplomatic isolation as a secessionist state meant that Biafran 
officials were not afforded the same courtesy that their Nigerian counterparts enjoyed as 
a matter of protocol. This was not merely a matter of decorum in international relations. 
Biafran officials often had to travel clandestinely and were rarely afforded any 
recognition during diplomatic summit engagements. John Stremlau stressed throughout 
his work, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War that one of the main 
objectives of the Biafran diplomatic corps was to alleviate the diplomatic isolation during 
the war.
3
 These attempts led to several embarrassing moments during the series of peace 
talks in the summer of 1968 (discussed in detail in chapter 5). In one incident, Philip 
 fiong, Ojukwu’s second in command, was en route to Addis Ababa to meet with 
Emperor Haile Selaisse. During the circuitous route from Biafra to Addis Ababa, which 
included stops in Libreville, Khartoum and Athens, Efiong recalled that  
 
Sudan, at the time, was said to be channeling a lot of 
military support to Nigeria and the thought of what could 
happen to me if the Sudanese authorities got wind of my 
                                                 
3 John Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). 
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being there made me very uncomfortable while we waited 




The Biafrans attempted to make the most out of every opportunity in the public 
forum, often causing an extensive backlash against their efforts. In the first round of 
talks, sponsored by the British Commonwealth in Kampala, the Biafran delegation 
caused a media circus during their opening remarks, distributing graphic imagery of 
Biafran children in literature that equated the Igbo plight to that of the Jews in Europe 
during World War II. The talks in Kampala ended abruptly ten days later (discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5) and were followed by another set of talks in Niamey and Addis 
Ababa. These talks were sponsored by the OAU and the organization was desperate to 
avoid a fiasco like the one in Kampala. When Ojukwu was invited to Niamey to plead his 
case to the OAU leaders, he was escorted under guard from the airport and delivered 




Despite these restrictions, Biafran diplomats were extremely effective at 
organizing press conferences and embarked on many missions of shuttle public 
diplomacy, especially after the peace talks. Louis Mbafeno departed from Kampala for a 
series of talks in London where he blamed the Nigerian delegation for the collapse of the 
peace efforts. While in London, Mbafeno met with Lord Shepherd from the 
                                                 
4 Philip Efiong, Nigeria and Biafra: My Story (Princeton, Abuja, Owerri, Lorji: Sungai 
Books, 2003), 241. 
5 Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970. 
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Commonwealth office, much to the chagrin of the Nigerian government who saw this 
meeting a de facto recognition of Biafra as a legitimate political entity. In reality, the 
Harold Wilson government was attempting to deflect the growing groundswell of 
discontent regarding its commitment to supporting Nigeria militarily.
6
 Similarly, after the 
Addis Ababa peace conference Nnamdi Azikiwe held press conferences in London 
talking both before and after parliamentary debates about Biafra on 28 August, 1968. 
These debates ended in adjournment without a vote with chaotic scenes in the House of 
Commons. The British Daily Mail reported on the disturbances saying that after the 
House refused to vote on ending military supply to Nigeria, the crowd erupted with 
shouts of "shame" and "murderer!"
7
 Protesters subsequently marched on the Prime 
Minister’s residence, breaking two windows with bricks.
8
 This was not the first time that 
Biafran demonstrators had violently attacked British government buildings. On the same 
day, David Heaton of the Cabinet Office reported to the Commonwealth Office that 
 
I think you should know that last Sunday, 25
th
 August, at 
10:40 p.m. a brick was thrown through the ground floor 
window of the cabinet Office (70 Whitehall), wrapped in a 
piece of paper on which was written the words “Stop Arms 




                                                 
6 Biafran organizations were putting increased pressure on governments, with protests 
outside British embassies, consulates and missions all over the world. 
7 Alan Young, "Murderer!," Daily Mail, 28 August 1968. 
8 Efiong, Nigeria and Biafra, 250.  
9 David Heaton, 28 August 1968. 
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Similarly, the Commonwealth Office reported disturbances at British 
Representations in Copenhagen, Bonn, Munich, Ottawa and Montreal; as well as protests 
in New York at the United Nations. Though direct engagement succeeded in many ways, 
and the Biafran efforts included several very high profile statesmen, such as Nnamdi 
Azikiwe until his renunciation of Biafra in August 1969, it was very limited in scope and 




Despite its effectiveness, direct public engagement was only a small fraction of 
the Biafran push for international aid and support. Much of Biafra’s propaganda effort 
stemmed from a very innovative and successful use of mass media, especially print, 
television and radio. The most widely disseminated print news organ that the Biafrans 
directly controlled was the Biafra Newsletter. Though it claimed to be published in 
Enugu, this is highly unlikely for several reasons. First and foremost, the Biafran 
government lost control of Enugu very early in the war and never regained control of the 
city. As mentioned in the previous chapter, most Biafran government documents placed 
themselves as printed in Enugu, despite the fact that doing so would place the publishers 
in mortal danger, with the most likely publication location for most documents being at 
the second capital in Umuahia until its fall in April 1969. Second, the periodical was so 
                                                 
10  fiong’s trip from Biafra to the peace conference in Addis Ababa is detailed in the 
next chapter. However, he stated in his memoirs that he would have been stranded 
with his entourage in Athens had Gabon’s Omar Bongo (then Albert-Bernard Bongo) 
not provided him with money to complete the journey. 
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widely distributed outside of Biafra that publishing it within the country would have been 
very difficult, especially considering the paper shortages that forced Biafran documents 
to be published on school notebook paper, while the Biafra Newsletter continued 
publication unabated throughout the war.
11
 Third, the newsletter’s language was geared 
almost exclusively toward a foreign audience. Unlike other Biafran outlets that had to 
negotiate a balance in their programming that catered to Biafrans, Nigerians and those 
outside the conflict zone, the Biafran Newsletter was almost exclusively geared toward 
people outside of the warzone. Its emphasis on the genocidal aspect of the war was 
coupled with an accusatory tone toward foreign assistance to the Nigerians, especially 
from Britain, which appeared to be the main audience of the newsletter. 
Regardless of its publication location, the Biafra Newsletter served as the prime 
outlet for the Biafran message. Printed very clearly for external consumption, the Biafra 
Newsletter had three clear objectives that ran through its entire publication. First and 
foremost, the weekly newsletter’s main theme was the repetition of Biafra’s main 
propaganda point: the Nigerians were waging a genocidal war against the Igbo. With 
articles such as If Londoners Knew! the Biafrans sought not only to accuse Nigeria of 
crimes against humanity, but also to implicate the Wilson government as actively 
complicit in Nigeria’s genocide.
12
 
                                                 
11 Douglas Anthony, "Resourceful and Progressive Blackmen: Modernity and Race in 
Biafra 1967-70," The Journal of African History 51, no. 1 (2010): 52. 
12 "If Londoners Knew!," Biafra Newsletter, 17 May 1968. 
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In another article, titled Why Britain has Become Nigeria’s – Partner in Genocide, 
the newsletter argued that British economic interests were the single most important 
reason for British support of Nigeria.
13
 Stating that “Britain wrongly believes that to 
preserve her economic interests in Nigeria and Biafra, she must crush Biafra by 
enthroning Northern Nigerian  eudalism […] Yakubu Gowon is simply the Saraduna of 
Sokoto in military uniform”
14
, the article mentioned how the British government armed, 
trained and even fought for the Nigerians, listing the names of several British officers 
said to have died in the fighting.  
In another article titled Support Biafra, the newsletter encouraged open and direct 
support by individuals and countries. Ifegwu Eke, the Commissioner for Information, 
implored open direct support of Biafra from countries and individuals, saying “we have 
got lots of support now from all over the world, but sympathy not expressed in concrete 
terms is not useful so long as Nigeria continues its war of genocide.”
15
 The articles 
enumerates the reasons why open support would strengthen Biafra and force a negotiated 
settlement. The article focuses on practical and moral issues pertaining to Biafran 
independence and urges the reader to support Biafra stating Nigeria’s war as being “the 
gravest crime in international law, the most heinous crime against humanity – genocide”, 
and that by supporting Biafra, the reader “will salutarily indicate to Nigeria’s 
                                                 
13 Several recent works have placed British oil interests as the prime motive of Britain’s 
support of Nigeria during the Civil War.  
14 "Why Britain Has Become Nigeria’s – Partner in Genocide," Biafra Newsletter, 17 
May 1968. 
15 "Support Biafra," Biafra Newsletter, 29 March 1968. 
130 
 
collaborators that they are aiding and abetting a senseless war being waged in violation of 
the conscience of humanity.”
16
  
Closely related, the newsletter accused the world of standing idle while the 
Nigerians waged a war of extermination against the Igbo. The failure to supply relief and 
aid to the starving masses, coupled with the large scale bombing campaign against what 
the Biafrans saw as civilian targets, the Biafrans accused all levels of British society of 
complacency and complicity in the genocide. In one article, the Biafra Newsletter 
accused the Church of England of abandoning its morality by not standing up to the 
British government’s assistance to Nigeria. Citing several British clergymen who 
witnessed the destruction of a hospital at Itu and “condemned the silence of the British 
press and Church”, the article praised  ope  aul VI who both personally implored 
Gowon to end the war at its very inception and sponsored several goodwill missions to 
Biafra and Nigeria. Thus, it was not just the British government that supported the 
Nigerian war of genocide, but all levels of British society proved to be complicit in 
Nigeria’s “war of genocide, [which] marks not only the culmination, but also the signal 
for a total extermination of all Biafrans.”
 17
 
Biafran independence was espoused as the only option for the Igbo to achieve 
security. The article Give us The Guns, in November 1968, portrayed a noticeably 
different tone in the language of propaganda.
18
 The Biafrans here assert that they are 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 "The British Church and Biafra," Biafra Newsletter, 17 May 1968. 
18 "Give Us the Guns," Biafra Newsletter, 23 November 1968. 
131 
 
more than capable of fending off Nigerian aggression, but are unable to do so because of 
a lack of arms and ammunition. In an attempt to divert the issue from the hunger and 
suffering of the civilian population, the newsletter states simply that “the real cause of the 
suffering is the shooting WAR. As long as the shooting war continues, so long there will 
be homeless people and starving children.” The article continues to plead for a ceasefire, 
and states, “If there will not be a ceasefire, then – GIVE US THE GUNS. Biafrans are not 
a beggar nation, and despise the very idea of lining up for relief.”
19
 
Accompanying the articles was a series of editorial caricatures called Biafratoons. 
These Biafratoons lampooned the Nigerian Government, portrayed the Nigerian soldiers 
as illiterate cowards, and exalted the Biafran military and leadership. Furthermore, these 
cartoons ridiculed the relationship between the British and the Soviets with Nigeria, at 
times portraying the Nigerians as lackeys of the European powers, other times showing 
the Europeans as complicit in the genocide. Much like in the articles, European motives, 
mostly relating to economic pressures featured prominently as the main impetus for 
British support of Nigeria. Many of these cartoons were designed more for shock value 
than amusement and depicted scenes like that of a Nigerian soldier standing over a pile of 
civilian bodies, shooting the baby on the back of one of the dead women, while a group 
of vultures watches from a tree labeled “TH  SIL NT OBS RV R T AM”, a reference 
to the United Nations observer team sent to investigate accusations of genocide.
20
 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 




Figure 9: In this image, the Nigerian soldier appears to shoot innocent civilians while 









Figure 10: In this cartoon, Gowon urges the international observer team to sign his 
report stating that there is no genocide rather than risk their lives to see for 




In another image, a man in traditional Hausa garb reminiscent of the Sarduana of 
Sokoto is standing on a stylized map of Nigeria, armed with a spear. He looks in fear as 
the part of country labeled Biafra drifts away. Spearing the breakaway Biafra, the 
obviously Northerner yells “KWOM BACK BIA RA! [sic]”
23
 
The Biafra Newsletter thus acted as a call to arms for the world to assist and put 
pressure on the world to intervene to halt the war. As such, with very few exceptions, the 
newsletter refrained from direct commentary on the war except to highlight Nigerian 
atrocities and to publicize Biafran successes. Reporting of the latter, however, was 
                                                 
22 "Biafratoon," Biafra Newsletter, 23 March 1968. 
23 "Biafratoon," Biafra Newsletter, 1 March 1968. 
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largely abandoned when the successes that the Biafrans claimed could be verified rather 
quickly. In one instance, on 29 December 1967, the newsletter triumphantly reported that 
“the brigade commander in the Calabar region, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Adekunle, 
has been killed.”
24
 The report listed several other fanciful successes in Enugu, but did 
report the failure of the 2
nd
 Division to capture Onitsha in November 1967. Similarly, on 
16 February, 1968, the newsletter proclaimed that Biafran forces had recaptured the town 
of Nsukka, one of the cities to fall to the Nigerians in August 1967. Further, the paper 
reported Ifegwu Eke saying that Biafran troops had continued north and that the Nigerian 
military, led by white mercenaries had suffered what amounted to a total collapse. Eke 
described one story where a mercenary told his deserting soldiers “you idiots, go back 
and fight or I’ll carry out Gowon’s orders”, with the mercenary reportedly killed twenty 
five deserting soldiers.
25
   
However, throughout the war, details of civilian casualties were consistently 
listed, with the 17 January 1969 issue devoting four pages chronicling Nigerian air and 
artillery raids on civilian targets.
26
  
USE OF LANGUAGE 
The main theme that permeated Biafran propaganda was that Nigeria was waging 
a genocidal war against the Igbo, Thus, the Igbo, the so called “Jews of Nigeria”, were 
                                                 
24 "Col. Adekunle and 300 Enemy Troops Killed," Biafra Newsletter, 29 December 
1967. 
25 "University Town on Nsukka Recaptured," Biafra Newsletter, 16 February 1968. 
26 "Details of Raids on Biafra," Biafra Newsletter, 17 January 1969  
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suffering the same fate that their cousins, the Jews of Europe, suffered barely twenty 
years earlier at the hands of the Nazis. By focusing their efforts on this message they 
tapped in to the European collective memory of the Holocaust. The Directorate of 
Propaganda largely discouraged the use of European historical similes in propaganda 
destined for consumption in Biafra, claiming that the historical equivalents would be lost 
on people largely unfamiliar with European history. However, equating Biafran suffering 
to the Holocaust would immediately connect to the Second World War and the Jewish 
suffering where the memory of the atrocities that the Nazis committed was barely twenty 
years old.  
Biafra Newsletter determined to equate the plight of the Jews to that of Biafra, not 
only on a metaphoric level, but portrayed Hitler as Gowon’s ideological mentor. Calling 
Gowon a “pocket-size Hitler”, the newsletter stated that only “stern, rapid and effective 
international action against the Gowon brand of Hitlerism” could stop “the big and empty 
bully.”
27
  Further, the descriptions of the ways the Nigerians supposedly executed the 
Biafrans were eerily reminiscent of the work of the German Einsatzgruppen on the 
Russian Front during World War II.
28
 The Biafran account of the Nigerian massacres 
stated a pattern 
                                                 
27 "African Leaders and Biafra," Biafra Newsletter, 31 May 1968. 
28 The Einsatzgruppen were special SS death squads that followed the Wehrmacht on the 
Eastern front, entering villages, rounding up Jews and massacring them. The most 
notable Einsatzgruppen massacre was at Babi Yar on 29-30 September, 1941, where 




First, they line up all males above the age of eight and 
shoot them. Then the women and children are thoroughly 
whipped, with intermittent application of izal to the blisters 
made by the canes. The younger girls are carried to the 
North to become concubines to their ‘religious’ natural 
rulers. The women and children are carted off ‘to refugee 




As in the Jewish Holocaust, the survivors of the initial massacres were allegedly 
taken to locations unknown where they were either forced into sexual slavery or 
disappeared completely. While the Newsletter did not specifically accuse the Nigerians of 
setting up death camps in Lagos, the implicit connection was that these camps were 
indeed “taking care of” the forced deportees. Further, Nigerians were accused of 
transporting Igbo girls to Northern Nigeria where they were forced into prostitution, 
similar to the Holocaust where Jewish girls were forced into Freudenabteilung, brothels 
called Joy Divisions, where they were sterilized and used as rewards for German soldiers 
and non-Jewish inmates of the concentration camps.
30
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The Biafrans did not only use the memory of the Holocaust to further their cause, 
but they used the language of persecution against the Jews in general as a crux to their 
writing in the Biafra Newsletter. The massacres of 1966 were not referred to as such, but 
rather as pogroms; a word used to describe the mass violence against Jews in Eastern and 
Central Europe in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. 
By equating Biafra with the Jews of Europe during World War II, the Biafrans 
hoped to not only evoke the sympathies, guilt and anger of people in the West, but also to 
equate the establishment of the Jewish state to that of Biafra. Just as Israel was 
established in the aftermath of the Holocaust as a safeguard against future pogroms and 
genocide, only an independent Biafra could provide the necessary safeguards against 
future massacres from Northern Nigeria. Indeed, every issue of the Biafra Newsletter 
contained the phrase “ours is a fight for survival” as an immediate subhead to the title. 
On 13 April, 1968, Julius Nyerere delivered a speech to mark Tanzania’s 
recognition of Biafra. In the speech, he directly equated Biafra’s need for an independent 
state with the founding of Israel only three years after the Holocaust. He said 
 
Tanzania has recognized the State of Israel and will 
continue to do so because of its belief that every people 
must have some place in the world where they are not 
liable to be rejected by their fellow citizens. But the 
Biafrans have now suffered the same kind of rejection 
within their state that the Jews of Germany experienced. 
Fortunately they already had a homeland. They have 
retreated to it for their own protection, and for the same 
reason - after all other efforts had failed - they have 
declared it to be an independent state. […] We therefore 
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recognize the State of Biafra as an independent sovereign 
entity, and as a member of the community of nations. Only 
by this act of recognition can we remain true to our 
conviction that the purpose of society, and of all political 




The propaganda line stated that Biafrans were waging a war to stave off the very 
fate that the Jews suffered during World War II. Whereas the Jews had no homeland to 
flee to, and thus were exterminated in Europe, the Igbo fled to Biafra, where they took up 
arms against their tormentors. Much like the popular perception whereby the Jews were 
“given” a country as a means to prevent another holocaust from ever occurring again, the 
Biafrans were fighting for their own “Zion”, a haven against continued aggression from 
the country they claimed to have not seceded from, but rather to have been pushed out of. 
Thus, by using a language that instantly resonated with the British population, and 
urging the British population to counter their government’s complicit endorsement of 
genocide, the Biafra Newsletter urged people all over the world, but especially Britons to 
pressure their government to reject support of Nigeria and help to create the political and 
diplomatic space necessary to end the war with the only stated aim acceptable to Biafra: 
Independence.  
RADIO BIAFRA 
Despite the effectiveness of the Biafra Newsletter, the symbol of Biafra 
throughout the war was Radio Biafra. For most of the war, Radio Biafra broadcast from 
                                                 
31 Julius Nyerere speech. 13 April, 1968 
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Ojukwu’s bunker in Umuahia until 15 April 1969, when the station was relocated due to 
the fall of the city to Federal troops, after which it moved quite often to avoid detection.
32
 
The effectiveness of print propaganda, though undeniable, required an active 
readership and the creation of what  rank Biocca referred to as “the audience [having] 
active control over the structure of the information process and whether the individual is 
best described not as passive but as reactive to the structure and content of the media.”
33
 
In other words, for print media to be effective, it required an active readership willing to 
seek out, read and process the information. Radio Biafra broadcasts required much of the 
same active response, as it was only broadcast on shortwave radio and therefore less 
accessible to most households.
34
 Further, Radio Biafra had only one station transmitting, 
and only transmitted in English for a short time each day. Each issue of the Biafra 
Newsletter contained a detailed program guide for Radio Biafra. Splitting its time 
                                                 
32 The location is now the site of the Nigerian National War Museum. In his memoir, 
Obasanjo was impressed with the professional nature that the Biafrans employed 
concealment of Biafra’s sole radio station. Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command: An 
Account of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-70 (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books 
Ltd., 1980). 
33 Frank A. Biocca, "Opposing Conceptions of the Audience: The Active and Passive 
Hemispheres of Mass Communication Theory," in Communication Yearbook 11, ed. 
James A. Anderson (London: Routledge, 1988). 
34 Shortwave radio was prevalent in the 1960s mainly for propaganda purposes like the 
Voice of America and Radio Moscow, as well as stations like BBC World Service and 
educational stations such as French ORTF, which offered French Language classes 
over shortwave radio.  
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between English, French and Spanish from 6am until 11am, Radio Biafra then switched 
to Nigerian languages, broadcasting in Hausa, Yoruba, Tiv, Igala and Idoma with a 




Another major issue was the ability to effectively disseminate information 
through the fog of war. In "The Nigerian Civil War and Its Media: Groping for Clues", 
Françoise Ugochukwu argued that many of the problems for global media in obtaining 
accurate information were due to the lack of understanding of a distant African tragedy, 
and that for the Biafran message to be effective, the tragedy of “one death on your 
doorstep equals ten deaths in the neighbouring country and tens of thousands of deaths in 
Africa” had to be addressed.
36
 Even moreso, foreign agencies were reluctant to use Radio 
Biafra or any Biafran source as an authoritative voice. Several times, Biafran sources 
quoted military successes where none occurred, such as in February 1968, when they 
proclaimed the recapture of Nsukka by Biafran forces.
37
 
One publication, The Africa Research Bulletin, a news aggregator, consistently 
reported Radio Biafra’s reports of attacks  against civilians as well as purported military 
sucesses such as the fictive recapture of Nsukka as well as many of the important 
                                                 
35 Biafra Newsletter June 28, 1968, Jan 17, 1969 
36 Françoise Ugochukwu, "The Nigerian Civil War and Its Media: Groping for Clues," 
Media, War & Conflict 3, no. 2 (2010). 
37 "University Town on Nsukka Recaptured." 
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speeches such as Nnamdi Azikiwe’s speech to the 1 
th
 Battalion of the Biafran Army on 
26 February, 1968, where he said 
 
We are citizens of a free country who are resolutely 
determined to survive the onslaught of an enemy so as to 
preserve for ourselves and our posterity the heritage of 
freedom. We are fighting because there is abundant 
evidence to convince us that our very existence is 
threatened. If we fail to defend ourselves, we shall be 




Because of the proximity of its publication to actual events, and the fact that the 
publicationpublished most reportage regardless of source or veracity, the Africa Research 
Bulletin remains the most extensive source for Radio Biafra transcripts, if even in 
severely abbreviated form. Most media outlets, however, had reporters that authenticated 
their sources before publishing. Despite the fact that many news organizations, such as 
the BBC and Agence France-Presse had journalists in both Nigeria and Biafra, in many 
cases, even the simple facts of events were difficult to ascertain. In one instance, explored 
by Ugochukwu, a Swedish Red Cross plane was shot down by the Nigerian Air Force. 
Details of the incident and its political aftermath are discussed in depth in the next 
chapter, but Ugochukwu detailed the fact that it took over a week from when the incident 
occurred to ascertain the exact circumstances of the event. On the day of the incident, 
France-Inter, the news radio station of Radio France, reported that three planes were 
missing, while the BBC reported that the plane was brought down by anti aircraft fire and 
                                                 
38 Address delivered on 26 February, 1968 on Radio Biafra. Cited in Africa Research 
Bulletin 15 March, 1968 p. 984C 
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Radio Brussels reported that the pilots were captured near Calabar. In reality, the plane 
was shot down by a Nigerian MiG 17 flown by a South African pilot. Also, none on 
board the ICRC plane survived the crash.
39
 
Radio Biafra, despite being the voice of Biafra was limited logistically, as it had 
to broadcast in several languages and consisted of only one voice. Furthermore, its voice 
was muted by the layers of gatekeepers preventing it from receiving a wider audience 
around the world. The Biafrans were thus faced with a real need to penetrate the world 
media system in a meaningful and effective way. To do so, they chose to utilize a Swiss 
public relations firm called Markpress. 
MARKPRESS 
Markpress served as Biafra’s public diplomacy arm for the duration of the war. 
The public relations firm accepted the Biafran account in late 1967 and immediately had 
a profound effect on the conduct of the war. Though none of the material that Markpress 
released was of its own make, the firm made extensive use of its knowledge of the 
international media system and thus gave Biafra an effective way of penetrating global 
media. Time Magazine acknowledged Markpress’ success, saying 
 
Since January [of 1968], Mark-press has literally waged 
Biafra's war in press releases – more than 250 of them. 
They are crammed with news of impending arms deliveries 
                                                 
39 For a discussion of the media reportage of the incident see Ugochukwu, "The Nigerian 
Civil War and Its Media: Groping for Clues," 191. For details of the incident itself, see 
Michael I. Draper, Shadows: Airlift and Airwar in Biafra and Nigeria 1967-1970 
(Aldershot: Hikoki Publications, 2000), 177-78. 
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that is designed to embarrass European governments and 
with stark warnings about starvation. The firm has arranged 
air passage into Biafra for more than 70 newsmen from 
every West European nation and transmitted eyewitness 




Though Markpress released thousands of press releases until Biafra’s surrender in 
1970, its owner, American H. Wm. Bernhardt, made relatively few remarks regarding his 
rationale for accepting the role as Biafra’s press department. In one letter addressed to the 
editors receiving Markpress releases, Bernhardt stated that though his company had never 
accepted an account such as the Biafran one and only accepted Biafra’s account after 
investigating the situation and concluding that 
 
Our company felt that it had no alternative but to put its 
communications network at Biafra’s disposal, thus the 
Biafran people and their government, which is supported 
by a consultative assembly, representing all ethnic groups 
within Biafra, could be heard and defend themselves from 
false information flowing from Lagos. 
 
People all over the world are presently sending money to 
purchase food and medical supplies for the Biafrans. Our 
company is extending its services below costs as its 




Markpress contributed to the Biafran war effort, not by writing press releases, but 
by opening the country to reporters, funding their travels to Biafra and acting as a hub to 
                                                 
40 "Nigeria's Civil War: Hate, Hunger and the Will to Survive," Time, August 23 1968. 
41 Letter from H. Wm. Bernhardt to Editors receiving Markpress Releases. 25 June, 1968  
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release their stories, images and films. The company was so effective in their efforts that 
they were both praised and maligned using much the same language. Time Magazine 
reported in the same issue above that “the [Nigerian]  ederal Government admits that it 
has come out second best in the war of words.”
42
 Indeed, in response to Markpress’ work 
with Biafra, the Nigerian Government hired the British advertising firm Galizine, Grant 
& Russell. Company director,  avid Russell said “I think one reason we were taken on 
was because the Biafran account was dealt with so brilliantly.”
43
 
Criticism of Markpress’ effectiveness reached the British House of Commons, 
where conservative M  John Cordle told the House that “sincere people in this country 
believe the propaganda and muck which Markpress has put out about Nigeria. My heart 
boils when I compare this propaganda with what the Nigerians say for themselves.”
44
 In 
the only other open letter regarding Markpress’ involvement with Biafra, Bernhardt wrote 
“the photographs which have appeared in the Press are all taken by completely 
independent  ress photographers, not by Markpress or the Biafran Government.”
45
 
Bernhardt then accused Cordle of hypocrisy stating that Markpress was doing the same 
work that the Nigerians had contracted other public relations companies to do, and that 
the Nigerians had the added benefit of their own official government offices and the 
British Commonwealth offices assisting their public diplomacy efforts.  
                                                 
42 "Nigeria's Civil War: Hate, Hunger and the Will to Survive." 
43 Signing Off. Markpress. Jan 1970 
44 House of Commons, 20 December 1969 
45 Open letter from H. Wm. Bernhardt to John Cordle 24 Dec, 1969 
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Much of Biafra’s propaganda campaign around the world began to wither in the 
latter half of 1969, owing to the Nigerian military’s push that would end the war in 
January 1970. In October 1969, the British government released a booklet called Conflict 
in Nigeria: the British View, and widely circulated it to its representations around 
Europe.
46
 In anticipation of its release, the Foreign Office sent a letter to many of its 
embassies abroad, with the British embassy in “Switzerland  important because of 
Markpress  would have liked something more detailed.”
47
 However, interest in the civil 
had waned in many European capitals, even those considered to be very pro Biafra. John 
Wilson of the Foreign and Commonwealth office stated that  
 
The need for [special envoys sent to European meetings 
regarding Biafra] may be somewhat less. The Biafrans are 
now perhaps somewhat on the defensive even in 
Scandinavia […] Apart from this, pro-Biafran campaigns 
are no longer unchallenged and it seems to us that the peak 
of the criticism of our policies in Germany and Switzerland 
may have passed and that Markpress is now less widely 




Interest in Biafra in general had waned across Europe by the latter half of 1969, 
and most British missions were in general agreement with the fact that Markpress was no 
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47 B. R. Curson, "P.Q. By Frank Allaun on 13 October: Booklet on Nigerian Civil War," 
(London: Information Policy Department, 1969). 
48 John Wilson, 7 October 1969; FCO 26/302, National Archives, Kew 
146 
 
longer as effective as it had been in the earlier stages of the war. Further, the general 
consensus among British diplomatic staff was that the public opinion campaign for Biafra 
had waned enough that there was no need to stir up attention with either the booklet or 
and special envoys. The embassy in Rome stated simply that “in Italy, the Biafran 
propaganda campaign is now fairly muted and receives scant publicity […] but if the 
situation deteriorates again, we shall probably want to take up your offer.”
49
 Similarly, 
the embassy in Copenhagen reported that “ anish interest in Biafra is not at the moment 
acute”
50
 and the embassy in Brussels concurred, saying “at present Biafran propaganda is 
neither very noticeable nor effective in Brussels” and that “we do not think [engaging the 
Belgian press] would be useful and it could even work against our purposes by drawing 
attention to a situation which does not at the moment get much attention from the local 
press.”
51
 Just as the war was turning against the Biafrans, it appeared that Markpress’ 
reach as a media source lost much of its luster.
52
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In January 1970, when Biafra finally surrendered, Markpress released a notice on 
the closure of the “Biafran Overseas  ress Service”. Titled Signing Off, Markpress 
defended their support of Biafra by saying 
 
We have been repeatedly asked since the surrender whether 
we thought we had done the right thing in accepting this 
account. We are even accused of having prolonged the war. 
To answer this, one has only to ask some simple questions, 
such as  “ oes one believe in the freedom of the press?”, 
and  “ oes one believe that everyone has a right to be 
heard?” Negative answers can only mean press censorship 
and, in effect, a rejection of basic human rights. 
 
The Biafran people, no one can deny, fought bravely and 
from the highest motives. We are proud that we were 




In addition to the official mediums that the Biafrans used to bring attention to the 
world, many unofficial channels also existed that comprised of students, activists, 
scholars, both Biafran and non Biafran. In one dramatic example, Eric Beth, an assistant 
professor at Buffalo State University purchased almost an entire page in the New York 
Times to publish “An Appeal to Uphold a Right to Survival”.
54
 In his appeal, Beth made 
clear his agreement with the assertion that Biafran independence was the only way for the 
Igbos to obtain true security. Beth used the 1966 anti-Igbo massacres, stating that even 
Ironsi was powerless to protect the Igbo during the first massacres in May 1966. He 
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continued, saying “if  asterners could not be saved when the government was headed by 
a person friendly to them, how can any present or future government of Nigeria be 
expected to be able to protect them, even if willing?”
55
 Beth concluded by asking  
 
Does mankind prefer to put its stamp of approval on 
forcing people into belonging to a country in which they 
will be in danger of extermination? 
 
Whether the Biafrans succeed in defending their right (and 
the right of everyone) not to belong to a state in which they 
would be in danger of extermination by fellow citizens, and 





Biafrans abroad also flocked to support their fledgling nation. Perhaps the most 
prominent person to openly declare his support for Biafra was the boxer Dick Tiger. One 
of Nigeria’s most prominent fighters, Tiger declared his allegiance to Biafra very early in 
the war, and became a prominent spokesman for the country, donating his entire fortune 
to the Biafran war effort and receiving an honorary commission as a 2
nd
 lieutenant in 
Biafra’s “Morale Corps”.
57
 Tiger required that the Biafran national anthem be played at 
his fights, and in the prelude to his fight with Bob Foster (where he was knocked out for 
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56 Ibid. 
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Alexander Madiebo and Philip Efiong both criticized Ojukwu for placing such 
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149 
 
the first and only time in his career and lost his world light heavyweight title) he told 
Sports Illustrated  
 
Whatever happens, Biafra will never give up. This is a war 
of survival. If they left only one person, that person must 
fight until he dies. That is our country. They can't make me 
run away from my country. It's better that I die there than to 




In response to his allegiance to Biafra, Tiger was declared persona non grata in 
Nigeria and forbidden from ever returning to the country. This decree was finally lifted in 
late 197 , when a destitute Tiger, now working as a security guard in New York’s 
Natural History Museum, was diagnosed with terminal cancer. He was immediately 
allowed to return to Nigeria, where he died in January 1971. 
Universities 
U.S. student opposition to American involvement in the Vietnam War, especially 
by organizations like the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) led to the invention of 
teach-ins; large scale informal conferences designed both to educate attendees about the 
war and as an activist platform to agitate against it. The largest of these teach-ins took 
place at the University of California – Berkeley in 1965. The event drew up to 30,000 
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people and included speakers such as Dr. Benjamin Spock, Norman Mailer and Mario 
Savio. These Teach-ins became a staple of resistance organizations.
59
 
Many activist groups adopted the tactics of the SDS and other anti-Vietnam War 
activists. Biafrans and Biafran supporters formed campus organizations all over the world 
and conducted teach-ins, organized protests and staged several conventions, such as the 
Biafra Students Convention in New York on 24 November, 1967 and more importantly, 
the First International Conference on Biafra, held at Columbia University on 7-8 
December, 1968.  
First International Conference on Biafra 
Perhaps the single most important event in the United States in support of Biafra 
came at Columbia University with the “ irst International Conference on Biafra” on 7-8 
December, 1968. The conference attracted many scholars and activists, including Carl 
Gustav Von Rosen, who presented a speech about the military situation in Biafra, where 
he said about the Biafran soldier 
 
He will always question authority  he will say, “I will 
follow the right man anywhere but if the man is not 
superior, then I will not follow him.” He wants to see an 
intelligent man on top. So they are not good soldiers in the 
conventional way. But, they are turning out slowly now to 
an excellent defense of their people because each Biafran is 
a little army in himself and he will be able to operate both 
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at the front and far behind the Nigerian lines in a better way 




However, on the supply situation, Von Rosen said “as far as I can tell you on 
good days, they get 25 tons [of ammunition a day], and on not so good days, maybe 
15.”
61
 Interestingly, Von Rosen publicly spoke for the first time of an idea for air warfare 
that would become his famous Minicon squadron. In his speech about securing Biafra, he 
mentioned that a small force of sport planes could be raised for little cost and effectively 
“go in and smash those fighters and attack bombers on the ground which Nigeria has 
used to kill off the civilian population.”
62
 Von Rosen’s efforts to open the air corridor to 
Biafra and the creation of the Minicon squadron are discussed in depth in chapter 5. 
The conference included speeches by the Tanzanian ambassador to the United 
Nations, Akili Danieli, Nigerian experts Richard Sklar  and Stanley Diamond a poetry 
reading by Ifeanyi Menkiti
63
. In his speech, Ambassador  anieli defended Tanzania’s 
decision to recognize Biafra saying that Biafra was a case where the government was 
longer viable as it had lost the loyalty of a significant portion of its citizenry. Rather than 
Biafra acting as a catalyst for other regions to secede, Danieli argued that it served as a 
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63 Spelled in the conference publication as Mankiti. 
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cautionary tale. In an argument similar to Thomas  aine’s “Common Sense”, Biafra was 
a case where the state failed its people, and thus was no longer considered legitimate. 
64
 
Though the conference masqueraded as an academic one, it was set up and 
organized by scholarly activists and included several workshops including one on 
genocide, which concluded with a letter that was sent to each African country’s mission 
to the United Nations imploring them to “move the General Assembly of the United 
Nations to take appropriate steps to prevent or suppress the crime of Genocide in 
Biafra.”
65
  Other workshops included how to effectively raise funds for Biafra and how to 
engage the United States’ foreign policy and effective dissemination of public 
information. 
GLOBAL OPINION 
Biafran propaganda had a very palpable effect on global opinion, spawning 
citizens, both of Biafran origin and others, to create organizations, garner donations and 
even risk their lives volunteering to assist Biafra.   
Protests and Letters 
Biafrans all over the world bombarded British embassies, consulate and other 
missions with letters that went along with several protests. The British High Commission 
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in Ottawa reported a demonstration held on 19 July, 1968. Though radio and press 
announcements billed the protests as massive, according to the High Commission “only 
20 turned up and only half of these were Africans, the others being Canadian 
sympathizers.”
66
 Similarly, in New York, the NYPD warned the British Mission that a 
protest of up to 500 people would be staged on 2 August 1968. However, according to the 
communiqué “in the event they numbered about 35, mainly local Ibo students”, who tried 




The protesters handed W. N. Hugh Jones of the High Commission a letter, in 
which the British government was accused of being “ready to sacrifice 14 million African 
lives  in so far as they are not whites  if only to tap the oil wealth of Biafra.”
68
 Hugh 
Jones stated that the protesters, armed with signs against Britain, Russia and Canada 
marched from the High Commission to the Soviet Embassy where they attempted to hand 
the Soviet Ambassador a similar letter. A member of the embassy scolded the protesters, 
telling them that their letter was insulting to his Government and refused to accept it.
69
 
Similar protests took place in other European cities. In Copenhagen, the British 
 mbassy reported on 8 July, 1968 that “the Biafran Students’ Union held a second 
                                                 
66 W.N. Hugh Jones, 26 July 1968; FCO 38/222 National Archives, Kew 
67 J.R. Owen, 6 August 1968; FCO 38/222 National Archives, Kew 
68 Letter from Biafra Union of Canada to the British High Commissioner, Ottawa. 18 
July, 1968; FCO 38/222 National Archives, Kew 
69 W.N. Hugh Jones, 26 July 1968; FCO 38/222 National Archives, Kew 
154 
 
demonstration in Copenhagen on 6 July against British involvement in the Nigerian civil 
war […] Afterwards the demonstrators visited both the Russian and British Embassies 
and left the enclosed letter with our Security Guard.”
70
 
The letter accused Britain of hypocrisy, asking “if Britain supports genocide in 
Biafra, why not use force in Rhodesia to suppress their rebellion?”
71
 Implicit in this 
question was the racist element that the Biafrans accused the British of. Many Biafrans 
accused Britain of a double standard by allowing the Nigerians to wage what they 
considered a war of extermination, while not intervening against Ian Smith’s rogue white 
supremacist regime in Rhodesia.  
Several days after the protests in New York, the High Commission in Montreal 
reported a demonstration on 8 August, 1968. Similar protests were reported in Bonn and 
Munich by the British Embassy in Germany. The letter that the High Commission in 
Montreal received was similar in tone to the other letters, and added that  
 
One cannot but conclude that your policy in the 
Nigeria/Biafra conflict verges very much on racial 
discrimination, seeing that your government has been most 
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Though all the protests were undoubtedly passionate, the British diplomatic staff 
stated that no major incidents occurred in any of the protests, and all the protesters 
“behaved in an orderly fashion.”
73
 
In the United States as well, Biafran propaganda was having a profound effect. 
Images of starving Biafran children were on the news everywhere, and public pressure to 
help send relief flights to the affected area was mounting from all sides. One of the 
Johnson administration’s first actions with regards to the war was a presidential memo to 
General Gowon urging him to allow for the creation of a Red Cross airstrip at Uli. 
74
 
Though this still did not represent a drastic departure from previous US policy, it would 
set the tone for events to come. 
The administration was at first resistant to any direct involvement, despite much 
pressure from activist groups, concerned citizens, Congressmen and even the Mayor of 
Los Angeles. The Mayor of Los Angeles, Sam Yorty, urged the President to take 
responsibility and send a personalized team to assess the situation in Biafra. As a possible 
emissary, the mayor offered Senator Edward Brooke, Supreme Court Justice Thurgood 
Marshall and several others. Though the Administration only sent him a cursory reply, 
Walt Rostow, Johnson’s National Security Advisor, drafted a long letter explaining the 
US position on the Nigerian Civil War. In the unsent reply, Rostow stated 
 
We hope that others may be in a better position to bring 
about a peaceful end to the Nigerian conflict. We have 
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quietly encouraged efforts of the Organization of African 
Unity and the British Commonwealth Secretariat to bring 
the sides together. And we welcome the individual efforts 
of men of good will. In the last analysis, only the Nigerians 
themselves can settle their dispute and resolve to live in 




The letter from Mayor Yorty was one of the first letters to arrive at the White 
House demanding action regarding Biafra. When the scale of the humanitarian disaster 
became apparent, the administration was flooded with letters from all over the United 
States. People of every walk of life signed countless petitions, sent letters, photographs, 
and offered to donate money to alleviating the famine in Biafra. The intensity of the 
letters showcased the intense public pressure on the Johnson administration to act in 
Biafra.  
A letter from Robert Schulman, the head of the Department of Ambulatory Care 
at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Yeshiva College said 
 
Why should these people die --just one-- because the rich 
nations stood idly by when they could have helped, it will 
be another black mark on the history of mankind … and 
you, Mr. President, will be more to blame than anyone, 
because all you have to do is pick up a telephone to have 
the food sent. […] Will your conscience permit you one 
moment of peace if you let millions starve? If so then God 




                                                 
75 Proposed reply to Mayor Sam Yorty, March 28, 1968. 
76 Letter from Robert Schulman, 5/3/1968; B. 96 Biafra Letters folder, LBJ Archives. 
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While many of the letters to the President had such a strong emotional overtone, 
not all of them were as aloof and damning to a President who had little ability to act 
decisively to end the famine. Rev. Edward Riley, a catholic priest from New Orleans who 
was on his way to teach at a seminary in Ibadan, had a much more sober view of the 
situation, came to much the same conclusion of Schulman. In his letter, Riley stated that 
he understood the diplomatic difficulties in bringing food to Biafra, but the starving 
masses could not wait for a political solution. He ended by expressing sympathy for the 
decisions Johnson must make, not only regarding Biafra, but also on Vietnam, Civil 
Rights “and other difficult problems which daily confront you.”
77
 
Other writers had more practical requests. In a joint letter by several leading 
religious figures from the Boston area, the religious leaders asked why the United States 
had not offered any logistic means to transport the food.
78
 Another letter, from Conrad 
Brown, an editor from one of the publishing houses in New York, wrote “let us counter 
America’s bad world image resulting from civilian casualty figures in Vietnam by 
loading long range bombers with food for the starving children of Biafra.”
79
 
The Israeli government was also the target of a large amount of letters urging the 
Jewish state to assist the Biafrans. Israel’s position was unique, as the Biafrans went to 
                                                 
77 Letter from Edward Riley, 5/3/1968; B. 96 Biafra Letters folder, LBJ Archives. 
78 Letter from Bishop James Mathews (Boston Methodist Church), Rabbi Roland 
Gittelsohn, President Dana Greely of the Unitarian Universalist Organization and 
Right Rev. Frederic T. Lawrence (Bishop of the Episcopal Church of Massachusetts, 
n.d.; B. 96 Biafra Letters folder, LBJ Archives. 
79 Letter from Conrad Brown, 7/30/1968. B. 96 Biafra Letters folder, LBJ Archives. 
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great lengths to tie their suffering to that of the Jews during the holocaust. In one letter, 
sent to the Israeli Ambassador in Washington, Yitzhak Rabin, Simon Obi Anekwe, a 
prolific letter writer throughout the war, wrote to Rabin, saying 
 
I am left with the impression that neither Israel nor the AJC 
or other agency, has been moved to assist the people who in 
happier days had been their friends and have extended the 
welcoming hand. Even over the objections of Nigeria's 
Muslim leaders. I am puzzled to think that not a bottle of 
aspirin or a vial of penicillin; not a rubber ball are dying 
has gone from the state and the people possessed of such 
military and financial strength that they could stand up to 
the whole Islamic Middle East: not an ounce of eight to 




Anekwe concluded by saying 
 
The hour is late but not too late for you to reflect on the 
role you played in the face of Nigeria's attempt to do to 
Biafra. What Nazi Germany did to Jews in Europe. Justice 
and morality are universal. Genocide is genocide; 
extermination is extermination, whether by gas or the 
bullet. I hope when the history of the Biafran struggle is 
written, it can be said that Israel and American Jews 
reverted to the kind of role played by Pres. Roosevelt and 
setting the right course to a people whose plight parallel 
today in Biafra was crying out to the conscience of 
mankind. 
 
In another letter, sent to the Israeli consulate in New York, the President of the 
Biafra Students Association in the Americas, Godwin Anyaogu stated that “having been 
                                                 
80 Letter from Simon Obi Anekwe to Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin, 26 June, 1968; Nig. 
103.1, Non Gov. 1/68 –9/68, Israel State Archives 
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called ‘the Jews of Africa’, we are now passing through similar historical process [sic] as 
the Jews of  urope and Israel”, and continued by saying “our cries for help have gone 
unheard, and the same forces which have conspired to destroy the State of Israel are 
seeking to annihilate the Biafran people.”
81
 
Biafran students studying in Israel also formed student organizations and 
embarked on a letter writing campaign to try to sway the Israeli government to its side. A 
senior Israeli official, Yochanan Bein was visited by a Biafran Okey Anyadike, who 
introduced himself as the Publicity Secretary of the Biafran Union of Israel. Anyadike 
gave Bein a letter that read much like the letter from Anekwe, urging Israeli support, 
stating “very often people have pointed out the similarities between Israel and Biafra […] 
thus, by recognizing Biafra, Israel will gain a true friend among the progressive nations 




Bein attached a memo to the letter, which he circulated to the foreign ministry and 
the Israeli embassy in Lagos, stating among other points, that “I explained because of its 
size and struggle, official Israeli recognition might add prestige, but will bring diplomatic 
                                                 
81 Letter from the Biafran Students Association in the Americas to Consulate-General of 
Israel, New York. 17 September, 1968; Nig. 103.2, Non Gov. 10/68 –8/69, Israel State 
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Because the Nigerian press repeatedly accused Israel of actively assisting the 
Biafrans militarily, the Israeli government was extremely cautious in dealing with the 
Biafrans and kept its involvement only to humanitarian aid. In all, The Israeli government 
sent two military medical teams to rebel held territory, the first time the Israeli 
Government committed any troops to overseas deployment.
84
 The Israeli government 
also donated 20 tons of canned meat to Biafra, which was actually captured from the 
Egyptian Army during the 1967 war. The labels were replaced and sent to Biafra, though 
the source of the meat was not publicized at the time.
85
 
Clearly, the Biafrans hoped to enlist some material help from the Israeli 
government. However, the Israeli government, reluctant to take sides in the conflict, 
declined to openly assist the Biafrans in any way other than humanitarian aid.  
PRACTICAL EFFECTS 
Biafran propaganda’s main aim was to rouse global public opinion to such an 
extent that citizens all over the world would exert pressure on their governments to 
intervene to end the war. The Biafrans hoped that their public media blitz would sway 
                                                 
83 Memo from Yochanan Bein 15 April, 1968; Nig. 103.1, Non Gov. 1/68 –9/68, Israel 
State Archives. Translated by author. 
84 Aside from Search and Rescue teams to earthquake sites, the Israeli government 
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organizations, governments and individuals to assist in the war effort by either giving the 
Biafran army the means to combat the Nigerians, or by internationalizing the conflict and 
thereby granting a reprieve for the besieged secessionist enclave.  
Pressure to intervene 
The Biafran media campaign was one of the most effective in the history of 
warfare and led to a global outcry against the conduct of the Nigerian military and 
government in Biafra. More importantly, the campaign influenced British policies 
supporting Nigeria and forced the British to deal not only with the political and 
diplomatic situation abroad, but also created a groundswell of public pressure that forced 
the British government to react to the pressure and is widely cited as one of the reasons 
for Harold Wilson’s defeat in the 197  general election.
86
 
Elsewhere, Biafran propaganda served as one of the main catalysts that convinced 
Charles De Gaulle to support the Biafran cause, becoming the major supplier of arms and 
ammunition to the secessionist enclave. In the United States, Israel and elsewhere, 
support for the Biafrans put pressure on governments to help Biafra, if not militarily, at 
least with humanitarian aid. Most importantly, as the next chapter shows, Biafran 
pressure on the world helped to create the political and diplomatic climate where a 
political solution to the issue of secession could be resolved. The fact that the war did not 
end until Biafra’s surrender in 197  despite intense global pressure that resulted in 
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Analysis of Biafran Propaganda 
INTRODUCTION 
Biafran propaganda, despite its effectiveness, did not prevent Biafra’s demise in 
January 197 . However, while many commentators foresaw Biafra’s collapse in mid-
1968, the Biafran government continued its ill-fated fight for independence for nearly 
two years.
1
 The fact that the Igbo remained galvanized in the defense of their lives and 
country and largely believed that the Nigerian military was waging a war of 
extermination against them was testament to the efficacy of the Directorate of 
Propaganda and its overseas arm at Markpress. 
Throughout the war, the Biafrans used their propaganda as an effective weapon, 
both tactically and strategically. Tactically, propaganda created breathing space for 
political and military maneuvering throughout the war. At home, propaganda provided 
the will to fight, to suffer, to starve and to die for Biafra. Abroad, the images of starving 
children horrified and enraged the world, putting pressure on governments, especially in 
the West to act to end the suffering. This pressure translated into diplomatic recognition, 
peace conferences, humanitarian aid and military supplies. 
Karl von Clausewitz, one of the foremost military theorists of the 19
th
 century, is 
best known for his treatise On War; considered by many the father of modern military 
theory, Clausewitz established an overt connection between the political and military 
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 For Clausewitz, the act of war was not the failure of politics, but 
rather a part of the political process. On the tactical level, his work focused on connecting 
the goals and means of warfare in a simple way that had not been articulated before. War, 
as a political instrument, should only be used to achieve clearly articulated goals.  
Though propaganda has been part and parcel of warfare for much of the 20
th
 
century, the study of propaganda and its effects in wartime has largely been the focus of 
the political sphere and not been the subject to serious analysis from military historians. 
Biafran propaganda serves as a unique case study for several reasons. First, the Biafran 
government used propaganda as a central instrument of their war effort. Second, Biafran 
propaganda responded quickly and with relative agility to the changes in the military 
situation, both in its internal propaganda and to the messages it was sending out to the 
rest of the world. 
Analyzing Biafra’s demise through the lens of the propaganda campaign is both 
challenging and useful. Though it is tempting to dismiss the Biafran propaganda 
campaign by stating that wars are won on the battlefield, Biafra’s propaganda served as 
an integral part of the war effort. The Biafrans were acutely aware of the developments in 
the war theater and enforced strict discipline in how propaganda was disseminated and 
what messages would be pursued. Further, the Biafran side was largely fighting a 
defensive war, and thus the Biafrans did not have to win the war, but only had to avoid 
losing. A stalemate would have forced the Nigerian side to negotiate a settlement. 
Propaganda thus served an important role because by focusing on a message that stressed 
                                                 
2 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J.J. Graham (Ware: Wordsworth, 1997). 
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that the Igbo were literally fighting for their lives, the Biafran government made certain 
that the siege mentality remained; thus both the military and the civilian population 
would continue to fight. 
Also, the Biafrans sought to internationalize the conflict. Very early in the 
conflict, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) created a committee to help mediate 
the conflict. After a meeting in Kinshasa, the OAU’s committee, labeled the “consultative 
committee”, comprised of the heads of state of  thiopia, Zaire, Liberia, Niger, Cameroon 
and Ghana. Though the committee, in its resolution stated that the committee’s purpose 
was “to assure [Gowon] of the assembly’s desire for the territorial integrity, unity and 
peace of Nigeria”, the Nigerian government was skeptical, and feared that the committee 
would serve to internationalize the conflict.
3
 In fact, the OAU’s initial public support of 
Nigeria ensured that the Biafran question would never reach the United Nations and 
remain, if not a local matter at least a regional one. Further, by acknowledging Nigeria as 
the only legitimate sovereign, the OAU essentially agreed to Gowon’s one Nigeria, and 
thus refused to acknowledge Ojukwu as any kind of partner for peace until he accepted 
that Nigeria was to remain unified. This tactic further isolated Ojukwu in the international 
sphere and contributed to his waging the international conflict in the court of public 
opinion.   
When Ojukwu declared Biafran independence on 30 May 1967, the goal was to 
achieve independence from Nigeria. However, by the end of that year, it became apparent 
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that Biafra’s viability as an independent state was severely limited.  aced with an 
untenable military goal, Biafran propaganda ultimately failed to adapt to the situation. 
Furthermore, Biafran propaganda was so successful in the global arena that it created an 
atmosphere where continuing the war could have more gains than ending it through 
negotiations. Moreover, it appeared that no real goals of the war were ever articulated, 
and the success of propaganda created an ad hoc political atmosphere where the political 
aims were consistently shifting based on the momentary gains.  
Propaganda’s importance was also magnified due to the effects of global pressure. 
The Biafran government, buoyed by the global outcry and the pressure it put on 
governments in the West, though that the international pressure would force the 
Nigerians to accept a ceasefire that would be beneficial to the Biafrans. However, as the 
situation shifted from despair to hope, the Biafrans became less receptive to any end to 
the war. Only in the final days, in January 1970, Ojukwu actively searched for a solution 
that would give him any advantage other than abject capitulation. However, when 
Ojukwu realized the immediacy of his defeat, there was little he could do to avoid fleeing 
the country. 
Thus, propaganda created the political climate for a political solution that would 
secure Biafra’s return to Nigeria while safeguarding the rights and security of the Igbo. 
However, the Biafran political elites, namely Ojukwu, could not use the leverage granted 
to them by the global pressure to secure a political resolution to the war, choosing instead 
to use propaganda as a weapon to prolong the war, which eventually led to Biafra’s 
ignoble demise in January 1970. 
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PROPAGANDA AND PEACE TALK DIPLOMACY 
The peace talks in Kampala coincided with the Federal offensive on Port 
Harcourt. By the time talks began on May 23
rd
 1968, Bonny and Port Harcourt had fallen 
to the Federal Military. The Federal government made a concerted effort to capture the 
last port city under Biafran control before the beginning of the talks to underscore 
Biafra’s lack of viability as an independent state. However, according to Stremlaw, 
“Biafra’s chances of achieving complete and lasting sovereignty were negligible. […] By 
1968, Ojukwu’s overriding concern was to ensure maximum opportunities for Ibo 
political and economic self-determination within a new Nigerian entity.”
4
 Indeed, even 
during the height of Biafran euphoria during the Midwest offensive, Ojukwu made 
overtures to the Commonwealth secretary to broker a ceasefire and negotiate a 
settlement.  
Though Biafra’s prospects were bleak, the Biafran leadership hoped that they 
could hold out at least long enough to broker some kind of deal. The British International 
Institute for Strategic Studies surmised in their 1967 report that the Nigerians would not 
be able to effect a solely military solution to the conflict, citing in part that “the Nigerian 
Army of 8,    men […] was never intended as an instrument of invasion.”
5
 However, by 
mid-1968, the  MG’s military numbered significantly more than at the time of the IISS’s 
report, and more than enough to lay siege to, and eventually overwhelm, Biafra. Thus, by 
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the time the talks in Kampala began, the Biafran delegation had only one major 
bargaining chip: official renunciation of secession. 
On the other hand, the Nigerian government’s official position throughout the 
conflict was that any cessation of hostilities would only occur after the Biafran 
government accepts the twelve state federal solution of May 26
th
, 1967 and officially 
renounce secession. Further exasperating the Nigerian position, Gowon was under 
increasing pressure to end the war, especially considering his remarks that the Biafran 
government’s back would be broken by March of 1968. Though Gowon never intended 
this as a deadline to end the war, the Nigerian press did, and several papers used March 
31
st
 as the official deadline to end the war, with one paper even publishing a daily 
countdown to victory box.
6
 The frustration within Nigeria for lack of progress in the war 
was palpable and Gowon was under increased pressure to achieve final victory.  
Though Gowon was correct in his assumptions regarding Biafra’s military 
capabilities, the Biafran government was not willing to renounce secession until 
negotiations regarding the future status were negotiated. However, for Gowon, the only 
acceptable solution was that of the twelve states, and any cessation of hostilities was 
contingent on Ojukwu accepting that solution. The Biafrans thus sought to increase 
international pressure on the Nigerians to agree to negotiations that could lead to a 
compromise and an end to the war. Failing that, the Biafrans hoped to achieve some kind 
of de facto recognition by allowing relief agencies to work freely in the country, and to 
internationalize the conflict by bringing in foreign aid workers under international 
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auspices. To this end, the Biafran government, already suffering from acute material 
shortages for both military and civilian needs enlisted the directorate of propaganda to 
create a campaign that emphasized the genocidal nature of the Nigerian campaign. The 
Biafrans hoped that public pressure, especially in Britain and the United States, would 
pressure the Gowon government to the table and allow for the peace talks to go forward 
without preconditions.  
Biafran propaganda thus created a groundswell of public opinion all over the 
world, and Ojukwu hoped that this public opinion would pressure western governments 
to influence the Nigerian government to soften its stance and allow for talks that would 
stop the war, even if only temporarily and to allow relief supplies to flow into Biafra to 
alleviate the civilian suffering. 
The first attempt at a peace conference came in Kampala, Uganda with a 
conference sponsored by the British Commonwealth that began on 23 May 1968. 
Commonwealth Secretary, Canadian Arnold Smith, hoped that the direct talks between 
the Nigerian delegation, headed by Chief Anthony Enahoro and the Biafran 
representatives, led by Sir Louis Mbafeno would yield an agreement that would end the 
war, at least long enough for substantial peace talks to ensue. However, the talks quickly 
descended into a standoff, which Stremlau referred to as the “Kampala Confrontation.”
7
 
Both sides received strict orders not to deviate from their opening positions. For 
the Nigerians, this meant that the renunciation of the secession was a precursor to any 
talks regarding the final status of the Igbo within a united Nigeria. In fact, the Nigerian 




proposal on any ceasefire had the stipulation that twelve hours before the agreed 
ceasefire, the “Rebels will renounce secession, order their troops to lay down their arms 
as from the Cease-Fire Hour and announce the renunciation and the order publicly and 
simultaneously.”
8
 In his opening address to the conference,  nahoro stated that “the 
concept of Biafra is now dead”, reiterating the fact that most of the area that the Biafrans 
now controlled was part of the Southeastern State in Gowon’s federal plan for Nigeria. 
Concluding,  nahoro said “I suggest we address ourselves here at this meeting to the 
need to lay a sound foundation for a political solution”  a solution that hinged upon the 
Twelve States. However, Enahoro made one important concession when he agreed that 
the Igbo concerns regarding their security did indeed have merit. This concession paved 
the way to the softening of the Nigerian stance in the ensuing talks in Addis Ababa.
9
 
For the Biafrans, this stipulation meant nothing less that total surrender, and 
Mbafeno rejected the demands. In his opening address to the conference, Mbafeno 
reiterated Biafra’s propaganda, citing that the Nigerians were waging a genocidal 
campaign against the Igbo; and accompanied his talk with graphic literature depicting 
starving Biafran children alongside images from the Holocaust.
10
 For the Biafrans, any 
talk of a permanent settlement could only come after a ceasefire that would ensure 
security for the Igbo. 
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Because of the media circus and the Biafran determination to seize the 
international stage at the conference, the Nigerians and Biafrans would not be able to 
compromise their public positions. Furthermore, talks nearly collapsed after five days 
when a member of the Nigerian delegation, Johnson Banjo, disappeared and was 
presumed kidnapped. Both sides blamed each other for the disappearance of Banjo and 
the Biafran delegation threatened to leave if negotiations did not resume immediately.
11
 
After several days of wrangling, the sides returned to the talks where Enahoro laid out his 
plans for a comprehensive ceasefire and end to hostilities. In  nahoro’s plan, the Biafrans 
would lay down their arms and a force consisting of Igbo and non-Igbo would be 
responsible for security in the Igbo areas. Mbafeno and the Biafran delegation rejected 
the Nigerian proposal, stating that it amounted to little more than Biafran surrender.
12
 
Secretary Smith proposed closed door informal sessions where the Nigerian and 
Biafran delegations could discuss their positions. Despite what Smith described as a 
positive atmosphere in the private talks, they did not reach fruition, with Smith blaming 
Ojukwu personally for the breakdown in negotiations. In reality, both Ojukwu and 
Gowon intervened to collapse the talks. Gowon instructed Enahoro that 
The federal government must insist on the following: 
 
1. There must be explicit reference to the acceptance by 
the rebels of the twelve state structure. 
                                                 
11 Banjo’s body was discovered in a marsh outside Kampala several months after the end 
of the peace conference. Though the murder was never officially solved, the Ugandan 
authorities blamed the kidnapping and murder on Bugandan separatists. 
12 Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, 170-72. 
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2. No elements of the rebel forces can be included in the 
mixed force for disarming rebel troops. Rebel police 
must also be disarmed. 
 
3. Ibos will, like other Nigerians only be recruited 
individuals into the Armed Forces. There is no question 
of recruitment and formation of Ibo units for integration 
into the Armed Forces. 
 
4. There will be no question of an interim commission for 
rebel held areas. As soon as possible after renunciation 
of session and establishment of a cease-fire, the federal 
government will appoint a military government for the 
East central state. 
 
5. Cease-fire lines should be demarcated on the map and 
accepted as part of a cease-fire arrangement. 
 
6. With regard to an observer force, this may only come at 




Ojukwu, in a speech to mark Biafra’s first anniversary, declared that the Nigerians 
“believe in nothing but a military solution and would prefer that to peaceful negotiations. 
Their insincerity about the current talks has been borne out by Nigeria’s delaying 
maneuvers, first during the preliminary talks and now during the full scale 
negotiations.”
14
 Ojukwu then ordered Mbafeno to conclude the talks and leave Kampala. 
On 31 May, the talks concluded without settlement and the Biafrans left Uganda. The 
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next day, Radio Biafra announced that the talks were only intended to mask what they 
called “the Anglo-Nigerian war of total extermination of our people.”
15
 
After the collapse of the Kampala talks, the OAU stepped in to attempt to broker 
some kind of ceasefire that would let negotiations for a final settlement take place. Many 
in the OAU were desperate for a solution, because the crisis was threatening to split the 
organization. Not wanting to risk another failure like Kampala, the OAU decided on a 
second round of talks to be held in Addis Ababa in August 1968, with preliminary talks 
in Niamey.  
The OAU was formed in the aftermath of the Katanga Crisis in the Congo with 
the aim of preventing a repeat of the western intervention that created and propagated the 
crisis in the Congo. The Nigerian Civil War served as its first real test and threatened to 
tear the organization apart, due to the differences between the various members of the 
fledgling organization. To avoid a repeat of the failure of the Kampala talks, the OAU 
decided that before the meeting in Addis Ababa, preliminary talks were to be held in 
Niamey, Niger to formulate an agenda and secure at least an agenda for the talks that 
were to be mediated by Emperor Haile Selassie, with the consultative committee all in 
attendance. 
Though Gowon initially refused to attend the talks in Niamey and sent Obafemi 
Awolowo, the highest ranking civilian in the military government, in his stead, the 
OAU’s mediating committee requested he arrive to discuss several key issues. Gowon 
agreed, and flew to Niamey, but stated that the Nigerian Government would “prevent any 
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diplomatic maneuver which will enable the rebel leaders to sustain the rebellion and 
secession which they have lost on the battlefield.”
16
 Gowon’s assertion that Biafran 
secession had failed was mirrored by the events on the ground. The Federal forces had 
succeeded in seizing control of all parts of Biafra except the Igbo heartland, most of 
which was to be designated as the East Central State in Gowon’s twelve state federal 
structure. In essence, for the Nigerian Government, the task that remained was to quell 
the rebellion in one of the states, as de facto formation of the new structure was mostly 
completed.  
The committee, however, wished Gowon to discuss two main points. First, the 
immediate humanitarian crisis required attention, and the OAU was eager to mediate a 
solution to feed the starving civilian population. Second, the consultative committee 
wished to mediate a long term solution to the crisis. Though the OAU had stated at the 
beginning of the conflict that it was at the disposal of Gowon to broker a deal based on 
One Nigeria, it was even more eager to avoid a split in its ranks, which could threaten the 
organization’s goal of keeping the conflict and its resolution squarely in a regional setting 
rather than allowing growing public pressure in Europe and the United States to transfer 
the crisis and its settlement to a more global setting.  
Ojukwu himself was not accorded the same courtesy as Gowon. However, Gowon 
agreed to allow Ojukwu to travel to Niamey to meet with the consultative committee, if 
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only to assuage public opinion that both sides of the conflict were being properly 
consulted. Gowon however made sure to leave Niamey before Ojukwu’s arrival and gave 
strict orders that the entire Nigerian delegation was to be confined to its hotel for the 
duration of the Biafran leader’s visit.  urther, the exact text of the committee’s 
declaration was finalized with Gowon’s approval even before Ojukwu left Biafra. 
Though Ojukwu had several powerful friends in the OAU,
17
 his government was not 
recognized as legitimate by the organization, and he was only offered an invitation to 
attend the talks in Niamey as a way to assuage public opinion and the groundswell of 
support for Biafra and its people’s suffering.  
Once Ojukwu arrived on July 18
th
, the Nigerien government ensured that the 
Biafran leader would speak only to the committee. In his address, Ojukwu conceded that 
the rebellion had failed militarily, and that he would seek a solution to the conflict.
18
 
Thus, Biafran propaganda succeeded in two key aspects of internationalizing the 
conflict.  irst and foremost, Biafra’s propaganda campaign helped change the attitude of 
the OAU’s Consultative Committee toward the conflict. Rather than simply an assembly 
that would meet with Gowon, the six members of the committee realized that in order to 
prevent a fissure in the OAU ranks that could lead to the United Nations taking up the 
issue the assembly would have to treat Ojukwu’s Biafra, if not as a legitimate political 
actor, at least as a party to the dispute. Second, the issue of relief, either by air or by land, 
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was effectively separated from the wider question of solving the conflict. The Nigerian 
government, cognizant of the outcry over the suffering of the Igbo people, and Gowon 
under personal pressure from the consultative committee, had no choice but to mediate 
their demands. Allison Ayida, one of Gowon’s top advisors stated “when five heads of 
state who are patently your friends ask you, how can you refuse?”
19
 
With formal talks scheduled to begin in Ethiopia on August 5
th
 1968, the Biafran 
Foreign Ministry began a media blitz to prepare for the upcoming talks. Ojukwu fully 
expected Gowon to arrive to the talks, and the Biafran media referred to the talks as the 
“Addis Ababa Summit”. Gowon, on his part repeatedly rejected such a meeting, and 
presented his position to West Africa stating “I cannot enter discussions on equal terms 




Because the talks in Niamey failed to produce anything but the most rudimentary 
of schedules for the Addis Ababa round, low level delegations were sent by Nigeria and 
Biafra to pave the way for higher level talks. Though Ojukwu hoped for the talks to end 
in a meeting between the two leaders, Gowon made clear that no such meeting would 
take place. Further, Gowon was adamant that any high level talks regarding the final 
status of Biafra would only be held once the Biafrans agreed to a One Nigeria solution, a 
position that the OAU, eager to prevent the balkanization of Nigeria, supported. 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 188. 
20 "General Gowon Talks to the Editor," West Africa, August 24 1968, 971. 
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Similar to Kampala and Niamey, the Nigerian demand for an end to secession as a 
precursor to any permanent settlement did not change. The Nigerians did, however, 
present a proposal that they hoped would counter the Biafran claims of genocide. 
Anthony Enaharo, the head of the Nigerian delegation presented a nine point proposal 
which Emperor Selaisse conveyed to the members of the consultative committee. The 
proposal read: 
1. The renunciation of secession by a joint declaration 
which would proclaim the unity of Nigeria, but 
would not require the other side to make a unilateral 
pronouncement of secession. 
  
2. In the view of the federal government such a joint 
declaration, given agreement in other areas, could 
be immediately followed by the cessation of 
hostilities and should be followed by the disarming 
of the rebel forces. 
 
3. After disarming the rebel forces, the normal 
policing of rebel held areas should be the 
responsibility solely of the police, and that the 
police units in these areas should consist mostly of 
persons of Ibo origins. 
  
4. Until mutual confidence is restored an external 
force should be stationed in Iboland composed of 
forces from Ethiopia, India and Canada and the 
functions, its composition, numbers, command, 
financing, and the duration of the force could be 
negotiated.  
 
5. The military governor and members of his 
executive council should be Ibos. The Executive 
Council should be drawn in part from among 
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persons who supported the rebel cause in proportion 
to be agreed by negotiations. 
 
6. A general amnesty will be granted in most cases; 
other claims for amnesty could be examined at the 
talks. 
7. Public servants will be reabsorbed into public 
employment and that the Ibos as a people will be 
assured a fair share of employment in federal public 
services, including Federal Statutory Corporations. 
 
8. Arrangement will be made for a constitutional 
conference. The composition of such a conference, 
selection, procedures, etc. could be negotiated. 
 
9. Once there is agreement on the reunification of 





However, because Gowon refused a meeting with Ojukwu, the Biafran delegation 
responded with a short list of demands that was largely per functionary. The Biafran 
response essentially delegated any renunciation of secession to future talks and stressed, 




The Nigerian proposal demanded an end to secession before any talks regarding a 
final peace could commence. However, the Nigerian proposal was very similar to the 
Biafran demands in all but that one point. For the Nigerians, formal renunciation of 
                                                 
21 Cable from Selassie to the consultative committee, cited in Stremlau, The 
International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, 203. 
22 Ibid., 204. 
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Biafra as an independent state served as a precursor to any and all talks. For the Biafrans 
however, agreeing to rejoin Nigeria could only happen at the end of the negotiations, as it 
was the last bargaining chip remaining for Ojukwu’s government. 
The preliminary talks in Addis Ababa showed not only how wide the gap was 
between the Nigerian and Biafran sides, but more so, that ultimately, only Ojukwu would 
make the required decision regarding the end of the war. Nonetheless, without a 
“summit” between Ojukwu and Gowon, any settlement of the conflict was increasingly a 
remote possibility. Despite this, Ojuwku sent a high level mission to Addis Ababa led by 
 rofessor  ni Njoku  and included Ojukwu’s second in command, Philip Efiong, who 
arrived in Ethiopia after a long and arduous trip. 
 fiong’s account of his travel to Addis Ababa is especially telling, as it highlights 
both the lack of power the delegation had, and the dire straits that Biafra found itself in 
August 1968. Efiong left Biafra on August 12
th
, 1968, but did not arrive in Addis Ababa 
until August 23
rd
, having been put on the wrong flight out of the airstrip at Uli. Instead of 
the flight to Sao Tome, which would have connected him to Europe and then to the 
Ethiopian capital, Efiong arrived in Libreville, Gabon. President Bongo treated the 
Biafran general as an honored guest. However, Efiong remained in Gabon for more than 
a week before he could depart to Athens. In his memoirs, Efiong stated that “ resident 
Bongo had helped out with some funds; otherwise we would have been stranded at 
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 fiong’s finances were not simply the result of poor planning and a mistaken 
flight. By July 1968, Biafra was effectively broke, due in no small part to the loss of the 
oil rich minority areas and the various port cities, most significantly Port Harcourt.
24
 The 
Biafran pound was useless outside of the rebel held areas, and the Nigerian government’s 
monetary policy made any prewar Nigerian Pounds invalid tender. The Biafran military 
was in full retreat before the onslaught of the Federal forces, and the massive airlift that 
eventually stabilized Biafra’s fortunes had not yet begun.  urther, Ojukwu’s 
acknowledgement to the consultative committee in Niamey that the rebellion had failed 
gave hope that the talks mediated by Haile Selassie would reach a solution to the conflict. 
When Efiong finally reached Addis, he arrived for the final preliminary meeting 
with  mperor Selassie.  In a formalized meeting, Selassie urged  fiong’s delegation to 
accept the OAU’s mediation.  fiong recalled the formality of the meeting and how the 
emperor was barely audible in his muted address to the delegation, speaking in Amharic 
through his translator. After learning that  fiong was Ojukwu’s second in command, 
Selassie broke with protocol, ushered the Biafran general aside and implored him in 
perfect English, rather than the barely audible Amharic he normally used in formal 
                                                 
23 Philip Efiong, Nigeria and Biafra: My Story (Princeton, Abuja, Owerri, Lorji: Sungai 
Books, 2003), 241. 
24 Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, 165. 
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meetings as Emperor, to convince Ojukwu to accept not only political mediation, but to 
agree to end the war. 
Ultimately, Ojukwu was unwilling to make any concessions without meeting with 
Gowon. Further, the Biafran delegation was not allowed to make any concessions or 
declarations without explicit guidance from Ojukwu. Efiong stated that for Ojukwu to 
agree to Nigeria’s terms would require “courage and a sense of diplomatic genius to […] 
‘stoop to conquer’. In the event, the Biafran dream vanished in a puff of gun smoke after 
much suffering and the senseless and almost fateful determination of one man.”
25
 
With no hope of ending the conflict at Addis Ababa, talks shifted to the third 
point on the agenda, namely securing relief supplies to the civilian population. By August 
1968, the situation in Biafra had become increasingly desperate. The Igbo heartland, 
which had a long history as a net importer of food was surrounded and cut off from its 
traditional breadbasket, both from domestic and imported sources.
26
 Further exasperating 
matters, the massacres in Northern Nigeria prompted many Igbo in the rest of the Nigeria 
to “return” to their ancestral homes, even though many of those people were second and 
                                                 
25 Efiong, Nigeria and Biafra, 243. 
26 Most of the food staples came to the Igbo heartland from other parts of Nigeria, with 
much of the vegetable staples coming from the Cross Rivers east and most of the beef 
supplies coming from Northern Nigeria. However, much food came from abroad, with 
much of the fish arriving from as far away as Iceland. For a full account of agricultural 
history to Nigerian independence, see Gerald K. Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, 




third generation descendants in their adopted lands. By some estimates, around one 
million people fled the violence to the relative safety of the Igbo heartland in 1966.
27
 
After Port Harcourt fell, the Igbo heartland was effectively surrounded and food became 
a scarce commodity. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated 
that at the height of the food scarcity in Biafra, around ten thousand were dying daily, 
mainly children and the elderly.
28
 
Biafran propaganda was very effective in portraying this humanitarian crisis as 
evidence of a genocidal campaign against the Igbo. Biafra’s effective propaganda 
campaign mobilized global opinion against Nigerian actions, and rallied a plethora of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to provide relief to the besieged enclave. The 
global outcry that resulted in the spring and summer of 1968 prompted the OAU 
consultative committee to reach an agreement regarding the transfer of aid to Biafra. 
Selassie took an especially active role in mediating the issue of relief for several reasons. 
First and foremost, the emperor was, according to Stremlaw, “moved by the enormity of 
human suffering in Biafra, even after allowing for any politically motivated statistical 
inflation” wished to see relief efforts to the civilian population increased.
29
 Second, the 
issue of genocide had penetrated the international system to such an extent that Selassie 
                                                 
27 Murray Last, "Reconciliation and Memory in Postwar Nigeria," in Violence and 
Subjectivity, ed. Veena Das, et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 318. 
28 "Nigeria's Civil War: Hate, Hunger and the Will to Survive," Time, August 23 1968. 
29 Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, 209.  
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feared that the conflict would be further internationalized and sought to minimize foreign 
intervention in Nigeria. 
The issue of relief was complicated by the sheer amount of official, quasi-official 
and independent actors all determined to supply both relief to the Biafran population and 
arms to the Biafran military. While organizations such as the ICRC worked closely with 
the Nigerian government and the international community, other organizations like the 
Catholic Caritas, and the Protestant World Council of Churches organized clandestine 
relief flights and motivated individuals such as the Israeli Abie Nathan and Carl Gustav 
Von Rosen of Sweden helped both the airlift and the Biafran military directly.
30
 
Ojukwu continued to maneuver to further internationalize the conflict, or failing 
that, to grant an aid corridor that would be immune from both the Nigerian military and 
from inspection, thus allowing the Biafran to smuggle arms unabated. Further, any large 
scale ICRC mission to Biafra would require some kind of protection, or would force a 
limited ceasefire that would help the Biafrans rearm. Ojukwu was further buoyed by Von 
Rosen’s successful running of the Nigerian air blockade, which opened up the besieged 
Biafra to what would become the largest private airlift in world history.
31
 
                                                 
30 Abie Nathan would later become a peace activist, meeting with Yasser Arafat in the 
1970s and 80s, and spending time in prison for those acts. He also founded the Peace 
Ship; a pirate radio station devoted to peace in the Middle East. Nathan also flew 
missions to Nicaragua and Guatemala after earthquakes left large areas devastated. In 
1997 he received the Nuremberg Award for his humanitarian efforts. 
31 Von Rosen flew into Uli on August 13, 1968, flying at treetop level and thus avoiding 
both Nigerian planes and ground defenses. Most of the pilots on the Nigerian side were 
184 
 
Many western countries came under intense internal pressure to assist the 
suffering of the civilian population. In the United States, the Johnson administration was 
deeply concerned with the crisis in Nigeria. In fact, the administration issued almost daily 
status reports on the peace talks in Addis Ababa, how the humanitarian crisis was 
unfolding and what different groups were doing to bring aid to the afflicted areas. 
Getting the Nigerians and Biafrans to agree on any kind of supply route would 
prove extremely difficult.  The only two ways to supply the offer would be either by road 
or by air.  By road, the Nigerian Government proposed two corridors to supply food to 
the breakaway republic.  The first corridor was to run from Enugu south into rebel held 
territory.  The second corridor was to cross the river Niger at Onitsha and from there 
continue east into Biafra.  The Nigerians wanted the land corridors because that would 
ensure that all aid originates from Nigerian territory and thus could be inspected for 
weapons.  Also, the Nigerians would refuse any land corridor that was not previously 
agreed-upon so that these food supplies would reach the civilian population and not the 
Biafran military. 
The Biafrans, on the other hand, were vehemently opposed to any aid originating 
from Nigerian territory.  After all, according to Biafran propaganda, the Nigerians were 
                                                                                                                                                 
East German and Egyptian; Czech pilots would arrive in September 1968, after the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. For a full account of the air aspect of the war, see 
Michael I. Draper, Shadows: Airlift and Airwar in Biafra and Nigeria 1967-1970 
(Aldershot: Hikoki Publications, 2000). For an excellent analysis of Soviet – Czech 
relations vis-à-vis the Nigerian Civil War, see S.E. Orobator, "The Nigerian Civil War 
and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia," African Affairs 82, no. 327 (1983). 
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trying to exterminate all the Igbo and thus would try to poison the aid shipments. The 
Biafrans wished to continue the relief flights that were now being made extremely 
difficult due to the antiaircraft fire since the federal forces now controlled all the 
approaches into Biafra.  The Biafrans wished to demilitarize the airstrip outside of the 
new capital at Umuahia.  However, the war was not going well for Biafra and the new 
capital was now under siege as well.  The Nigerians saw this offer as an attempt to stall 
the federal push towards Umuahia and more importantly, to put international troops on 
the ground in Biafra, very close to the front lines.  Obviously, coming to an agreement 









Having gone thither to Addis Ababa, the nexus of the peace talks revolved around 
the establishment of a protected corridor to ferry relief supplies to Biafra. For Johnson, 
this was the moment where the US could exert its influence, not only in the limited 
                                                 




fashion with regards to the conflict, but also in a more expanded role with the 
international aid organizations, such as the Red Cross. To this effect, the Johnson 
administration mobilized George Christian and Robert Moore in Geneva to intervene 
with the ICRC in order to create a consensus on how to establish these corridors. Moore 
was sent to become part of the very senior four-man committee that included UNICEF 
Director Henry Labouisse and United Nations special representative Nils Goron Gussing, 
and headed by the Swiss ambassador to the Soviet Union, Auguste Lindt, which would 
handle all the aspects of any relief program to Biafra, should any relief efforts be agreed 
upon. 
One of the stickiest points in the peace talks was the opening of the air corridor to 
Biafra. Though both sides agreed that aid should arrive, the federal government insisted 
on a land corridor, because an air corridor would leave Biafra open to weapons 
smuggling. Ojukwu, on the other hand, would not consider any type of aid coming 
through the Federal government, officially because of fear that any shipment of food 
from Lagos would be poisoned to kill more Igbo. 
Ed Hamilton, in a memo to George Christian regarding the situation at the 
beginning of the Addis Ababa conference, said  
 
The political situation remains as before.  The Nigerians 
would permit the relief by land, but not call off their 
antiaircraft against planes ... The Biafrans will accept help 
by air, but not by land.  The current Red Cross focuses on 
getting an agreement to establish a Red Cross operated 
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On the U.S. role, Hamilton was rather sober, saying 
 
 The first truth is that the US cannot control the situation 
without major troop commitments.  And we are not 
thinking in any such terms [...] because of our policy 
against arms sales or other military aid to either side.  We 
are unloved by both, though not totally without influence 
with either. In summary, we can only exert marginal 
insolence [sic] for peace help with relief if relief is 
permitted and offer the considerable advantage of our 




   
Hamilton summed up the situation by saying, 
 
It is clear that the problem is Nigerian and Biafran 
governments getting in the way of their own people despite 
the best efforts of the rest of us short of direct interference 
in the war. Without some minimal agreement from the two 
sides, which will be excruciatingly difficult for both, no 
outside force is going to mount a massive relief program 




Another major concern for the administration was not just helping but making 
sure the American public was aware of the efforts that the government was making. In an 
                                                 





internal memo, Christian asked "are we getting across what we're doing to help."
36
 
Christian and Schwartz were so confident of Moore's efforts in Geneva that they decided 
to make him the voice of the government on this crisis.  However, Moore was running 
into difficulties with the negotiations in Geneva.  It became clear that the Biafrans would 
under no circumstances accept a land corridor subject to the scrutiny of the Federal 
Military Government and so all efforts now focused on opening an air corridor to arrange 
for relief flights into the country and hopefully build some level of trust between the 
warring sides so that future agreements would not be out of the question. 
Further complicating matters was the fact that the Red Cross seemed unwilling to 
work with the Federal Government. The relationship between the ICRC and the FMG 
was quickly deteriorating and would remain at loggerheads for the rest of the war.  
Eventually all sides in the Johnson administration, including the president's office and 
State  epartment, would agree that the ICRC’s proposals were little more than Ojukwu's 
proposals.  Furthermore and possibly more damaging was the fact that the ICRC was 
alienating the Nigerian Red Cross. Saidu Mohammed, the former national secretary of the 
Nigerian Red Cross expressed concern over the bad impression building up in the minds 
of the public against the activities of the ICRC.  Thus, the Red Cross and the Nigerian 
government were on a collision course that would end in violence in 1969.
37
 
                                                 
36 Memo from Lou Schwartz, 14 August, 1968; B. 96 D. 129, LBJ Archives. 
37 The animosity between Gowon and the ICRC would become increasingly strained 
over the course of the war and Gowon ordered the Nigerian Air Force to shoot down a 
Swedish ICRC relief plane in June of 1969. The Swedish target was chosen, perhaps as 
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Ambassador Lindt was very skeptical from the outset of the Nigerian federal 
government's desire to reach any agreement. In a memo from Geneva, Moore stated 
"Lindt foresees possibility that FMG may not reject proposal, but accept it subject to a 
number of new conditions.  If FMG response seems to be only a delaying tactic he will 
not be patience [sic].  But if it seems serious he is prepared to be patient because he 
believes FMG Biafran agreement can be highly important psychologically." Lindt 
continues to say, that should no agreement on an airfield be found, the ICRC would fly 
food and airfield construction material directly into Biafra without any agreement.  Lindt 
stresses from conversations with Ojukwu that "if FMG Biafran agreement is obtained on 




Gowon soon came to the conclusion that the ICRC was obviously pro-Biafra and 
that any agreements could not be made.  This was not entirely without foundation. During 
the negotiations for the airstrip, Lindt was in constant contact with Ojukwu and gave 
Ojukwu several months to come up with the airstrip proposal in Umuahia. On August 15, 
1968, Gowon informed the US ambassador in Lagos that the Nigerian Government 
would not be able to accept the Red Cross's proposal.  Gowon gave several reasons for 
his refusal. First and foremost was the way the negotiations were handled with Ojukwu as 
compared to with Nigeria. While the Biafrans were given months to present a proposal 
                                                                                                                                                 
a message to the Swedish Government due to the high profile assistance that Von 
Rosen was giving Ojukwu in creating the infamous Biafran Minicon air squad. 
38 Telegram from Robert Moore, August 1968; B. 96 D. 112, LBJ Archives 
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once the proposal was presented to the Nigerian delegation, the Nigerians were expected 
to give a positive reply within 24 hours.  Furthermore, while the Nigerian delegates were 
considering the proposal, Lindt held a press conference in Geneva publicizing the offer. 
The Nigerians found this unacceptable because it seemed to be an attempt by the ICRC to 
present the Nigerian government with an ultimatum or a dictate. Either way, Gowon 
could not submit to this kind of international pressure and still maintain control 
domestically.  
In a last-ditch effort to secure Nigerian support for the airlift, President Johnson in 
a rare personal intervention on the subject wrote a private message to Colonel Gowon 
urging the latter to accept an airlift.  In the letter, Johnson says,  
 
Your Excellency, the conscience of the world has been 
deeply moved by reports of starvation in Nigeria and tons 
of food are already in position near the most needy areas.  
The world will not easily understand any failure on the part 
of those most concerned to agree to effective international 
humanitarian arrangements to alleviate the suffering.  I 
therefore most earnestly urge you to make it possible for 
relief supplies to move rapidly into the hands of the needy 





On August 17, 1968, the Red Cross decided not to wait for FMG approval of the 
airstrip in a statement.  The ICRC decided upon agreement with the Biafran government 
to open up relief flights without an agreement with the FMG. The ICRC wished to put 
more pressure on the Nigerians and in their statement declared, “The ICRC deplores the 
                                                 
39 Telegram from George Christian, 14 August, 1968; B. 96 D. 108a, LBJ Archives 
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fact that the Federal military government has not accepted the solution to the problem of 
transporting relief supplies quickly to the victims in Biafran held territory.  It hopes the 
 ederal military government will revise its decision.”
40
 
After the Red Cross decided on this course of action the Nigerian government 
became increasingly infuriated. US ambassador to Nigeria, Elbert Mathews, placed the 
onus of the deteriorating relationship between the ICRC and the FMG squarely on the 
shoulders of Ambassador Lindt. In a State Department memo Mathews lambasted Lindt 
by saying, “we fear that if Lindt proceeds he has been,  MG may well be placed in 
position or public opinion will make it impossible to continue cooperation with ICRC.”
41
 
In a separate memo dated August 16, Mathews realized the precarious situation of the 
Gowon government. The ambassador stated that Gowon could not accept the ICRC 
proposal, and even if he could personally be persuaded, the rest of the government would 
not be brought along “on issue which most Nigerians will consider clear case foreign 
intervention.” Matthews concluded by saying that “Lindt handled the matter in way to 
ensure  MG rejection.”
42
 
Ultimately, the month of talks in Addis Ababa proved fruitless as the Nigerians 
and Biafrans could not agree on a ceasefire or any framework for a permanent solution to 
the war, nor could they agree on a formula for providing aid to the needy in the country. 
However, the talks helped the Nigerian side deflect international pressure and helped the 
                                                 
40 ICRC press release, 17 August, 1968 




OAU and the British Government deflect some of the criticism about their lack of 
intervention in the war. As Gowon later recalled “we were ready to talk as long as the 
war continued. It was the only way to parry the threat of greater foreign intervention. As 
long as you talk, people will wait”, and one of his advisors in  thiopia, Okoi Aripko, 
echoed the sentiment saying 
 
The peace talks accomplished what we wanted. While they 
did not influence those who supported the rebels they did a 
great deal to reassure our friends, particularly the British 
Labor government which was under great pressure from the 
Left Wing and public opinion. Our willingness to talk had 
an important impact because by not insisting on a military 




Thus, both the strengths and limitations of such a heavy handed propaganda 
campaign became painfully to the Biafrans. While the language of genocide did push 
many in the OAU, the Commonwealth and in the United States to agitate for a settlement 
and a program of relief to the war ravaged Igbo, the same propaganda emboldened 
Ojukwu to take a most rather inflexible position. Further, his demand for a meeting with 
Gowon as a precursor served only to make his position seem that much more 
unreasonable. Ojukwu would later say “if Gowon had gone to Addis, I would have been 
able to force him to sign a cease-fire in Africa Hall in front of the  mperor.”
44
 
                                                 




Biafran propaganda was most effective around the world in the spring and 
summer of 1968. The global outcry against what was being effectively marketed as 
genocide against the Igbo people forced Western governments to answer to the intense 
public pressure put on them. That a catastrophic humanitarian catastrophe was unfolding 
in Eastern Nigeria was without doubt, and the fact that Biafran propaganda equated the 
suffering of the Igbo with that of the Jews during the Holocaust created a sense of 
urgency and put increasing pressure on the Nigerian government to either end the war, or 
at the very least, allow relief supplies to into Biafra. 
Though the Nigerian government never strayed from its insistence on 
reunification, and conditioned any meaningful negotiations to end the war on the 
immediate renunciation of secession, Gowon's government did make several important 
concessions. Most importantly, the Nigerians agreed that any final status would be 
negotiated at a later date. Also, the issue of aid to the famine stricken areas was given 
priority in the talks. Gowon was personally concerned with the starvation in the 
secessionist east, and at times was criticized for being “too soft” by several of his top 
military commanders.  
However, Nigeria was not immune to the international criticism. As the protests 
against the war in the United States,  rance and especially Britain threatened Nigeria’s 
relations. In France after the failure of the Addis Ababa talks, De Gaulle shifted his 
position and openly supported Biafra, becoming the major supplier of arms to Ojukwu. In 
Britain, Nigeria’s most important ally, the Harold Wilson government came under 
increasing public pressure to withdraw support for the Nigerians, which he never did. As 
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Gowon stated, Nigeria’s shifting of its hardline stance helped Wilson deflect some of the 
criticism about his staunch support of the Gowon government. 
For Biafra, the peace talks served as a forum to with three main goals. First and 
foremost, Ojukwu felt that had he met with Gowon, the war could have been brought to 
an end. In the buildup to the talks in Ethiopia, Ojukwu placed such primacy on the 
“summit” aspect, it became virtually impossible for him to agree to any end to the 
conflict without a meeting with Gowon. Second, the Biafrans used the global forum to 
attempt to internationalize the conflict, even if informally by trying to establish an aid 
corridor and bridgehead. Establishing any kind of formal foreign presence would have 
done much to ease Biafra’s isolation and suffering.
45
 
The entire process of peace talks from Kampala to Addis Ababa showed both the 
influence of Biafran propaganda in getting the sides to talk and to compromise, but also 
the limitations in relying on propaganda as a weapon of war. Though Biafra’s global 
initiative succeeded in putting intense pressure on the Nigerian Government and its allies, 
eventually bringing the Nigerians to the negotiating table with more flexible demands 
that could have ended the war, enhanced Ojukwu’s standing in any final agreement and 
cemented the OAU’s standing as a regional organization, in the end, the global outcry, 
supported by the ICRC’s insistence to aid Biafra regardless of a deal, embolden Ojukwu 
to take a harder stance and ruined any chance of a deal, despite Ojukwu’s humble speech 
in Niamey. Instead of a ceasefire deal that would have ended the war and paved the way 




to negotiations for a final settlement, Biafra remained under siege for seventeen more 
months. 
  
BIAFRA’S FIRST COLLAPSE: MAY – NOVEMBER 1968 
The series of peace talks in 1968 coincided with a disastrous military campaign 
for the Biafrans. If the Biafrans were winning the war in the press, the Nigerians were 
winning the war on the battlefield, though much slower than the Nigerian people and 
press had hoped. Though the Federal forces secured most of the ports in Biafra and the 
border with Cameroon by March 1968, the Biafrans put up stiff resistance, especially on 
Murtala Mohammed’s  
nd
 Division, which only succeeded in capturing Onitsha on the 3
rd
 
attempt and afterwards became largely an occupation force and could not break through 
the resistance that the Biafrans put up. 
By 4 April 1968, the 1
st
 Division in the north of Biafra had captured Abakaliki, 
setting the stage of a push into the Igbo heartland, which culminated in the capture of 
Awgu a month later. Three months of bitter fighting followed, during which the 1
st
 
Division captured the airstrip at Obilagu and the town of Okigwi in late September.  
The 2
nd
 Division finally succeeded in its assault over the Niger and took Onitsha 
on 23 March 1968, but by then morale had deteriorated to such a point that Col. Murtala 
Mohammed and his successors could not form a cohesive fighting unit out of the 
division. In one spectacular incident at the end of March, a supply convoy of 100 vehicles 
was destroyed by a Biafran commando raid with much of the convoy captured intact and 
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its contents added to the Biafran army.
46





essentially destroyed the 2
nd
  ivision’s capability as a fighting force. Though the 
Division withstood several Biafran attempts to retake Onitsha, it would not factor in any 
offensive capacity for the remainder of the war. 
Though Gowon wanted the peace talks to succeed, he also wanted to put as much 
pressure as possible on Ojukwu to acquiesce to laying down his arms and renouncing 
secession. By keeping up the military pressure, Gowon hoped Ojukwu would respond to 
the hopelessness of secession and agree to end the war. Several factors gave the Biafrans 
some respite during their first collapse and the Biafrans ultimately did not agree to enter 
into any kind of ceasefire or renounce secession. In fact, Ojukwu never articulated any 
clear strategy for ending the war short of achieving secession wither in public or to his 
direct subordinates. Neither Efiong, Akpen or Madiebo mentioned any discussion of the 
sort except Efiong, and only when Ojukwu fled Biafra in January 1970.   
After the initial successes that culminated in the capture of Port Harcourt, the 
Nigerian Army largely faltered during the ensuing advance. Despite capturing Owerri and 
Aba, the Nigerians were unable to take the new capital in Umuahia, either from the North 
or the south. In fact, Adekunle’s reckless assault on Umuahia, discussed in detail later in 
this chapter, led to the near collapse of the 3
rd
 Commando Division and to his dismissal 
                                                 
46 This convoy raid was reported in several outlets, both during and after the war. The 
exact number of vehicles in the convoy has been disputed, with Momoh stating the 
number at 96, and Stremlau placing the figure at “over 1  ”. Regardless of the exact 
number of vehicles involved, this was a substantial supply convoy with food fuel and 
ammunition that was spectacularly destroyed.  
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as Division commander. In the wake of his failed assault, the Biafrans succeeded in 
mounting a counterassault that culminated in both the recapture of Owerri in May 1969, 
and a failed attempt at retaking Onitsha in November 1968.  
One of the mercenary commanders, Rolf Steiner was the commander of the 4
th
 
Commando battalion, a battalion skilled in the hit and run tactics that were becoming 
ever more popular among Biafran forces increasingly pressured and ill equipped. At the 
end of November 1968, Ojukwu ordered Steiner to plan a frontal assault on Onitsha using 
his forces. Codenamed Operation “Hiroshima”, Steiner’s troops were massacred because 
his troops were untrained in a frontal assault against fortified positions with little air and 
artillery support. Steiner went back to Ojukwu, enraged that half his men were killed and 
accused the Biafran president of murdering his men and slapped Ojukwu. Rather than kill 
Steiner, Ojukwu sent him out of the country the next day saying “it cuts across everything 
we believe here, to find our struggle for survival led by white mercenaries.”
47
 
Despite the very public renunciation of the mercenaries, it was another European, 
Von Rosen, who successfully broke the Nigerian aerial blockade on Biafra on 19 August 
1968 when he successfully flew his Constellation plane at tree level and landed at the 
Biafran airstrip at Uli. Von Rosen’s flight ushered in the airlift, which would supply the 
besieged country until its collapse in January 1970. 
Closely related to the airlift, French President Charles De Gaulle openly declared 
his support for Biafran secession. Though he stopped short of recognizing the country, 
                                                 
47 Zdenek Červenka, The Nigerian War, 1967-1970. History of the War; Selected 
Bibliography and Documents. (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1971), 68. 
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the French Red Cross assisted the government in supplying much of the material support 
needed to continue to wage war.
48
 Though the ICRC only ferried civilian relief supplies, 
the French Red Cross, along with Caritas and other private organizations, was a major 
carrier of the arms smuggling that Gowon feared would allow the Biafrans to continue 
their fight. 
Despite all indications that Ojukwu would agree to halt hostilities and negotiate a 
return of Biafra to Nigeria the softening of Nigeria’s stance, along with the increased 
global involvement in the conflict, due in no small part to the effect of Biafran 
propaganda on world opinion, allowed Ojukwu to harden his position. Rather than agree 
to end the war, the diplomatic recognition, French support, the increase in arms supply, 
coupled with the successes on the battlefield convinced the Biafran leader that continuing 
the war would lead to more tangible results. However, no clear plan to ending the war 
was ever articulated, and even after the relatively modest military gains that ended in 
May 1969, the Biafrans never used the semblance of resistance as leverage toward ending 
the war. Despite the military gains, the Biafrans never regained enough to make secession 
a viable option. 
                                                 









                                                 
49 H.B. Momoh, The Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970: History and Reminiscences 




CONTINUATION OF PROPAGANDA 
During the military collapse, Biafran propaganda worked to stabilize the war torn 
country and elicit support from abroad in defending the Biafrans, now almost exclusively 
Igbo, against what they termed a genocidal war led by a Hausa-Fulani elite dedicated to 
their destruction. While the Biafrans no longer put the religious aspect of the war at the 
forefront, either at home or abroad, Catholic and Protestant Christian charities were at the 
forefront of the airlift and the aid supplies to Biafra. Though the French took the lead in 
supplying the arms to Biafra, mainly through Gabon and the Ivory Coast, most of the 
pilots were not only English speakers, but from South Africa and Rhodesia. One 
Rhodesian pilot told Time Magazine about his motives for flying into Biafra, saying “that 
Harold Wilson is a bastard. He's against Biafra and he's buggering us too. This is a 
chance to bugger him.”
50
 Clearly, British support, so maligned by the Biafran side and 
publicized as abetting the genocidal Nigerian campaign, was having the desired effect.  
One of Biafra’s major image problems was the humanitarian catastrophe 
unfolding in the county. Ever since the massacres of 1966 and the mass exodus that came 
in its wake, the centerpiece of Biafran propaganda had been the issue of genocide. By 
focusing on the very real fears of annihilation, the Biafran government kept the Biafran 
population willing to fight, starve and die for the cause. Despite the success of the 
imagery of starving children, and the painting of the war as a new genocide, as the war 
dragged on, many commentators abroad came to the conclusion that the only way to 
                                                 
50 "Keeping Biafra Alive," Time Magazine, 6 December 1968. 
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alleviate the starvation was to end the war, or at the very least agree to a ceasefire. As 
Time Magazine reported in its  3 August 1968 issue, “they are not only losing the war: 
slowly but surely, eight million Biafrans are starving to death. Gradually, the image of 




As the military situation stabilized at the end of 1968, the Biafrans made several 
inroads and as 1969 began, the Nigerian advance that seemed destined to end the war had 
stalled. Now that the war had settled into another stalemate, the need to feed the 
population and deflect criticism led to the creation of the Land Army Program. The 
program, envisioned as a sort of agricultural sharing program between the farmers and 
the Biafran government, served three important purposes. First and foremost, the Land 
Army actively engaged the shortage in food in a way that was never practiced before. The 
Land Army officials cooperated with the farming communities and encouraged food 
production that would benefit both the local communities and the Biafran military. 
Ojukwu commissioned a quasi-military force made up of youths and those unfit for 
military service. The land army was tasked with preparing land for cultivation. The stated 
objective was for each village to be allocated around 100 acres of land, which was 
cleared by the Land Army. Farmers would grow crops on that land, while being protected 
by the Biafran military. The Biafran state would then get half of the harvest for 
redistribution to the military and the starving in other parts of the country. 
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Second, the Land Army played an important role in the internal propaganda 
mechanism. Though the Biafran government had many difficulties in explaining their 
plan to the people, Ojukwu lauded the program as one of the important first steps in his 
“Biafran Revolution that he articulated in the Ahiara declaration on Biafra’s second 
Independence  ay. In his speech, he lauded the Land Army’s efforts boasting that  
 
We seem to have overcome the once imminent danger of 
mass starvation and can now look forward to a period after 
the rains of comparative plenty. Our efforts in the Land 
Army programme give visible signs all over our land of 




Ojukwu went even further, stating that the Land Army would be the basis of 
agrarian reform and the creation of individualistic communes that resemble a mix of 
Jeffersonian yeoman ideals and the communal spirit that embodied the kibbutz project in 
Israel.  The Land Army served not only as an emergency food production system in war, 
but also would serve to germinate a postwar system that would 
 
Achieve balanced development between industry and 
agriculture, between regions or provinces within Biafra, 
between town and country and finally between Biafra and 




However, the Land Army program never deeply penetrated the Biafran 
consciousness. The report “What Biafrans Know about the Nigeria/Biafra War” showed 
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that the program suffered from a severe lack of knowledge about the project and were 
especially suspicious about it.  
Lastly, the Land Army Program served to show the world that despite the 
setbacks and the genocidal campaign against them, the Biafrans were able to feed 
themselves and were indeed a viable nation, despite the collapse of their military in mid-
1968. Many commentators agreed that the war in Biafra was hopeless; the only way to 
end the civilian suffering was to end secession and surrender. Harvard University’s 
newspaper, The Harvard Crimson, took an especially deep interest in the famine, due in 
no small part to Jean Meyer, a Harvard nutrition professor, being included in a special 
diplomatic mission to Biafra and Nigeria led by New York Senator Charles E. Goodell in 
February 1969. 
The mission examined many aspects of public health, nutrition, and even explored 
Biafran claims that the Nigerians were deliberately poisoning the food supply. For 
example, the mission took 1487 samples of salt, stating that the samples taken “could not 
have been ‘fixed’ by the Biafrans.” According to the mission, salt was taken because it 
was the primary commodity being smuggled across the lines to reach the civilian 
population in Biafra. All of the samples were given to the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), who found that 20 of the samples contained arsenic and 50 had 
traces of cyanide.
54
 Despite the toxic findings, a summary of the original Biafra Mission 
report published several months later in Clinical Pediatrics by Roy Brown, an Associate 
                                                 




Professor of Preventive Medicine at Tufts University and also a member of the Biafra 
Mission, made no mention of any deliberate poisoning of the population by the Nigerian 
military. Brown’s article, however, emphasized the nature of the bombing campaign 
against Biafra, stating in one instance “hospitals were no longer designated by large Red 




Just as Johnson’s administration was unable to mediate any agreement at Addis 
Ababa, Nixon could not take any concrete steps to aid the Biafran population. In both 
cases, any large scale involvement would either require a ceasefire, or at the very least a 
demilitarized zone. The report did however make special mention of the Land Army and 
recommended supplying it with tools and seeds to help feed the starving population. 
Ultimately, the Land Army did not significantly increase Biafra’s food supply for 
any extended period. Though Biafra’s propaganda arm portrayed the program as one step 
toward alleviating the besieged nation’s suffering, many Biafrans either did not know 
about the plan or were unwilling to cooperate with it because they were not properly 
informed about its aims. Abroad, however, the plan was much better received abroad, as 
the Goodell mission saw in the Land Army a significant way to improve access to food. 
More importantly, the program was designed to sell, both at home and abroad, that 
despite the starvation and war, the Biafrans were determined to both fight the enemy and 
feed their own people. 
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Though the Land Army was effective in a limited way in showing that the 
Biafrans were capable of beginning to feed their people despite the hardships and 
privations of war, the specter of genocide was simply too great to be successfully 
countered by a mere agricultural program. In a way, Biafran propaganda, which 
portrayed the Civil War as a war of extermination, was simply too effective and even its 
own progenitors could do little to put the genie of starvation and genocide into its bottle.  
 
OBASANJO AND THE END OF THE WAR 
Biafra’s unexpected resurgence caught many in the Nigerian military by surprise. 
Thanks to the largest airlift since the Berlin Blockade, and the help of French arms, the 
Biafran military stabilized the warfront by November 1968. In fact the three Nigerian 
divisions made little headway for over six months between October 1968 and April 1969. 
The 1
st
 Division, which had captured Enugu in October 1967, did not advance south for 
nearly a year before taking Awgu in June 1968 and the airstrip at Obilagu in September. 
The 2
nd
 Division, headed by Murtala Mohammed remained in Onitsha for much of the 
war, after failing to link with the 1
st
 Division in Enugu.  
The 3
rd
 Marine Commando Division, led by Benjamin Adekunle, captured Port 
Harcourt on May 19
th
, 1968 and made little headway into the Igbo heartland, going as far 




 Though Adekunle attempted several times in 1968 to 
                                                 
56 Though originally simply called the 3
rd
 Division, Adekunle felt that because he was in 
charge of securing the coastal regions, his division should be called the Marine unit. 
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capture the Biafran capital at Umuahia, poor planning, lack of supplies and Adekunle’s 
reputation for barbarity took a toll on Nigerian morale. H.B. Momoh, in his volume The 
Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970: History and Reminiscences, stated that “the mere 
mention of Adekunle elicited fear in the troops. If they failed to move he threatened he 
would ‘send them to Lagos’ meaning getting them shot as he was alleged in unconfirmed 
reports to have done in fact.”
57
 
In his recklessness, Adekunle nearly destroyed the entire 3
rd
 Division in October 
1968. In his zeal to end the war, he ordered a broad assault from the south of Biafran 
positions, codenamed Operation Leopard. Wishing to give Gowon his own “OAU” gift, 
Adekunle endeavored to capture Aba and Owerri, two of the three major urban centers 
still under Biafran control.
58
 After the 3
rd
 Division captured Aba and Owerri in 
September, Adekunle’s decided to continue to Umuahia (the U of the OAU gift), despite 
Army headquarters’ opinion that such a move would be “suicidal”, proved to be just 
that.
59
 Adekunle’s division lost 5 brigades and had just one defending Owerri, which was 
now surrounded and could not be resupplied. By May 1969, after five months of siege, a 
demoralized and outmanned 16
th
 Brigade retreated from Owerri, leaving it to the 
Biafrans. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 urther, he felt that adding the word “commando” to the division’s name would create a 
sense of fear and respect from the enemy.  
57Momoh, The Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970: History and Reminiscences, 104. 
58 Ibid., 105. 
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 Division collapsed, the 1
st
 Division finally succeeded in breaking 
the stalemate in the north of Biafra. Though Murtala Mohammed’s  
nd
 Division captured 
Onitsha on March 23
rd
, 1968, all attempts to link to the 1
st
 Division ended in catastrophe, 
most spectacularly with the destruction of a major supply convoy on the Onitsha – Awka 
road.
60
 Similarly, the 1
st
 Division was stalemated for over six months after capturing the 
airfield at Obilagu. However, at the end of March 1969, Mohammed Shuwa, the cautious 
commander of the 1
st
 division set out to accomplish what the reckless Adekunle had tried 
six months before – to capture Umuahia. Proceeding cautiously, it took the 5 battalions 
involved in the capture of the city nearly a month to reach the city. On April 22
nd
, the 
Nigerian army entered the city. Major (later General) Mamman Jiya Vatsa, the 
commander of the operation, summed up the action thus: 
At 1500 hours, 22
nd
 April, 1969, the troops entered the 
town. It was a ghost town. Umuahia was liberated. Unlike 
in Enugu, the rebels had refused to defend the town within. 
Seventy-seven people stayed behind. They had 
concentrated themselves mainly around the Police Station, 
expecting their end, for the rebel propaganda machinery 
had pumped ideas of ‘pogrom’ and ‘genocide’ into them. 
But in accordance with our ‘Code of Conduct’, we received 
them back into the Nigerian fold, clothed and fed them. 




                                                 
60 On March 23th, 1968 a major supply convoy of over 100 vehicles attempted to reach 
the 2
nd
 Division on the road, and was attacked by a Biafran force. The Biafrans 
destroyed a fuel tanker that was close to several trucks carrying ammunition. The 
ensuing chain reaction destroyed the entire convoy within minutes.  
61 Momoh, The Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970: History and Reminiscences, 905. 
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Adekunle was finally relieved of command on May 16
th
, 1969 after overseeing 
the near complete destruction of his division. Though Adekunle was relieved for his 
ineptitude, it was his brutality that helped Biafran propaganda instill the fear of genocide. 
 yewitness accounts of massacres of captive Igbo, Adekunle’s statements to the media, 
both foreign and domestic, coupled with his eccentric and unpredictable behavior toward 
his own troops created a sense of dread among the civilian population, especially the 
Igbo. His actions, together with his reckless tactics also effectively destroyed the 3
rd
 
Division as any kind of effective fighting force.
62
 
Many in the Nigerian Command criticized Gowon’s decision to leave Adekunle 
in command until May 1969. Joseph Garba, in his work Revolution in Nigeria: Another 
View, chronicled the tension that existed in the command structure in the Nigerian 
Military even before the war. According to Garba, the Nigerian field commanders found 
Gowon and the headquarters in Lagos as out of touch with the war on the ground.  
Further, Momoh stated repeatedly that Gowon was unwilling or unable to intervene to 




When Obasanjo finally took command of the 3
rd
 Marine Commando Division, he 
inherited a unit on the brink of collapse. In a directive issued a week before he took 
command, the divisional command stated its top priority to stabilize the front, 
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anticipating a Biafran offensive to retake Port Harcourt.
64
 Von Rosen’s Minicon raids, the 
massive airlift, Adekunle’s catastrophic offensive and  rench arms buoyed the Biafrans, 
both militarily and in spirits. Obasanjo’s first priority, then, was to restore the morale of 
his troops. Returning the men to a semblance of a fighting force “would produce officers 
and men imbued with loyalty [and] create harmony between the military and the 
civilians.” Creating such a harmony was instrumental in countering the image, 
encouraged by Adekunle, that the Nigerian military was a bloodthirsty, genocidal army. 
For Obansanjo, then creating a trust between the military and the population was 
instrumental, not only to counter the Biafran will, but because if he had the trust of the 
population, “success in my operational tasks – my second priority – would be assured.”
65
 
Creating internal discipline is instrumental in any wartime situation, and is the 
first step toward establishing a relationship with the civilian population. One of 
Obasanjo’s first directives toward the troops was to clamp down on looting. While not 
accusing his troops of looting, he forbade the purchase of “attractive and durable articles” 
that were usually sent from the war theater to the soldiers’ homes.
66
  
To the north of Biafran positions, the 1
st
 Division was finally able to connect with 
the 2
nd
 in Onitsha in June 1969, and Murtala Mohammed was replaced by Colonel I.B. 
Mohammed Haruna. However, Haruna was unsuccessful in reorganizing the division in 
the same way that Obasanjo stabilized the 3
rd
 Division and was quickly replaced once 
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again by Lt. Col. Gibson Jalo, who relocated the division to the Midwest, where it served 
until the end of the war.  
After stabilizing the front, Obasanjo organized the division in preparation to link 
up with the 1
st
  ivision in Umuahia. Called Operation “ inishing Touch”, the objective 




 Divisions in 
Umuahia. The operation commenced in October, and despite several initial setbacks, by 
the end of October, the Nigerians had regained much of the ground they lost since the 
counterattack that saw the Biafrans recapture Owerri. The second step of the operation, 




 divisions in Umuahia, 
essentially split the remaining Biafran territory in two. The eastern enclave, centered in 
Arochukwu, was quickly overrun by two brigades from the 3
rd
 Division. Having thus 
broken much of the Biafran army, the stage was set for Operation “Tailwind”, which 
started in January, and proved to be the final operation of the war. 
Biafrans held hope that in the air their fortunes would be kept alive. In May 1969 
Von Rosen arrived in Biafra with 5 Malmö Flygindustri MFI-9 aircraft, followed by four 
more in July. After attaching rocket launchers to the wings of the single prop trainer 
aircraft, the MiniCOIN (Miniature Counter-Insurrection) squadron was born, though it 
was widely known during the war as the Biafran Babies, or more popularly as 
Minicons.
67
 The Biafrans had purchased several T-6 Texan trainers early in the war, but 
they were abandoned in Lisbon, but several of them finally arrived in 1969, bolstering the 
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Biafran Air Force even more. Further, Von Rosen created a training facility in Gabon and 
trained several pilots for combat missions. The air raids proved very effective and 
destroyed fuel silos, raided the Nigerian Air Force Base in Benin City and provided 
support for the ground forces. However, despite their ingenuity, the Minicons and Texans 
could stall, but not halt, the Federal advances. 
June 5
th
, 1969 signaled the beginning of the end for Biafran military success and 
the beginning of the military’s final collapse. The animosity between the  MG and the 
ICRC turned to violence when the Nigerian Air Force shot down a Red Cross plane 
piloted by a Swedish crew. The Nigerian government targeted the Red Cross plane for 
several reasons. Several organizations were ferrying humanitarian aid and military 
supplies into Biafra. However, most of the private organizations, such as Caritas and the 
Join Church Aid kept their flight records secret, but the ICRC, as a quasi official 
organization, was transparent with their flights and cargo. As such, the ICRC 
immediately reported the event and halted all flights into Biafra; the rest of the aid 
organizations quickly followed suit, temporarily halting the relief and supply flights into 
Biafra. Further, the fact that the downed flight comprised a Swedish crew was seen by 
several commentators as a veiled notice to the Swedish government, as Von Rosen’s 
active help to Biafra was well publicized.
68
  
For the Nigerians, equally important was to counter Biafran propaganda and break 
the will of the Biafran people to continue the war. Ojukwu went to great lengths to ensure 
that the war would continue despite the collapse of the military. To counter the Federal 
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offensive Ojukwu created a new force called the Biafran Organization of Freedom 
Fighters (BOFF). Based on the fighting tactics of the Vietcong, Ojukwu hoped to 




 ven though BO   helped the Biafran war effort, the population’s will to fight 
was evaporating. The most visible sign of the country’s dire straits happened on August 
17
th
, 1969 when former Nigerian President, the Igbo elder statesman Nnamde Azikiwe 
arrived in Lagos and met with Gowon, rather unexpectedly. Reportedly, none in Nigeria 
or Biafra knew of Azikiwe’s move until he arrived. The move was met with shock, both 
in Biafra and Nigeria, and in Biafra the shock turned to rage when on August 28
th
 Zik, as 
he was popularly known, formally announced that he no longer supported Biafran 
secession. Further, the Associated Press reported a press conference he held on the 28
th
, 
saying “he termed Biafran charges that Nigeria seeks to exterminate the Igbos a ‘cock 
and bull fairy tale’, and said that the fighting could end ‘if those who rule Biafra would 
forget about their puny selves’.”
70
 
Azikiwe expanded on his defection by saying 
                                                 
69 Many of the mercenaries that fought in Biafra also fought in the French Foreign 
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Knowing that the accusation of genocide is palpably false, 
but bearing in mind the widespread killing of 1966, which 
must always hunt our memories, why should some people 
continue to fool our people to believe that they are slated 
for slaughter, when we know that they suffer mental 
anguish and physical agony as a result of their being 
homeless and their places of abode having been desolated 




For many in Biafra saw the fact that the Igbo elder statesman, who wrote the 
Biafran national anthem, had so publicly abandoned the cause as a serious blow. Biafran 
propaganda seized on the issue, calling Azikiwe a traitor. The New York Times 
commented on the Biafran reaction to Azikiwe’s change in position citing a mixture of 
outrage, shock and bewilderment.  urther, the paper reported on Biafra’s accusations 
against Azikiwe that he was in cahoots with the British oil industry and “he always ends a 




Zik’s defection was emblematic of the dire straits that the Biafrans found 
themselves militarily and Biafran propaganda tried to offset the increasing desperation 
that Nigeria’s advance was inflicting on the civilian population. Though the Biafrans 
were able to stall the Nigerian final offensive, several signs that the Biafran side was 
close to collapse became increasingly apparent. First and foremost, military morale and 
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with it the very command and control structure that kept the Biafran army intact was 
beginning to collapse. 
One of the major signs of the deterioration of Biafran morale and command was 
the emergence of the “spiritual churches”. According to  fiong and Ben Gbulie, these 
churches came to prominence as a direct result of the collapse in Biafran morale. These 
churches guaranteed the besieged Biafran soldiers and officers that by deferring to the 
church leaders, they would all survive the war. Though this caused a breakdown in the 
command structure and sapped the Biafran soldiers will to fight,  fiong recalled that “in 
the long run, this ‘spiritual’ surrender may have helped to save a lot of lives, since the 
advancing Nigerian troops did not have to fight to capture every inch of the land.”
73
 
The privations that the civilian population endured caused several desperate acts 
on the part of the civilians. In one case near Aba,
74
 residents of a village killed and 
cannibalized several Biafran soldiers. Ojukwu immediately ordered the village razed, 
removed the local chief and installed Ben Gbulie as military governor of the area.
75
 
Naturally, the propaganda directorate attempted the counter the collapsing morale. 
However, by this point both the military situation had deteriorated to the point where any 
attempt to counter it became increasingly futile. Biafrans verbal assaults on Azikiwe, 
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explained in detail in chapter 3, amounted to little more than rage and name calling. 
 urthermore, the propagandists’ attempts to help the war effort largely backfired, because 
there was little hope convincing the population that all was not lost. In one instance, 
detailed in Chapter 3, the appraisals committee rebuked Radio Biafra for attempting to 
foment an uprising in the areas held by the Nigerian army. Though they no doubt wished 
to see such an uprising, the radio broadcasts emphasized the depravity of the enemy and 
the suffering of the Biafrans living under such ruthlessness. However, the appraisals 
committee was well aware that, toward the end of the war, the excesses that Adekunle 
encouraged were not tolerated by Obasanjo. Thus, the Appraisals Committee criticized 
the propaganda writers for undermining their own message without understanding the 
situation in Federal held territories. 
On January 7
th
 1970, Operation “Tailwind” commenced. Two days later, the 
Federal forces recaptured Owerri, the last major urban center still in Biafran hands. On 
the 10
th
, Ojukwu held his final meeting with his cabinet where he revealed his intention 
to flee the country. That night, at 2am, Ojukwu departed From Uli on one of the 
Constellation aircraft donated to the Biafrans by Lyndon Johnson. The scene at Uli was 
chaotic as the airfield was besieged by Biafran officials and their families, all desperate to 
leave. Ekerette Urua Akpan, Ojukwu’s chief secretary, described the scene saying “the 
news of the number of people who had left the previous night […] had gone round, and 
people who could make it had traveled to the airstrip to leave or at least send their 
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families, if they could.”
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, with de St. Jorre stating it was at 
2am on the 11
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. 
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Another flight was set to leave that night carrying several French doctors and 
some sick Biafran children. However, several vehicles arrived carrying the wives of some 
Biafran officials and demanded to be evacuated. The soldiers defending the airfield were 
in near panic and prevented the children and doctors from boarding. In the ensuing chaos, 
the soldiers fired into the mass of people attempting to board the aircraft, and the 
Rhodesian crew left the airfield with an empty plane. 
Before leaving, Ojukwu prepared a lengthy speech that was delivered after his 
departure. Titled “Ojukwu's Call from  xile”, the speech reaffirmed his commitment to 
Biafra, claiming that he was only leaving to secure peace abroad. Much like his attempts 
to secure some kind of foreign presence during the talks at Addis Ababa, and evoking the 
propaganda lines of the holocaust, Ojukwu claimed that “Nigeria's aim is to destroy the 
elite of Biafra.  The only possible way of preventing such a catastrophe is by interposing 
between the contesting forces some neutral force to prevent a genocide that would make 
1939-45  urope a mere child's play.”
79
 
However, he also named Efiong as his successor. Efiong wrote in his memoirs: 
He [Ojukwu] knew we had lost the War and that he was 
“checking out” for good and leaving the rest of us to 
survive if indeed we would at all have such a chance. […] I 




The next morning, Efiong, charged with the unenviable task of deciding to 
surrender, held a staff meeting. Ojukwu had hoped that Efiong could hold out at least two 
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weeks; however, the latter knew that the situation was dire and it was doubtful that he 
would be able to hold out for even two days. In an interview with Drum Magazine, he 
described the meeting thus: 
Military Officers: General, when are you making the 
statement? 
Efiong: Which statement? 
M.O.: Of course, you know what we are talking about.  
Efiong: How do you expect me to know what you have in 
your mind? Tell me.  
M.O.: Are we going to continue like this? We think we 
should stop fighting. 
Efiong: Are you suggesting we surrender?  
M.O.: Will that amount to surrender?  
Efiong: Of course. Yes.  
M.O.  Ah! Well, if that amounts to surrender, let’s stop 
fighting all the same. The people are suffering 
unnecessarily. 
Efiong: Okay, gentlemen. Go and put it in black and white, 







, Efiong went to the well camouflaged headquarters of Radio 
Biafra. On the road to the station, Efiong recalled the sight of the refugees fleeing the 
collapsing front.  
 
The fleeing refugees we saw were a study in human 
tragedy. No one can fully describe the spectacle we saw. 
The people were ragged, footsore, and haggard from 
hunger and starvation. Some women were with babies and 
some of these were hanging on and sucking the dry breasts 
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of their mothers. It was a scene of pathetic suffering and 
agonizing endurance. […] To me, every single one of these 




 At 4:40pm, Efiong gave his speech on Radio Biafra ordering the cessation of 
hostilities saying 
 
I am convinced now that a stop must be put to the 
bloodshed, which is going on as a result of the war. I am 
also convinced that the people are now disillusioned and 
those elements of the old government regime who have 
made negotiations and reconciliation impossible have 






, Efiong flew to Dodan Barracks in Lagos where he signed the official 
surrender notice. The notice was short and simply read 
I, Major-General Phillip Efiong, Officer Administering the 
Government of the Republic of Biafra, now wish to make 
the following declaration: 
 
1. That we affirm that we are loyal Nigerian citizens 
and accept the authority of the Federal Military 
Government of Nigeria. 
2. That we accept the existing administrative and 
political structure of the Federation of Nigeria. 
3. That any future constitutional arrangement will be 
worked out by representatives of the people of 
Nigeria. 
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Biafran propaganda was instrumental in the prosecution of the war, but ultimately 
could do little once the tide turned irrevocably. Further, at no time in the war was Biafra 
in any position to realistically secure its independence. Once Port Harcourt fell to the 
Federal forces, even the most optimistic supporters of Biafra could not but realize that 
there was no future for Biafra as an independent country. 
Biafra’s propaganda campaign had a two pronged method. First, it galvanized the 
public, especially the Igbo to suffer through the deprivations of war, starvation and terror 
with the end result to secure a stable future.  
Internationally, propaganda served to create a global outcry about the 
humanitarian conditions in Biafra. The Biafran government, labeling the war as genocidal 
and evoking the holocaust in Europe as equivalent what the Igbo were suffering, created 
a groundswell of  protests, political interventions and debates all over the western world. 
Domestic pressures on the western governments, especially in the United States, Britain 
and France put pressure on the Nigerian government to agree to negotiate with the 
Biafrans. Though the French openly supported the Biafran cause with aid and arms, in 
other places propaganda could not change government policy, such as in Britain where 
the Wilson government stood steadfastly by Gowon’s government. Yet, even in Britain, 
                                                 




and to a lesser extent in the United States, the Biafran media campaign put intense 
pressure on the government, which in turn pressured the Nigerian government to soften 
their stance enough to allow for a political solution to the war.  
Even more so, the global outcry against what was very effectively marketed as a 
genocidal war against the Igbo prompted many international organizations to fly aid 
supplies and armaments to the besieged republic. Caritas, the Red Cross and the Joint 
Church Aid, a hastily formed coalition of mostly Scandinavian church organizations all 
flew flights in what became the largest non government supported airlift in history, and 
second in size only to the American airlift to Berlin. 
Despite all its successes, propaganda had one catastrophic shortfall. While 
propaganda created pressure on the Nigerians and strengthened the Igbo resolve to fight, 
in the end, all political decisions rested with Ojukwu. Many of Ojukwu’s top 
commanders came out against him, both during the war and after. For some, like Victor 
Banjo, criticizing Ojukwu meant death; while Hilary Njoku was spared only because the 
officers in charge of his execution refused to obey Ojukwu’s orders. Others, like 
Madiebo, Akpan and  fiong wrote scathing criticisms of Ojukwu’s cult of personality, 
both regarding the military conduct of the war and the failure to end it several times when 
the military, political and diplomatic situations would have allowed Ojukwu to end the 
war in a relatively respectable manner. Efiong even likened Ojukwu, mistakenly, to 
Sancho  anza in Miguel de Cervantes’ classic novel Don Quixote. 
85
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Biafran propaganda served as an important strategic weapon in the war and 
helped to soften the Nigerian political and military stance against the Biafrans. During the 
peace talks in 1968, the Nigerians agreed to send high ranking delegations, including the 
head of state, to the meetings despite their initial stated position that renunciation of 
secession was a precondition to any negotiation. Further, the images of starving Biafrans, 
shown around the world, places such intense pressure on Gowon (who himself was 
personally distressed by the suffering of the innocents) that the Nigerian government 
even agreed to separate the discussion of immediate relief from the talks on a permanent 
settlement. 
Biafran propaganda ultimately could not bring about an end to the war, but to say, 
as Momoh stated, that “propaganda cannot win wars”,
86
 is an oversimplification of the 
use of propaganda. Momoh equated propaganda to military intelligence, claiming that 
though both are important in waging the conflict; neither alone can win the war. Biafran 
propaganda was instrumental in one important way: it created a climate where the 
Nigerian demands were eased to the point where a political solution to the conflict was 
both tenable and preferable to the continuation of the war. Thus, Biafran propaganda 
acted more as a support mechanism to the political and diplomatic warfare, and can be 
more likened to artillery support of the front line it that it softened the enemy’s position, 
if not literally, then at least from a diplomatic point of view. 
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Thus, it was not the propaganda that failed, but rather the political climate that it 
created was not utilized properly to gain concessions. Despite his conciliatory speech to 
the OAU consultative committee in Niamey, Ojukwu became emboldened by much of 
the political wrangling in Addis Ababa, especially the debate over relief supplies. Rather 
than shift his efforts to ending the conflict, Ojukwu instead sought to provide for foreign 
“boots on the ground” in a way that would internationalize the conflict, and create a 
buffer between the Nigerian 1
st
 Division and his own armies, rather than end the war and 
negotiate a settlement to return to the Nigerian fold. 
Equally important, French military assistance, the European mercenaries and the 
unprecedented airlift served to further embolden the Biafran military. The military 
successes that came with Adekunle’s catastrophic assault on Umuahia and ensuing 
counterattacks gave the Biafrans the military clout that would have allowed a more 
favorable end to the war. However, these successes only encouraged Ojukwu to continue 
rather than sue for a peace that would secure the Igbo’s future in Nigeria. By May 1969, 
the Biafran counteroffensive stalled and Obasanjo, the new commander of the 3
rd
 
Division, managed to reorganize the division, break the back of Biafran resistance and, 
along with Shuwa and the 1
st
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